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Date:   Fri, 3 Jul 2020 05:55:48 +0300
From:   Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
To:     Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc:     x86@kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v33 12/21] x86/sgx: Allow a limited use of
 ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY for attestation
Message-ID: <20200703025548.GD306897@linux.intel.com>
References: <20200617220844.57423-1-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
 <20200617220844.57423-13-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
 <20200629160242.GB32176@zn.tnic>
 <20200703023146.GA306897@linux.intel.com>
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On Fri, Jul 03, 2020 at 05:32:28AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 29, 2020 at 06:02:42PM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> > On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:34AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > Provisioning Certification Enclave (PCE), the root of trust for other
> > > enclaves, generates a signing key from a fused key called Provisioning
> > > Certification Key. PCE can then use this key to certify an attestation key
> > > of a QE, e.g. we get the chain of trust down to the hardware if the Intel
> > 
> > What's a QE?
> > 
> > I don't see this acronym resolved anywhere in the whole patchset.
> 
> Quoting Enclave.

Thanks for spotting this. I updated my GIT-tree accordingly.

/Jarkko