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[23.128.96.18]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id mm15si10716266ejb.561.2020.07.14.12.56.38; Tue, 14 Jul 2020 12:57:01 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.18; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=intel.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729404AbgGNTye (ORCPT + 99 others); Tue, 14 Jul 2020 15:54:34 -0400 Received: from mga05.intel.com ([192.55.52.43]:14481 "EHLO mga05.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726634AbgGNTye (ORCPT ); Tue, 14 Jul 2020 15:54:34 -0400 IronPort-SDR: wsoxCM2zgg6v4TOMoOHx2Z1CHnK4ItRToVe65DXkrrLalS88t+EE6f3iRHMkMVpwqnJfRpWyx3 G6wPcGDumzig== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9682"; a="233873753" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.75,352,1589266800"; d="scan'208";a="233873753" X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga005.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.41]) by fmsmga105.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 14 Jul 2020 12:54:31 -0700 IronPort-SDR: PPq2wjG/VuBkxZQWD4RyuTVWXWXFLvv+HMF7lBFHDu2duafo7wT1B5gkBD2jnZ2+WOrFz8kTkL JFvUQHUOTZ5w== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.75,352,1589266800"; d="scan'208";a="459811937" Received: from calinapo-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO [10.255.6.204]) ([10.255.6.204]) by orsmga005-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 14 Jul 2020 12:54:27 -0700 Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/bugs/multihit: Fix mitigation reporting when KVM is not in use To: Pawan Gupta Cc: Sean Christopherson , Borislav Petkov , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Paolo Bonzini , Vitaly Kuznetsov , Wanpeng Li , Jim Mattson , Joerg Roedel , Tony Luck , "Gomez Iglesias, Antonio" , Andy Lutomirski , Peter Zijlstra , Fenghua Yu , Dave Hansen , Vincenzo Frascino , Josh Poimboeuf , Anthony Steinhauser , Mike Rapoport , Mark Gross , Waiman Long , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, Jonathan Corbet References: <267631f4db4fd7e9f7ca789c2efaeab44103f68e.1594689154.git.pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> <20200714014540.GH29725@linux.intel.com> <099d6985-9e9f-1d9f-7098-58a9e26e4450@intel.com> <20200714191759.GA7116@guptapadev.amr> From: Dave Hansen Autocrypt: addr=dave.hansen@intel.com; keydata= xsFNBE6HMP0BEADIMA3XYkQfF3dwHlj58Yjsc4E5y5G67cfbt8dvaUq2fx1lR0K9h1bOI6fC oAiUXvGAOxPDsB/P6UEOISPpLl5IuYsSwAeZGkdQ5g6m1xq7AlDJQZddhr/1DC/nMVa/2BoY 2UnKuZuSBu7lgOE193+7Uks3416N2hTkyKUSNkduyoZ9F5twiBhxPJwPtn/wnch6n5RsoXsb ygOEDxLEsSk/7eyFycjE+btUtAWZtx+HseyaGfqkZK0Z9bT1lsaHecmB203xShwCPT49Blxz VOab8668QpaEOdLGhtvrVYVK7x4skyT3nGWcgDCl5/Vp3TWA4K+IofwvXzX2ON/Mj7aQwf5W iC+3nWC7q0uxKwwsddJ0Nu+dpA/UORQWa1NiAftEoSpk5+nUUi0WE+5DRm0H+TXKBWMGNCFn c6+EKg5zQaa8KqymHcOrSXNPmzJuXvDQ8uj2J8XuzCZfK4uy1+YdIr0yyEMI7mdh4KX50LO1 pmowEqDh7dLShTOif/7UtQYrzYq9cPnjU2ZW4qd5Qz2joSGTG9eCXLz5PRe5SqHxv6ljk8mb ApNuY7bOXO/A7T2j5RwXIlcmssqIjBcxsRRoIbpCwWWGjkYjzYCjgsNFL6rt4OL11OUF37wL QcTl7fbCGv53KfKPdYD5hcbguLKi/aCccJK18ZwNjFhqr4MliQARAQABzShEYXZpZCBDaHJp c3RvcGhlciBIYW5zZW4gPGRhdmVAc3I3MS5uZXQ+wsF7BBMBAgAlAhsDBgsJCAcDAgYVCAIJ CgsEFgIDAQIeAQIXgAUCTo3k0QIZAQAKCRBoNZUwcMmSsMO2D/421Xg8pimb9mPzM5N7khT0 2MCnaGssU1T59YPE25kYdx2HntwdO0JA27Wn9xx5zYijOe6B21ufrvsyv42auCO85+oFJWfE K2R/IpLle09GDx5tcEmMAHX6KSxpHmGuJmUPibHVbfep2aCh9lKaDqQR07gXXWK5/yU1Dx0r VVFRaHTasp9fZ9AmY4K9/BSA3VkQ8v3OrxNty3OdsrmTTzO91YszpdbjjEFZK53zXy6tUD2d e1i0kBBS6NLAAsqEtneplz88T/v7MpLmpY30N9gQU3QyRC50jJ7LU9RazMjUQY1WohVsR56d ORqFxS8ChhyJs7BI34vQusYHDTp6PnZHUppb9WIzjeWlC7Jc8lSBDlEWodmqQQgp5+6AfhTD