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Date:   Thu, 6 Aug 2020 09:51:57 +1000 (AEST)
From:   James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To:     Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
cc:     James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>,
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        Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>, Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>,
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Subject: Re: [dm-devel] [RFC PATCH v5 00/11] Integrity Policy Enforcement
 LSM (IPE)
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On Wed, 5 Aug 2020, Mimi Zohar wrote:

> If block layer integrity was enough, there wouldn't have been a need
> for fs-verity.   Even fs-verity is limited to read only filesystems,
> which makes validating file integrity so much easier.  From the
> beginning, we've said that fs-verity signatures should be included in
> the measurement list.  (I thought someone signed on to add that support
> to IMA, but have not yet seen anything.)
> 
> Going forward I see a lot of what we've accomplished being incorporated
> into the filesystems.  When IMA will be limited to defining a system
> wide policy, I'll have completed my job.

What are your thoughts on IPE being a standalone LSM? Would you prefer to 
see its functionality integrated into IMA?