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[23.128.96.18]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id n4si11158517ejg.426.2020.07.06.20.44.58; Mon, 06 Jul 2020 20:45:22 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.18; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=intel.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728275AbgGGDmC (ORCPT + 99 others); Mon, 6 Jul 2020 23:42:02 -0400 Received: from mga18.intel.com ([134.134.136.126]:20040 "EHLO mga18.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727092AbgGGDmB (ORCPT ); Mon, 6 Jul 2020 23:42:01 -0400 IronPort-SDR: ckpXfEmP9miHgkGQVySpNvGfaF29gstnd+mniSp5UFATaHWpaQQ9mTrWi+j9pCHwjtW1O5+v0p uFclG+Wxq/xw== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9674"; a="134999810" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.75,321,1589266800"; d="scan'208";a="134999810" X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga004.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.38]) by orsmga106.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 06 Jul 2020 20:42:01 -0700 IronPort-SDR: W9EYdyyTGQP7vLYm7mR/2xma0viHSyy6+0yMLFnlnylMz1y5ocZpTF3RZPZeuL8e8Nhxb/2Lmg CE7RXFtjBUKA== X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.75,321,1589266800"; d="scan'208";a="427314861" Received: from apiccion-mobl1.ger.corp.intel.com (HELO localhost) ([10.249.45.178]) by orsmga004.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 06 Jul 2020 20:41:51 -0700 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: x86@kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Sean Christopherson , Jethro Beekman , Jarkko Sakkinen , akpm@linux-foundation.org, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com, asapek@google.com, bp@alien8.de, cedric.xing@intel.com, chenalexchen@google.com, conradparker@google.com, cyhanish@google.com, dave.hansen@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, josh@joshtriplett.org, kai.huang@intel.com, kai.svahn@intel.com, kmoy@google.com, ludloff@google.com, luto@kernel.org, nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com, puiterwijk@redhat.com, rientjes@google.com, tglx@linutronix.de, yaozhangx@google.com Subject: [PATCH v35 19/24] x86/fault: Add helper function to sanitize error code Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2020 06:37:42 +0300 Message-Id: <20200707033747.142828-20-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20200707033747.142828-1-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> References: <20200707033747.142828-1-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Sean Christopherson Add helper function to sanitize error code to prepare for vDSO exception fixup, which will expose the error code to userspace and runs before set_signal_archinfo(), i.e. suppresses the signal when fixup is successful. Acked-by: Jethro Beekman Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c index 1db6fbd7af8e..8ba78384ea73 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c @@ -556,6 +556,18 @@ pgtable_bad(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, oops_end(flags, regs, sig); } +static void sanitize_error_code(unsigned long address, + unsigned long *error_code) +{ + /* + * To avoid leaking information about the kernel page + * table layout, pretend that user-mode accesses to + * kernel addresses are always protection faults. + */ + if (address >= TASK_SIZE_MAX) + *error_code |= X86_PF_PROT; +} + static void set_signal_archinfo(unsigned long address, unsigned long error_code) { @@ -612,6 +624,8 @@ no_context(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, * faulting through the emulate_vsyscall() logic. */ if (current->thread.sig_on_uaccess_err && signal) { + sanitize_error_code(address, &error_code); + set_signal_archinfo(address, error_code); /* XXX: hwpoison faults will set the wrong code. */ @@ -760,13 +774,7 @@ __bad_area_nosemaphore(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, if (is_errata100(regs, address)) return; - /* - * To avoid leaking information about the kernel page table - * layout, pretend that user-mode accesses to kernel addresses - * are always protection faults. - */ - if (address >= TASK_SIZE_MAX) - error_code |= X86_PF_PROT; + sanitize_error_code(address, &error_code); if (likely(show_unhandled_signals)) show_signal_msg(regs, error_code, address, tsk); @@ -885,6 +893,8 @@ do_sigbus(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address, if (is_prefetch(regs, error_code, address)) return; + sanitize_error_code(address, &error_code); + set_signal_archinfo(address, error_code); #ifdef CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE -- 2.25.1