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Subject: Re: [PATCH] ima: Rename internal audit rule functions
From:   Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To:     Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc:     Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
        James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
        "Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
        Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
        linux-audit@redhat.com
Date:   Thu, 16 Jul 2020 10:23:01 -0400
In-Reply-To: <20200710194234.GA7254@sequoia>
References: <20200629153037.337349-1-tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
         <1593466203.5085.62.camel@linux.ibm.com> <20200710194234.GA7254@sequoia>
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On Fri, 2020-07-10 at 14:42 -0500, Tyler Hicks wrote:
> On 2020-06-29 17:30:03, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > [Cc'ing the audit mailing list]
> > 
> > On Mon, 2020-06-29 at 10:30 -0500, Tyler Hicks wrote:
> > > 
> > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> > > index ff2bf57ff0c7..5d62ee8319f4 100644
> > > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> > > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> > > @@ -419,24 +419,24 @@ static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig)
> > >  /* LSM based policy rules require audit */
> > >  #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
> > >  
> > > -#define security_filter_rule_init security_audit_rule_init
> > > -#define security_filter_rule_free security_audit_rule_free
> > > -#define security_filter_rule_match security_audit_rule_match
> > > +#define ima_audit_rule_init security_audit_rule_init
> > > +#define ima_audit_rule_free security_audit_rule_free
> > > +#define ima_audit_rule_match security_audit_rule_match
> > 
> > Instead of defining an entirely new method of identifying files, IMA
> > piggybacks on top of the existing audit rule syntax.  IMA policy rules
> > "filter" based on this information.
> > 
> > IMA already audits security/integrity related events.  Using the word
> > "audit" here will make things even more confusing than they currently
> > are.  Renaming these functions as ima_audit_rule_XXX provides no
> > benefit.  At that point, IMA might as well call the
> > security_audit_rule prefixed function names directly.  As a quick fix,
> > rename them as "ima_filter_rule".
> > 
> > The correct solution would probably be to rename these prefixed
> > "security_audit_rule" functions as "security_filter_rule", so that
> > both the audit subsystem and IMA could use them.
> 
> There doesn't seem to be any interest, from the audit side, in re-using
> these. I don't quite understand why they would want to use them since
> they're just simple wrappers around the security_audit_rule_*()
> functions.

The security_filter_rule_* wasn't meant to be in addition, but as a
replacement for security_audit_rule_*
> 
> I'll go the "quick fix" route of renaming them as ima_filter_rule_*().

That's fine.

Mimi