Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S965212AbWECPAb (ORCPT ); Wed, 3 May 2006 11:00:31 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S965213AbWECPAa (ORCPT ); Wed, 3 May 2006 11:00:30 -0400 Received: from nz-out-0102.google.com ([64.233.162.202]:11818 "EHLO nz-out-0102.google.com") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S965212AbWECPAa convert rfc822-to-8bit (ORCPT ); Wed, 3 May 2006 11:00:30 -0400 DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; q=dns; c=nofws; s=beta; d=gmail.com; h=received:message-id:date:from:to:subject:cc:in-reply-to:mime-version:content-type:content-transfer-encoding:content-disposition:references; b=kEbFbSfG4ktVLbhcAyxITcQ8afjtEpDLTSm3DujoOOP2wKrgoiSWsZ0W5IEn+/3MRsSKGqAA1fLY6LHOGVm50PhnC4jegU4AOVtqhaqMWsKhqFtOCsX32pWWE/zWnqjHGDWE203EieLFJq27uZIjgacct6LV5HmKd9F9oe9/A/4= Message-ID: <9e4733910605030800i4f7e7444qe63b5daee2f1773b@mail.gmail.com> Date: Wed, 3 May 2006 11:00:29 -0400 From: "Jon Smirl" To: "Stephen Smalley" Subject: Re: [PATCH 11/14] Reworked patch for labels on user space messages Cc: "Al Viro" , "Ingo Molnar" , "Steve Grubb" , "Andrew Morton" , "James Morris" , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Linus Torvalds" In-Reply-To: <1146667956.27735.73.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Content-Disposition: inline References: <9e4733910605030711p2acab747g8f2ea7fdbb95f3c4@mail.gmail.com> <20060503142802.GD27946@ftp.linux.org.uk> <1146667956.27735.73.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 3354 Lines: 89 I can boot again with this patch... On 5/3/06, Stephen Smalley wrote: > On Wed, 2006-05-03 at 15:28 +0100, Al Viro wrote: > > On Wed, May 03, 2006 at 10:11:52AM -0400, Jon Smirl wrote: > > > Something seems to be wrong in selinux_get_task_sid. I am getting > > > thousands of these and can't boot the kernel. > > > > It's actually in security/selinux/hooks.c::selinux_disable() and gets > > triggered if you have selinux enabled and explicitly disable afterwards. > > Stephen Smalley had done a fix yesterday, basically adding > > selinux_enabled = 0; > > after > > selinux_disabled = 1; > > in there. selinux_get_task_sid() happens to step on that in visible way > > and nobody had caught that while this stuff was sitting in -mm ;-/ > > > > The only question I have about that patch: what would happen if we do not > > have CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM? In that case selinux_enabled is > > defined to 1, so... > > Good point. Ok, take two. > > [patch 1/1] selinux: Clear selinux_enabled flag upon runtime disable. > > Clear selinux_enabled flag upon runtime disable of SELinux by userspace, > and make sure it is defined even if selinux= boot parameter support is > not enabled in configuration. > > Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley > > --- > > security/selinux/hooks.c | 3 +++ > security/selinux/include/security.h | 5 ----- > 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) > > diff -X /home/sds/dontdiff -rup linux-2.6.17-rc3-mm1/security/selinux/hooks.c linux-2.6.17-rc3-mm1-x2/security/selinux/hooks.c > --- linux-2.6.17-rc3-mm1/security/selinux/hooks.c 2006-05-02 09:08:02.000000000 -0400 > +++ linux-2.6.17-rc3-mm1-x2/security/selinux/hooks.c 2006-05-03 10:26:43.000000000 -0400 > @@ -101,6 +101,8 @@ static int __init selinux_enabled_setup( > return 1; > } > __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup); > +#else > +int selinux_enabled = 1; > #endif > > /* Original (dummy) security module. */ > @@ -4535,6 +4537,7 @@ int selinux_disable(void) > printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n"); > > selinux_disabled = 1; > + selinux_enabled = 0; > > /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */ > security_ops = secondary_ops; > diff -X /home/sds/dontdiff -rup linux-2.6.17-rc3-mm1/security/selinux/include/security.h linux-2.6.17-rc3-mm1-x2/security/selinux/include/security.h > --- linux-2.6.17-rc3-mm1/security/selinux/include/security.h 2006-03-20 00:53:29.000000000 -0500 > +++ linux-2.6.17-rc3-mm1-x2/security/selinux/include/security.h 2006-05-03 10:25:39.000000000 -0400 > @@ -29,12 +29,7 @@ > #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE > #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB > > -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM > extern int selinux_enabled; > -#else > -#define selinux_enabled 1 > -#endif > - > extern int selinux_mls_enabled; > > int security_load_policy(void * data, size_t len); > > > -- > Stephen Smalley > National Security Agency > > -- Jon Smirl jonsmirl@gmail.com - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/