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[23.128.96.18]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id r20si3946184edy.598.2020.07.10.07.20.19; Fri, 10 Jul 2020 07:20:42 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.18; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@redhat.com header.s=mimecast20190719 header.b=Vlpha8W+; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=redhat.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728043AbgGJOUF (ORCPT + 99 others); Fri, 10 Jul 2020 10:20:05 -0400 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-1.mimecast.com ([205.139.110.120]:48412 "EHLO us-smtp-1.mimecast.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727110AbgGJOUC (ORCPT ); Fri, 10 Jul 2020 10:20:02 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1594390801; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding; bh=S/hfdY2jn078JPQClgP6PouoRBDjiWkYV+fASuPUqJA=; b=Vlpha8W+gfVSUDC8sJdYzNMYLSJbDGwtrnPJ1dIvei+SFgUNTxb/9rQJ7/2dDegtVprlf6 Cn9TVwZF+8TgvegnCilmVTSlqK9NxdGE/1QUt2EDDlSLbGeZRHvzpEeMvRAX+Xgib02tdR XO8q0aTjWi+KGitg8Bt04X1daD5hBjA= Received: from mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (mimecast-mx01.redhat.com [209.132.183.4]) (Using TLS) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP id us-mta-12-Ur_35eYIO8ykayRn1yNGQw-1; Fri, 10 Jul 2020 10:19:57 -0400 X-MC-Unique: Ur_35eYIO8ykayRn1yNGQw-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx06.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.16]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 128B11B18BC0; Fri, 10 Jul 2020 14:19:55 +0000 (UTC) Received: from steredhat.redhat.com (ovpn-112-4.ams2.redhat.com [10.36.112.4]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id DF67B5C1D6; Fri, 10 Jul 2020 14:19:46 +0000 (UTC) From: Stefano Garzarella To: Jens Axboe Cc: Sargun Dhillon , Kees Cook , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Kernel Hardening , Jann Horn , Aleksa Sarai , Christian Brauner , Stefan Hajnoczi , io-uring@vger.kernel.org, Alexander Viro , Jeff Moyer Subject: [PATCH RFC 0/3] io_uring: add restrictions to support untrusted applications and guests Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2020 16:19:42 +0200 Message-Id: <20200710141945.129329-1-sgarzare@redhat.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.16 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Following the proposal that I send about restrictions [1], I wrote a PoC with the main changes. It is still WiP so I left some TODO in the code. I also wrote helpers in liburing and a test case (test/register-restrictions.c) available in this repository: https://github.com/stefano-garzarella/liburing (branch: io_uring_restrictions) Just to recap the proposal, the idea is to add some restrictions to the operations (sqe, register, fixed file) to safely allow untrusted applications or guests to use io_uring queues. The first patch changes io_uring_register(2) opcodes into an enumeration to keep track of the last opcode available. The second patch adds IOURING_REGISTER_RESTRICTIONS opcode and the code to handle restrictions. The third patch adds IORING_SETUP_R_DISABLED flag to start the rings disabled, allowing the user to register restrictions, buffers, files, before to start processing SQEs. I'm not sure if this could help seccomp. An alternative pointed out by Jann Horn could be to register restrictions during io_uring_setup(2), but this requires some intrusive changes (there is no space in the struct io_uring_params to pass a pointer to restriction arrays, maybe we can add a flag and add the pointer at the end of the struct io_uring_params). Another limitation now is that I need to enable every time IORING_REGISTER_ENABLE_RINGS in the restrictions to be able to start the rings, I'm not sure if we should treat it as an exception. Maybe registering restrictions during io_uring_setup(2) could solve both issues (seccomp integration and IORING_REGISTER_ENABLE_RINGS registration), but I need some suggestions to properly extend the io_uring_setup(2). Comments and suggestions are very welcome. Thank you in advance, Stefano [1] https://lore.kernel.org/io-uring/20200609142406.upuwpfmgqjeji4lc@steredhat/ Stefano Garzarella (3): io_uring: use an enumeration for io_uring_register(2) opcodes io_uring: add IOURING_REGISTER_RESTRICTIONS opcode io_uring: allow disabling rings during the creation fs/io_uring.c | 155 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- include/uapi/linux/io_uring.h | 59 ++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 194 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) -- 2.26.2