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[23.128.96.18]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id dn20si18487916ejc.104.2020.08.18.08.27.30; Tue, 18 Aug 2020 08:27:54 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.18; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728121AbgHRP0c (ORCPT + 99 others); Tue, 18 Aug 2020 11:26:32 -0400 Received: from lhrrgout.huawei.com ([185.176.76.210]:2629 "EHLO huawei.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728072AbgHRP0V (ORCPT ); Tue, 18 Aug 2020 11:26:21 -0400 Received: from lhreml722-chm.china.huawei.com (unknown [172.18.7.106]) by Forcepoint Email with ESMTP id D6365A8F61BFE861120E; Tue, 18 Aug 2020 16:26:19 +0100 (IST) Received: from kstruczy-linux-box (10.204.65.138) by lhreml722-chm.china.huawei.com (10.201.108.73) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) id 15.1.1913.5; Tue, 18 Aug 2020 16:26:18 +0100 Received: by kstruczy-linux-box (sSMTP sendmail emulation); Tue, 18 Aug 2020 17:26:20 +0200 From: To: , , , CC: Krzysztof Struczynski , , , , , , , , , , Subject: [RFC PATCH 06/30] ima: Add ima namespace to the ima subsystem APIs Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2020 17:20:13 +0200 Message-ID: <20200818152037.11869-7-krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20200818152037.11869-1-krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com> References: <20200818152037.11869-1-krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII X-Originating-IP: [10.204.65.138] X-ClientProxiedBy: fraeml707-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.35) To lhreml722-chm.china.huawei.com (10.201.108.73) X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Krzysztof Struczynski Add ima namespace pointer to the input parameters of the relevant functions. This is a preparation for the policy namespacing, more functions may be modified later, when other aspects of the ima are namespaced. Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Struczynski --- include/linux/ima.h | 4 +-- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 25 ++++++++----- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 6 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 16 +++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c | 3 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 38 +++++++++++--------- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 36 +++++++++++-------- security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c | 3 +- 9 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index d61c9c21ffb9..3fd3746a0dee 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -140,13 +140,13 @@ static inline void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS */ #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE -extern bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void); +extern bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(const struct ima_namespace *ima_ns); extern void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry); extern int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len); extern int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name); #else -static inline bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void) +static inline bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(const struct ima_namespace *ima_ns) { return 0; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 4872f193f7a3..7d522fdab0d8 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -264,7 +264,8 @@ static inline void ima_process_queued_keys(void) {} int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr, struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, - const char *keyring); + const char *keyring, + const struct ima_namespace *ima_ns); int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func); int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, @@ -276,7 +277,8 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, struct ima_template_desc *template_desc); void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func, - int pcr, const char *keyring); + int pcr, const char *keyring, + struct ima_namespace *ima_ns); void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, const unsigned char *filename); int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data, @@ -292,15 +294,16 @@ const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename); int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr, struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, - const char *keyring); + const char *keyring, + const struct ima_namespace *ima_ns); void ima_init_policy(void); void ima_init_ns_policy(struct ima_namespace *ima_ns, const struct ima_policy_setup_data *policy_setup_data); void ima_update_policy(void); -void ima_update_policy_flag(void); +void ima_update_policy_flag(struct ima_namespace *ima_ns); ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *); void ima_delete_rules(void); -int ima_check_policy(void); +int ima_check_policy(const struct ima_namespace *ima_ns); void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos); void *ima_policy_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos); void ima_policy_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v); @@ -327,13 +330,15 @@ int ima_default_appraise_setup(const char *str, #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, - const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr); + const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr, + struct ima_namespace *ima_ns); int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig); -int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func); +int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func, + struct ima_namespace *ima_ns); void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file); enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, enum ima_hooks func); @@ -344,7 +349,8 @@ int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, #else static inline int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, - const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr) + const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr, + struct ima_namespace *ima_ns) { return 0; } @@ -361,7 +367,8 @@ static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, } static inline int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, - enum ima_hooks func) + enum ima_hooks func, + struct ima_namespace *ima_ns) { return 0; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index 4f39fb93f278..8b41183200e8 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -171,6 +171,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, * @pcr: pointer filled in if matched measure policy sets pcr= * @template_desc: pointer filled in if matched measure policy sets template= * @keyring: keyring name used to determine the action + * @ima_ns: ima namespace whose policy data will