Received: by 2002:a05:6a10:a0d1:0:0:0:0 with SMTP id j17csp1548995pxa; Thu, 20 Aug 2020 14:20:35 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJxFjP8edXZ/KoZwIwAU/5Cz83qjlL6YCGmiEO52Emu8gVsrJ4ABnesmphKQICk/izoDr9kb X-Received: by 2002:a17:906:1396:: with SMTP id f22mr580920ejc.227.1597958435675; Thu, 20 Aug 2020 14:20:35 -0700 (PDT) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1597958435; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=pxcmABEgX8dnHTUdpXdqwz2Hp17/MCKMOi8ekfpgSTiP7X3ou/6Op56Pn0+Hx5spvO Xhwbs15cx/BHf4AUmI+kcgQpTJtb2fliGqFK1dRN4S8bKhdDPp1KesbyvmvW3L3ekqaa VdtlNGZO2jCUgkJe+Rg0BGq7aI4fANaCc26cX3Cu8sMN8ItekXgVb8U4vGeYXNmqvbbO LqhEOL9QNexIMLSeyO+ieJOjVvII0nRl3UTn5xBOluQ7rXYW9z+xUDaMyfuY2FBc/fa/ C/zTiQxCHrCpl1DA0FsRvZkeh1NyIBU/49LgjRLTIqVOVcP0jX52ZyyBNNWkr0lqoE4F iSsQ== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:sender:mime-version:user-agent:references :message-id:in-reply-to:subject:cc:to:from:date; bh=+yT9U+48cezh6EqoxoWid0LZ9zwWnX9+poiVmR7Fbfo=; b=d1m45PTSf3hgaa2I0aZ0IUwbhNCAzFmUVYzrDcqz3bQ62Hm4BCW9T7zl8D+unmTdLn 5p085B6n7DU/n0TMTNln2zpXCBR6Ll02sSsTbkV7wG0Pnhvs5KNOWJjZGPuzVdXCW5Kt M35dT9oZLUqhgiVDCu6JQn7HqfC1vn7X7W46u53foODAlpcVVguGT6/JQXrnGPEccs5Y yvFuA866Mg4I3NCGauQMrmQ5gr5w2tfuOYXLyvAPqnLmd2AtcQwTjGzB7bWIG0uI9INk WXzSNsYbcTnZd9eBd/ETIY9/HYDvXpumnjbPtWOgSkIH6PdfU1XDoOTDY4vcH8Corsms BXhQ== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Return-Path: Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org. [23.128.96.18]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id m21si2273305edr.155.2020.08.20.14.20.09; Thu, 20 Aug 2020 14:20:35 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.18; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727829AbgHTSgr (ORCPT + 99 others); Thu, 20 Aug 2020 14:36:47 -0400 Received: from namei.org ([65.99.196.166]:60306 "EHLO namei.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726701AbgHTSgq (ORCPT ); Thu, 20 Aug 2020 14:36:46 -0400 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by namei.org (8.14.4/8.14.4) with ESMTP id 07KIZcXA030350; Thu, 20 Aug 2020 18:35:38 GMT Date: Fri, 21 Aug 2020 04:35:38 +1000 (AEST) From: James Morris To: Lokesh Gidra cc: Alexander Viro , Stephen Smalley , Casey Schaufler , Eric Biggers , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Paul Moore , Eric Paris , Daniel Colascione , Kees Cook , "Eric W. Biederman" , KP Singh , David Howells , Thomas Cedeno , Anders Roxell , Sami Tolvanen , Matthew Garrett , Aaron Goidel , Randy Dunlap , "Joel Fernandes (Google)" , YueHaibing , Christian Brauner , Alexei Starovoitov , Alexey Budankov , Adrian Reber , Aleksa Sarai , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, kaleshsingh@google.com, calin@google.com, surenb@google.com, nnk@google.com, jeffv@google.com, kernel-team@android.com Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 0/3] SELinux support for anonymous inodes and UFFD In-Reply-To: <20200807224941.3440722-1-lokeshgidra@google.com> Message-ID: References: <20200807224941.3440722-1-lokeshgidra@google.com> User-Agent: Alpine 2.21 (LRH 202 2017-01-01) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Fri, 7 Aug 2020, Lokesh Gidra wrote: > Userfaultfd in unprivileged contexts could be potentially very > useful. We'd like to harden userfaultfd to make such unprivileged use > less risky. This patch series allows SELinux to manage userfaultfd > file descriptors and in the future, other kinds of > anonymous-inode-based file descriptor. SELinux policy authors can > apply policy types to anonymous inodes by providing name-based > transition rules keyed off the anonymous inode internal name ( > "[userfaultfd]" in the case of userfaultfd(2) file descriptors) and > applying policy to the new SIDs thus produced. Can you expand more on why this would be useful, e.g. use-cases? -- James Morris