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From:   Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Date:   Fri, 14 Aug 2020 12:51:05 -0400
Message-ID: <CAEjxPJ50vrauP7dd-ek15vwnMN1kvAyvYSc0fhR4xwCJEQSFxQ@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] selinux: add tracepoint on denials
To:     =?UTF-8?Q?Thi=C3=A9baud_Weksteen?= <tweek@google.com>
Cc:     Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>, Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>,
        Joel Fernandes <joelaf@google.com>,
        Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com>,
        Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
        Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
        Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
        Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
        linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        SElinux list <selinux@vger.kernel.org>
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On Fri, Aug 14, 2020 at 9:05 AM Thi=C3=A9baud Weksteen <tweek@google.com> w=
rote:
>
> On Thu, Aug 13, 2020 at 5:41 PM Stephen Smalley
> <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > An explanation here of how one might go about decoding audited and
> > tclass would be helpful to users (even better would be a script to do i=
t
> > for them).  Again, I know how to do that but not everyone using
> > perf/ftrace will.
>
> What about something along those lines:
>
> The tclass value can be mapped to a class by searching
> security/selinux/flask.h. The audited value is a bit field of the
> permissions described in security/selinux/av_permissions.h for the
> corresponding class.

Sure, I guess that works.  Would be nice if we just included the class
and permission name(s) in the event itself but I guess you viewed that
as too heavyweight?