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Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 0/4] LSM: Measure security module data
From:   Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To:     Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>,
        stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com
Cc:     tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com, sashal@kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org,
        linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Date:   Wed, 05 Aug 2020 08:00:33 -0400
In-Reply-To: <20200805004331.20652-1-nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
References: <20200805004331.20652-1-nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
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On Tue, 2020-08-04 at 17:43 -0700, Lakshmi Ramasubramanian wrote:
> Critical data structures of security modules are currently not measured.
> Therefore an attestation service, for instance, would not be able to
> attest whether the security modules are always operating with the policies
> and configuration that the system administrator had setup. The policies
> and configuration for the security modules could be tampered with by
> malware by exploiting kernel vulnerabilities or modified through some
> inadvertent actions on the system. Measuring such critical data would
> enable an attestation service to better assess the state of the system.

From a high level review, "Critical data structures" should be the
focus of this patch set.  Measuring "critical data structures" should
be independent of measuring the "policy" being loaded.   The in memory
policy hash could be an example of  data included in the "critical data
structures". 

Keep this patch set simple.

Mimi