Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S932255AbWC3SB5 (ORCPT ); Thu, 30 Mar 2006 13:01:57 -0500 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1751349AbWC3SB4 (ORCPT ); Thu, 30 Mar 2006 13:01:56 -0500 Received: from ebiederm.dsl.xmission.com ([166.70.28.69]:53430 "EHLO ebiederm.dsl.xmission.com") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751347AbWC3SB4 (ORCPT ); Thu, 30 Mar 2006 13:01:56 -0500 To: "Serge E. Hallyn" Cc: Chris Wright , David Lang , Sam Vilain , Nick Piggin , Bill Davidsen , Linux Kernel ML Subject: Re: [RFC] Virtualization steps References: <442A26E9.20608@vilain.net> <20060329182027.GB14724@sorel.sous-sol.org> <442B0BFE.9080709@vilain.net> <20060329225241.GO15997@sorel.sous-sol.org> <20060330013618.GS15997@sorel.sous-sol.org> <20060330020445.GT15997@sorel.sous-sol.org> <20060330143224.GC6933@sergelap.austin.ibm.com> <20060330153012.GA16720@MAIL.13thfloor.at> From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) Date: Thu, 30 Mar 2006 11:00:19 -0700 In-Reply-To: <20060330153012.GA16720@MAIL.13thfloor.at> (Herbert Poetzl's message of "Thu, 30 Mar 2006 17:30:12 +0200") Message-ID: User-Agent: Gnus/5.1007 (Gnus v5.10.7) Emacs/21.4 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1036 Lines: 25 Herbert Poetzl writes: > sorry folks, I don't think that we _ever_ want container > root to be able to load any kernel modues at any time > without having CAP_SYS_ADMIN or so, in which case the > modules can be global as well ... otherwise we end up > as a bad Xen imitation with a lot of security issues, > where it should be a security enhancement ... Agreed. At least until someone defines a user-mode linux-security-module. We may want a different security module in effect for a particular guest. Which modules you get being defined by the one system administrator is fine. The primary case I see worth worry about is using a security module to ensure isolation of a container, while still providing the selinux mandatory capabilities to a container. Eric - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/