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From:   Claire Chang <tientzu@chromium.org>
To:     robh+dt@kernel.org, frowand.list@gmail.com, hch@lst.de,
        m.szyprowski@samsung.com, robin.murphy@arm.com
Cc:     treding@nvidia.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
        saravanak@google.com, suzuki.poulose@arm.com,
        dan.j.williams@intel.com, heikki.krogerus@linux.intel.com,
        bgolaszewski@baylibre.com, devicetree@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
        drinkcat@chromium.org, tfiga@chromium.org, tientzu@chromium.org
Subject: [RFC v2 0/5] Restricted DMA
Date:   Tue, 28 Jul 2020 13:01:35 +0800
Message-Id: <20200728050140.996974-1-tientzu@chromium.org>
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This series implements mitigations for lack of DMA access control on
systems without an IOMMU, which could result in the DMA accessing the
system memory at unexpected times and/or unexpected addresses, possibly
leading to data leakage or corruption.

For example, we plan to use the PCI-e bus for Wi-Fi on one MTK platform and
that PCI-e bus is not behind an IOMMU. As PCI-e, by design, gives the
device full access to system memory, a vulnerability in the Wi-Fi firmware
could easily escalate to a full system exploit (remote wifi exploits: [1a],
[1b] that shows a full chain of exploits; [2], [3]).

To mitigate the security concerns, we introduce restricted DMA. The
restricted DMA is implemented by per-device swiotlb and coherent memory
pools. The feature on its own provides a basic level of protection against
the DMA overwriting buffer contents at unexpected times. However, to
protect against general data leakage and system memory corruption, the
system needs to provide a way to restrict the DMA to a predefined memory
region (this is usually done at firmware level, e.g. in ATF on some ARM
platforms).

[1a] https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2017/04/over-air-exploiting-broadcoms-wi-fi_4.html
[1b] https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2017/04/over-air-exploiting-broadcoms-wi-fi_11.html
[2] https://blade.tencent.com/en/advisories/qualpwn/
[3] https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/vulnerabilities-found-in-highly-popular-firmware-for-wifi-chips/


Claire Chang (5):
  swiotlb: Add io_tlb_mem struct
  swiotlb: Add device swiotlb pool
  swiotlb: Use device swiotlb pool if available
  dt-bindings: of: Add plumbing for restricted DMA pool
  of: Add plumbing for restricted DMA pool

 .../reserved-memory/reserved-memory.txt       |  35 ++
 drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c                   |   8 +-
 drivers/of/address.c                          |  39 ++
 drivers/of/device.c                           |   3 +
 drivers/of/of_private.h                       |   6 +
 drivers/xen/swiotlb-xen.c                     |   4 +-
 include/linux/device.h                        |   4 +
 include/linux/dma-direct.h                    |   8 +-
 include/linux/swiotlb.h                       |  49 +-
 kernel/dma/direct.c                           |   8 +-
 kernel/dma/swiotlb.c                          | 418 +++++++++++-------
 11 files changed, 393 insertions(+), 189 deletions(-)

--
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/cover/1271660/
Changes in v2:
- build on top of swiotlb
 
2.28.0.rc0.142.g3c755180ce-goog