kDv1a+W5+ncq+Uo63WHRiCPuyt4di4/0zo28RVcjtzlGBZtmz2EIC3vUfmoZbO/Gn6EKbYAn rzz3iU/JWV8DwQ+sZSGu0HmvYMt6t5SmqWQo/hyHtA7uF5Wxtu1lCgolSQw4t49ZuOyOnQi5 f8R3nE7lpVCSF1TT+h8kMvFPv3VG7KunyjHr3sEptYxQs4VRxqeirSuyBv1TyxT+LdTm6j4a mulOWf+YtFRAgIYyyN5YOepDEBv4LUM8Tz98lZiNMlFyRMNrsLV6Pv6SxhrMxbT6TNVS5D+6 UorTLotDZKp5+M7BTQRUY85qARAAsgMW71BIXRgxjYNCYQ3Xs8k3TfAvQRbHccky50h99TUY sqdULbsb3KhmY29raw1bgmyM0a4DGS1YKN7qazCDsdQlxIJp9t2YYdBKXVRzPCCsfWe1dK/q 66UVhRPP8EGZ4CmFYuPTxqGY+dGRInxCeap/xzbKdvmPm01Iw3YFjAE4PQ4hTMr/H76KoDbD cq62U50oKC83ca/PRRh2QqEqACvIH4BR7jueAZSPEDnzwxvVgzyeuhwqHY05QRK/wsKuhq7s UuYtmN92Fasbxbw2tbVLZfoidklikvZAmotg0dwcFTjSRGEg0Gr3p/xBzJWNavFZZ95Rj7Et db0lCt0HDSY5q4GMR+SrFbH+jzUY/ZqfGdZCBqo0cdPPp58krVgtIGR+ja2Mkva6ah94/oQN lnCOw3udS+Eb/aRcM6detZr7XOngvxsWolBrhwTQFT9D2NH6ryAuvKd6yyAFt3/e7r+HHtkU kOy27D7IpjngqP+b4EumELI/NxPgIqT69PQmo9IZaI/oRaKorYnDaZrMXViqDrFdD37XELwQ gmLoSm2VfbOYY7fap/AhPOgOYOSqg3/Nxcapv71yoBzRRxOc4FxmZ65mn+q3rEM27yRztBW9 AnCKIc66T2i92HqXCw6AgoBJRjBkI3QnEkPgohQkZdAb8o9WGVKpfmZKbYBo4pEAEQEAAcLB XwQYAQIACQUCVGPOagIbDAAKCRBoNZUwcMmSsJeCEACCh7P/aaOLKWQxcnw47p4phIVR6pVL e4IEdR7Jf7ZL00s3vKSNT+nRqdl1ugJx9Ymsp8kXKMk9GSfmZpuMQB9c6io1qZc6nW/3TtvK pNGz7KPPtaDzvKA4S5tfrWPnDr7n15AU5vsIZvgMjU42gkbemkjJwP0B1RkifIK60yQqAAlT YZ14P0dIPdIPIlfEPiAWcg5BtLQU4Wg3cNQdpWrCJ1E3m/RIlXy/2Y3YOVVohfSy+4kvvYU3 lXUdPb04UPw4VWwjcVZPg7cgR7Izion61bGHqVqURgSALt2yvHl7cr68NYoFkzbNsGsye9ft M9ozM23JSgMkRylPSXTeh5JIK9pz2+etco3AfLCKtaRVysjvpysukmWMTrx8QnI5Nn5MOlJj 1Ov4/50JY9pXzgIDVSrgy6LYSMc4vKZ3QfCY7ipLRORyalFDF3j5AGCMRENJjHPD6O7bl3Xo 4DzMID+8eucbXxKiNEbs21IqBZbbKdY1GkcEGTE7AnkA3Y6YB7I/j9mQ3hCgm5muJuhM/2Fr OPsw5tV/LmQ5GXH0JQ/TZXWygyRFyyI2FqNTx4WHqUn3yFj8rwTAU1tluRUYyeLy0ayUlKBH ybj0N71vWO936MqP6haFERzuPAIpxj2ezwu0xb1GjTk4ynna6h5GjnKgdfOWoRtoWndMZxbA z5cecg== Message-ID: Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2020 12:54:26 -0700 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/68.8.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20200714191759.GA7116@guptapadev.amr> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 7/14/20 12:17 PM, Pawan Gupta wrote: > On Tue, Jul 14, 2020 at 07:57:53AM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote: >> Let's stick to things which are at least static per reboot. Checking >> for X86_FEATURE_VMX or even CONFIG_KVM_INTEL seems like a good stopping >> point. "Could this kernel run a naughty guest?" If so, report >> "Vulnerable". It's the same as Meltdown: "Could this kernel run >> untrusted code?" If so, report "Vulnerable". > > Thanks, These are good inputs. So what I need to add is a boot time > check for VMX feature and report "Vulnerable" or "Not > affected(VMX disabled)". > > Are you suggesting to not change the reporting when KVM deploys the > "Split huge pages" mitigation? Is this because VMX can still be used by > other VMMs? > > The current mitigation reporting is very specific to KVM: > > - "KVM: Vulnerable" > - "KVM: Mitigation: Split huge pages" > > As the kernel doesn't know about the mitigation state of out-of-tree > VMMs can we add VMX reporting to always say vulnerable when VMX is > enabled: > > - "VMX: Vulnerable, KVM: Vulnerable" > - "VMX: Vulnerable, KVM: Mitigation: Split huge pages" > > And if VMX is disabled report: > > - "VMX: Not affected(VMX disabled)" I see three inputs and four possible states (sorry for the ugly table, it was this or a spreadsheet :): X86_FEATURE_VMX CONFIG_KVM_* hpage split Result Reason N x x Not Affected No VMX Y N x Not affected No KVM Y Y Y Mitigated hpage split Y Y N Vulnerable I don't think we should worry about out-of-tree VMX.