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Sat, 15 Aug 2020 16:30:38 +0000 (UTC) Received: from [10.36.113.93] (ovpn-113-93.ams2.redhat.com [10.36.113.93]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C147E7A426; Sat, 15 Aug 2020 16:30:28 +0000 (UTC) Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 09/15] iommu/vt-d: Check ownership for PASIDs from user-space To: Liu Yi L , alex.williamson@redhat.com, baolu.lu@linux.intel.com, joro@8bytes.org Cc: kevin.tian@intel.com, jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com, ashok.raj@intel.com, jun.j.tian@intel.com, yi.y.sun@intel.com, jean-philippe@linaro.org, peterx@redhat.com, hao.wu@intel.com, stefanha@gmail.com, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org References: <1595917664-33276-1-git-send-email-yi.l.liu@intel.com> <1595917664-33276-10-git-send-email-yi.l.liu@intel.com> From: Auger Eric Message-ID: <0db97d4a-7c74-9fac-0763-0ed56dcc5eaa@redhat.com> Date: Sat, 15 Aug 2020 18:30:27 +0200 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/68.5.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <1595917664-33276-10-git-send-email-yi.l.liu@intel.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.15 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Hi Yi, On 7/28/20 8:27 AM, Liu Yi L wrote: > When an IOMMU domain with nesting attribute is used for guest SVA, a > system-wide PASID is allocated for binding with the device and the domain. > For security reason, we need to check the PASID passed from user-space. > e.g. page table bind/unbind and PASID related cache invalidation. > > Cc: Kevin Tian > CC: Jacob Pan > Cc: Alex Williamson > Cc: Eric Auger > Cc: Jean-Philippe Brucker > Cc: Joerg Roedel > Cc: Lu Baolu > Signed-off-by: Liu Yi L > Signed-off-by: Jacob Pan > --- > drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 10 ++++++++++ > drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c | 7 +++++-- > 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c > index b2fe54e..88f4647 100644 > --- a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c > +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c > @@ -5436,6 +5436,7 @@ intel_iommu_sva_invalidate(struct iommu_domain *domain, struct device *dev, > int granu = 0; > u64 pasid = 0; > u64 addr = 0; > + void *pdata; > > granu = to_vtd_granularity(cache_type, inv_info->granularity); > if (granu == -EINVAL) { > @@ -5456,6 +5457,15 @@ intel_iommu_sva_invalidate(struct iommu_domain *domain, struct device *dev, > (inv_info->granu.addr_info.flags & IOMMU_INV_ADDR_FLAGS_PASID)) > pasid = inv_info->granu.addr_info.pasid; > > + pdata = ioasid_find(dmar_domain->ioasid_sid, pasid, NULL); > + if (!pdata) { > + ret = -EINVAL; > + goto out_unlock; > + } else if (IS_ERR(pdata)) { > + ret = PTR_ERR(pdata); > + goto out_unlock; > + } > + > switch (BIT(cache_type)) { > case IOMMU_CACHE_INV_TYPE_IOTLB: > /* HW will ignore LSB bits based on address mask */ > diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c > index c85b8d5..b9b29ad 100644 > --- a/drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c > +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c > @@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ int intel_svm_bind_gpasid(struct iommu_domain *domain, struct device *dev, > dmar_domain = to_dmar_domain(domain); > > mutex_lock(&pasid_mutex); > - svm = ioasid_find(INVALID_IOASID_SET, data->hpasid, NULL); > + svm = ioasid_find(dmar_domain->ioasid_sid, data->hpasid, NULL); A question about the locking strategy. We don't take the device_domain_lock here. Could you clarify whether it is safe? > if (IS_ERR(svm)) { > ret = PTR_ERR(svm); > goto out; > @@ -440,6 +440,7 @@ int intel_svm_unbind_gpasid(struct iommu_domain *domain, > struct device *dev, u32 pasid) > { > struct intel_iommu *iommu = intel_svm_device_to_iommu(dev); > + struct dmar_domain *dmar_domain; > struct intel_svm_dev *sdev; > struct intel_svm *svm; > int ret = -EINVAL; > @@ -447,8 +448,10 @@ int intel_svm_unbind_gpasid(struct iommu_domain *domain, > if (WARN_ON(!iommu)) > return -EINVAL; > > + dmar_domain = to_dmar_domain(domain); > + > mutex_lock(&pasid_mutex); > - svm = ioasid_find(INVALID_IOASID_SET, pasid, NULL); > + svm = ioasid_find(dmar_domain->ioasid_sid, pasid, NULL); same here. > if (!svm) { > ret = -EINVAL; > goto out; > Thanks Eric