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Date:   Sun, 26 Jul 2020 06:09:30 -0400
From:   "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
To:     Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra@google.com>
Cc:     Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
        Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
        Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
        Iurii Zaikin <yzaikin@google.com>,
        Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
        Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com>,
        Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
        Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>,
        Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>,
        Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>,
        Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
        Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
        Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>, Shaohua Li <shli@fb.com>,
        linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
        Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com>,
        Minchan Kim <minchan@google.com>,
        Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>,
        Daniel Colascione <dancol@dancol.org>,
        Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>,
        Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>, kernel@android.com,
        Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] Add UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY
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On Fri, Jul 24, 2020 at 07:46:02AM -0700, Lokesh Gidra wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 24, 2020 at 7:28 AM Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Wed, Apr 22, 2020 at 05:26:31PM -0700, Daniel Colascione wrote:
> > > userfaultfd handles page faults from both user and kernel code.  Add a
> > > new UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY flag for userfaultfd(2) that makes the
> > > resulting userfaultfd object refuse to handle faults from kernel mode,
> > > treating these faults as if SIGBUS were always raised, causing the
> > > kernel code to fail with EFAULT.
> > >
> > > A future patch adds a knob allowing administrators to give some
> > > processes the ability to create userfaultfd file objects only if they
> > > pass UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY, reducing the likelihood that these processes
> > > will exploit userfaultfd's ability to delay kernel page faults to open
> > > timing windows for future exploits.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>
> >
> > Something to add here is that there is separate work on selinux to
> > support limiting specific userspace programs to only this type of
> > userfaultfd.
> >
> > I also think Kees' comment about documenting what is the threat being solved
> > including some links to external sources still applies.
> >
> > Finally, a question:
> >
> > Is there any way at all to increase security without breaking
> > the assumption that copy_from_user is the same as userspace read?
> >
> >
> > As an example of a drastical approach that might solve some issues, how
> > about allocating some special memory and setting some VMA flag, then
> > limiting copy from/to user to just this subset of virtual addresses?
> > We can then do things like pin these pages in RAM, forbid
> > madvise/userfaultfd for these addresses, etc.
> >
> > Affected userspace then needs to use a kind of a bounce buffer for any
> > calls into kernel.  This needs much more support from userspace and adds
> > much more overhead, but on the flip side, affects more ways userspace
> > can slow down the kernel.
> >
> > Was this discussed in the past? Links would be appreciated.
> >
> Adding Nick and Jeff to the discussion.

I guess a valid alternative is to block major faults in copy
to/from user for a given process/group of syscalls. Userspace can mlock
an area it uses for these system calls.

For example, allow BPF/security linux policy block all major faults
until the next syscall.  Yes that would then include userfaultfd.


> >
> > > ---
> > >  fs/userfaultfd.c                 | 7 ++++++-
> > >  include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h | 9 +++++++++
> > >  2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/fs/userfaultfd.c b/fs/userfaultfd.c
> > > index e39fdec8a0b0..21378abe8f7b 100644
> > > --- a/fs/userfaultfd.c
> > > +++ b/fs/userfaultfd.c
> > > @@ -418,6 +418,9 @@ vm_fault_t handle_userfault(struct vm_fault *vmf, unsigned long reason)
> > >
> > >       if (ctx->features & UFFD_FEATURE_SIGBUS)
> > >               goto out;
> > > +     if ((vmf->flags & FAULT_FLAG_USER) == 0 &&
> > > +         ctx->flags & UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY)
> > > +             goto out;
> > >
> > >       /*
> > >        * If it's already released don't get it. This avoids to loop
> > > @@ -2003,6 +2006,7 @@ static void init_once_userfaultfd_ctx(void *mem)
> > >
> > >  SYSCALL_DEFINE1(userfaultfd, int, flags)
> > >  {
> > > +     static const int uffd_flags = UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY;
> > >       struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx;
> > >       int fd;
> > >
> > > @@ -2012,10 +2016,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(userfaultfd, int, flags)
> > >       BUG_ON(!current->mm);
> > >
> > >       /* Check the UFFD_* constants for consistency.  */
> > > +     BUILD_BUG_ON(uffd_flags & UFFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS);
> > >       BUILD_BUG_ON(UFFD_CLOEXEC != O_CLOEXEC);
> > >       BUILD_BUG_ON(UFFD_NONBLOCK != O_NONBLOCK);
> > >
> > > -     if (flags & ~UFFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS)
> > > +     if (flags & ~(UFFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS | uffd_flags))
> > >               return -EINVAL;
> > >
> > >       ctx = kmem_cache_alloc(userfaultfd_ctx_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
> > > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h b/include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h
> > > index e7e98bde221f..5f2d88212f7c 100644
> > > --- a/include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h
> > > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h
> > > @@ -257,4 +257,13 @@ struct uffdio_writeprotect {
> > >       __u64 mode;
> > >  };
> > >
> > > +/*
> > > + * Flags for the userfaultfd(2) system call itself.
> > > + */
> > > +
> > > +/*
> > > + * Create a userfaultfd that can handle page faults only in user mode.
> > > + */
> > > +#define UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY 1
> > > +
> > >  #endif /* _LINUX_USERFAULTFD_H */
> > > --
> > > 2.26.2.303.gf8c07b1a785-goog
> > >
> >