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Message-ID: <839d2b185ba482d664edd3fda7c03965543553fa.camel@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/2] ima: Fix keyrings race condition and other key
 related bugs
From:   Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To:     Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>,
        Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc:     James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
        "Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
        Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>,
        Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>,
        Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Date:   Mon, 24 Aug 2020 14:44:55 -0400
In-Reply-To: <20200811192621.281675-1-tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
References: <20200811192621.281675-1-tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
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Hi Tyler,

On Tue, 2020-08-11 at 14:26 -0500, Tyler Hicks wrote:
> v2:
>  - Always return an ERR_PTR from ima_alloc_rule_opt_list() (Nayna)
>  - Add Lakshmi's Reviewed-by to both patches
>  - Rebased on commit 3db0d0c276a7 ("integrity: remove redundant
>    initialization of variable ret") of next-integrity
> v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200727140831.64251-1-tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com/
> 
> Nayna pointed out that the "keyrings=" option in an IMA policy rule
> should only be accepted when CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS is
> enabled:
> 
>  https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/336cc947-1f70-0286-6506-6df3d1d23a1d@linux.vnet.ibm.com/
> 
> While fixing this, the compiler warned me about the potential for the
> ima_keyrings pointer to be NULL despite it being used, without a check
> for NULL, as the destination address for the strcpy() in
> ima_match_keyring().
> 
> It also became apparent that there was not adequate locking around the
> use of the pre-allocated buffer that ima_keyrings points to. The kernel
> keyring has a lock (.sem member of struct key) that ensures only one key
> can be added to a given keyring at a time but there's no protection
> against adding multiple keys to different keyrings at the same time.
> 
> The first patch in this series fixes both ima_keyrings related issues by
> parsing the list of keyrings in a KEY_CHECK rule at policy load time
> rather than deferring the parsing to policy check time. Once that fix is
> in place, the second patch can enforce that
> CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS must be enabled in order to use
> "func=KEY_CHECK" or "keyrings=" options in IMA policy.

Thank you for fixing and cleaning up the existing keyring policy
support. 

> 
> The new "keyrings=" value handling is done in a generic manner that can
> be reused by other options in the future. This seems to make sense as
> "appraise_type=" has similar style (though it doesn't need to be fully
> parsed at this time) and using "|" as an alternation delimiter is
> becoming the norm in IMA policy.

Yes, thank you.  Better extending existing key value pairs than
defining new boot command line options.

This patch set is now queued in next-integrity-testing.

Mimi