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Date:   Fri, 31 Jul 2020 00:26:11 +0000
From:   William Mcvicker <willmcvicker@google.com>
To:     Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Cc:     security@kernel.org, Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu>,
        Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
        Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru>,
        Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>,
        netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org, coreteam@netfilter.org,
        netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        kernel-team@android.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] netfilter: nat: add range checks for access to
 nf_nat_l[34]protos[]
Message-ID: <20200731002611.GA1035680@google.com>
References: <20200727175720.4022402-1-willmcvicker@google.com>
 <20200727175720.4022402-2-willmcvicker@google.com>
 <20200729214607.GA30831@salvia>
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Hi Pablo,

Yes, I believe this oops is only triggered by userspace when the user
specifically passes in an invalid nf_nat_l3protos index. I'm happy to re-work
the patch to check for this in ctnetlink_create_conntrack().

> BTW, do you have a Fixes: tag for this? This will be useful for
> -stable maintainer to pick up this fix.

Regarding the Fixes: tag, I don't have one offhand since this bug was reported
to me, but I can search through the code history to find the commit that
exposed this vulnerability.

Thanks,
Will

On 07/29/2020, Pablo Neira Ayuso wrote:
> Hi Will,
> 
> On Mon, Jul 27, 2020 at 05:57:20PM +0000, Will McVicker wrote:
> > The indexes to the nf_nat_l[34]protos arrays come from userspace. So we
> > need to make sure that before indexing the arrays, we verify the index
> > is within the array bounds in order to prevent an OOB memory access.
> > Here is an example kernel panic on 4.14.180 when userspace passes in an
> > index greater than NFPROTO_NUMPROTO.
> > 
> > Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
> > Modules linked in:...
> > Process poc (pid: 5614, stack limit = 0x00000000a3933121)
> > CPU: 4 PID: 5614 Comm: poc Tainted: G S      W  O    4.14.180-g051355490483
> > Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. SM8150 V2 PM8150 Google Inc. MSM
> > task: 000000002a3dfffe task.stack: 00000000a3933121
> > pc : __cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24
> > lr : __cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24
> > ...
> > Call trace:
> > __cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24
> > name_to_dev_t+0x0/0x468
> > nfnetlink_parse_nat_setup+0x234/0x258
> 
> If this oops is only triggerable from userspace, I think a sanity
> check in nfnetlink_parse_nat_setup should suffice to reject
> unsupported layer 3 and layer 4 protocols.
> 
> I mean, in this patch I see more chunks in the packet path, such as
> nf_nat_l3proto_ipv4 that should never happen. I would just fix the
> userspace ctnetlink path.
> 
> BTW, do you have a Fixes: tag for this? This will be useful for
> -stable maintainer to pick up this fix.
> 
> Thanks.