be used * * The policy is defined in terms of keypairs: * subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic= @@ -186,14 +187,15 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr, struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, - const char *keyring) + const char *keyring, + const struct ima_namespace *ima_ns) { int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH; flags &= ima_policy_flag; return ima_match_policy(inode, cred, secid, func, mask, flags, pcr, - template_desc, keyring); + template_desc, keyring, ima_ns); } /* diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 0632d3881611..9388ff88ca4d 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -48,10 +48,11 @@ __setup("ima_appraise=", default_appraise_setup); /* * is_ima_appraise_enabled - return appraise status + * @ima_ns: pointer to the ima namespace being checked * * Only return enabled, if not in ima_appraise="fix" or "log" modes. */ -bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void) +bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(const struct ima_namespace *ima_ns) { return ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE; } @@ -61,7 +62,8 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void) * * Return 1 to appraise or hash */ -int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func) +int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func, + struct ima_namespace *ima_ns) { u32 secid; @@ -70,7 +72,8 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func) security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), secid, func, mask, - IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL); + IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL, + NULL); } static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, @@ -328,7 +331,8 @@ static int modsig_verify(enum ima_hooks func, const struct modsig *modsig, * Returns -EPERM if the hash is blacklisted. */ int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, - const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr) + const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr, + struct ima_namespace *ima_ns) { enum hash_algo hash_algo; const u8 *digest = NULL; @@ -345,7 +349,7 @@ int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, if ((rc == -EPERM) && (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURE)) process_buffer_measurement(NULL, digest, digestsize, "blacklisted-hash", NONE, - pcr, NULL); + pcr, NULL, NULL); } return rc; @@ -511,7 +515,7 @@ void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry) || !(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) return; - action = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, POST_SETATTR); + action = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, POST_SETATTR, NULL); if (!action) __vfs_removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA); iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c index 1c68c500c26f..58aa56b0422d 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c @@ -60,5 +60,6 @@ void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key, */ process_buffer_measurement(NULL, payload, payload_len, keyring->description, KEY_CHECK, 0, - keyring->description); + keyring->description, + NULL); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c index e3fcad871861..97aadee7e68e 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c @@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) if ((file->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY) return seq_release(inode, file); - if (valid_policy && ima_check_policy() < 0) { + if (valid_policy && ima_check_policy(NULL) < 0) { cause = "failed"; valid_policy = 0; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index c7e29277b953..196fa2bd490d 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -109,7 +109,8 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file, int must_measure, char **pathbuf, const char **pathname, - char *filename) + char *filename, + struct ima_namespace *ima_ns) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); fmode_t mode = file->f_mode; @@ -215,7 +216,8 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file) static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask, - enum ima_hooks func) + enum ima_hooks func, + struct ima_namespace *ima_ns) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL; @@ -239,7 +241,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, * Included is the appraise submask. */ action = ima_get_action(inode, cred, secid, mask, func, &pcr, - &template_desc, NULL); + &template_desc, NULL, ima_ns); violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) && (ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE)); if (!action && !violation_check) @@ -261,7 +263,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, if (!rc && violation_check) ima_rdwr_violation_check(file, iint, action & IMA_MEASURE, - &pathbuf, &pathname, filename); + &pathbuf, &pathname, filename, ima_ns); inode_unlock(inode); @@ -359,7 +361,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, xattr_value, xattr_len, modsig, pcr, template_desc); if (rc == 0 && (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)) { - rc = ima_check_blacklist(iint, modsig, pcr); + rc = ima_check_blacklist(iint, modsig, pcr, ima_ns); if (rc != -EPERM) { inode_lock(inode); rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file, @@ -413,7 +415,7 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) { security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, - 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK); + 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK, NULL); } return 0; @@ -452,7 +454,7 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot) security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file); action = ima_get_action(inode, current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC, - MMAP_CHECK, &pcr, &template, 0); + MMAP_CHECK, &pcr, &template, 0, NULL); /* Is the mmap'ed file in policy? */ if (!(action & (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK))) @@ -491,13 +493,13 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, - MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK); + MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK, NULL); if (ret) return ret; security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &secid); return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, NULL, 0, - MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK); + MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK, NULL); } /** @@ -517,7 +519,7 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | - MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK); + MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK, NULL); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check); @@ -583,7 +585,7 @@ void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct inode *inode) struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; int must_appraise; - must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, FILE_CHECK); + must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, FILE_CHECK, NULL); if (!must_appraise) return; @@ -610,7 +612,7 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry) struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; int must_appraise; - must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, FILE_CHECK); + must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, FILE_CHECK, NULL); if (!must_appraise) return; @@ -697,7 +699,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK; security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size, - MAY_READ, func); + MAY_READ, func, NULL); } /** @@ -764,7 +766,8 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) */ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func, - int pcr, const char *keyring) + int pcr, const char *keyring, + struct ima_namespace *ima_ns) { int ret = 0; const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM"; @@ -796,7 +799,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, if (func) { security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); action = ima_get_action(inode, current_cred(), secid, 0, func, - &pcr, &template, keyring); + &pcr, &template, keyring, NULL); if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE)) return; } @@ -868,7 +871,8 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) return; process_buffer_measurement(file_inode(f.file), buf, size, - "kexec-cmdline", KEXEC_CMDLINE, 0, NULL); + "kexec-cmdline", KEXEC_CMDLINE, 0, NULL, + NULL); fdput(f); } @@ -897,7 +901,7 @@ static int __init init_ima(void) pr_warn("Couldn't register LSM notifier, error %d\n", error); if (!error) - ima_update_policy_flag(); + ima_update_policy_flag(&init_ima_ns); return error; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 403854b18ef2..12f9dcf73c83 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -598,6 +598,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func) * @template_desc: the template that should be used for this rule * @keyring: the keyring name, if given, to be used to check in the policy. * keyring can be NULL if func is anything other than KEY_CHECK. + * @ima_ns: IMA namespace whose policies are being checked * * Measure decision based on func/mask/fsmagic and LSM(subj/obj/type) * conditions. @@ -609,7 +610,8 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func) int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr, struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, - const char *keyring) + const char *keyring, + const struct ima_namespace *ima_ns) { struct ima_rule_entry *entry; int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1); @@ -662,8 +664,9 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, * loaded policy. Based on this flag, the decision to short circuit * out of a function or not call the function in the first place * can be made earlier. + * @ima_ns: pointer to the ima namespace whose policy flag is updated */ -void ima_update_policy_flag(void) +void ima_update_policy_flag(struct ima_namespace *ima_ns) { struct ima_rule_entry *entry; @@ -690,7 +693,8 @@ static int ima_appraise_flag(enum ima_hooks func) return 0; } -static void add_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *entries, int count, +static void add_rules(struct ima_policy_data *policy_data, + struct ima_rule_entry *entries, int count, enum policy_rule_list policy_rule) { int i = 0; @@ -790,17 +794,18 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) /* if !ima_policy, we load NO default rules */ if (ima_policy) - add_rules(dont_measure_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(dont_measure_rules), + add_rules(NULL, + dont_measure_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(dont_measure_rules), IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); switch (ima_policy) { case ORIGINAL_TCB: - add_rules(original_measurement_rules, + add_rules(NULL, original_measurement_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(original_measurement_rules), IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); break; case DEFAULT_TCB: - add_rules(default_measurement_rules, + add_rules(NULL, default_measurement_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(default_measurement_rules), IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); default: @@ -817,7 +822,7 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) if (!arch_entries) pr_info("No architecture policies found\n"); else - add_rules(arch_policy_entry, arch_entries, + add_rules(NULL, arch_policy_entry, arch_entries, IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY | IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY); /* @@ -825,7 +830,8 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) * signatures, prior to other appraise rules. */ if (ima_use_secure_boot) - add_rules(secure_boot_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(secure_boot_rules), + add_rules(NULL, + secure_boot_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(secure_boot_rules), IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); /* @@ -837,23 +843,25 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) build_appraise_entries = ARRAY_SIZE(build_appraise_rules); if (build_appraise_entries) { if (ima_use_secure_boot) - add_rules(build_appraise_rules, build_appraise_entries, + add_rules(NULL, + build_appraise_rules, build_appraise_entries, IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY); else - add_rules(build_appraise_rules, build_appraise_entries, + add_rules(NULL, + build_appraise_rules, build_appraise_entries, IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY | IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY); } if (ima_use_appraise_tcb) - add_rules(default_appraise_rules, + add_rules(NULL, default_appraise_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules), IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); - ima_update_policy_flag(); + ima_update_policy_flag(NULL); } /* Make sure we have a valid policy, at least containing some rules. */ -int ima_check_policy(void) +int ima_check_policy(const struct ima_namespace *ima_ns) { if (list_empty(&ima_temp_rules)) return -EINVAL; @@ -889,7 +897,7 @@ void ima_update_policy(void) */ kfree(arch_policy_entry); } - ima_update_policy_flag(); + ima_update_policy_flag(NULL); /* Custom IMA policy has been loaded */ ima_process_queued_keys(); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c index 69a8626a35c0..34ca54ba52b7 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c @@ -162,7 +162,8 @@ void ima_process_queued_keys(void) entry->payload_len, entry->keyring_name, KEY_CHECK, 0, - entry->keyring_name); + entry->keyring_name, + NULL); list_del(&entry->list); ima_free_key_entry(entry); } -- 2.20.1