Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.18;
Subject: Re: [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 08/38] media: pci: ttpci: av7110: fix
 possible buffer overflow caused by bad DMA value in debiirq()
To:     Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>,
        Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc:     Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        stable@vger.kernel.org, Sean Young <sean@mess.org>,
        Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>,
        linux-media@vger.kernel.org
References: <20200821161807.348600-1-sashal@kernel.org>
 <20200821161807.348600-8-sashal@kernel.org>
 <20200829121020.GA20944@duo.ucw.cz>
 <20200829171600.GA7465@pendragon.ideasonboard.com>
From:   Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju@tsinghua.edu.cn>
Message-ID: <9e797c3a-033b-3473-ac03-1566d40e90d2@tsinghua.edu.cn>
Date:   Sun, 30 Aug 2020 15:33:11 +0800
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101
 Thunderbird/68.4.1
MIME-Version: 1.0
In-Reply-To: <20200829171600.GA7465@pendragon.ideasonboard.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Language: en-US
Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org
Precedence: bulk


On 2020/8/30 1:16, Laurent Pinchart wrote:
> On Sat, Aug 29, 2020 at 02:10:20PM +0200, Pavel Machek wrote:
>> Hi!
>>
>>> The value av7110->debi_virt is stored in DMA memory, and it is assigned
>>> to data, and thus data[0] can be modified at any time by malicious
>>> hardware. In this case, "if (data[0] < 2)" can be passed, but then
>>> data[0] can be changed into a large number, which may cause buffer
>>> overflow when the code "av7110->ci_slot[data[0]]" is used.
>>>
>>> To fix this possible bug, data[0] is assigned to a local variable, which
>>> replaces the use of data[0].
>> I'm pretty sure hardware capable of manipulating memory can work
>> around any such checks, but...
>>
>>> +++ b/drivers/media/pci/ttpci/av7110.c
>>> @@ -424,14 +424,15 @@ static void debiirq(unsigned long cookie)
>>>   	case DATA_CI_GET:
>>>   	{
>>>   		u8 *data = av7110->debi_virt;
>>> +		u8 data_0 = data[0];
>>>   
>>> -		if ((data[0] < 2) && data[2] == 0xff) {
>>> +		if (data_0 < 2 && data[2] == 0xff) {
>>>   			int flags = 0;
>>>   			if (data[5] > 0)
>>>   				flags |= CA_CI_MODULE_PRESENT;
>>>   			if (data[5] > 5)
>>>   				flags |= CA_CI_MODULE_READY;
>>> -			av7110->ci_slot[data[0]].flags = flags;
>>> +			av7110->ci_slot[data_0].flags = flags;
>> This does not even do what it says. Compiler is still free to access
>> data[0] multiple times. It needs READ_ONCE() to be effective.
> Yes, it seems quite dubious to me. If we *really* want to guard against
> rogue hardware here, the whole DMA buffer should be copied. I don't
> think it's worth it, a rogue PCI device can do much more harm.
>

 From the original driver code, data[0] is considered to be bad and thus 
it should be checked, because the content of the DMA buffer may be 
problematic.
Based on this consideration, data[0] can be also modified to bypass the 
check, and thus its value should be copied to a local variable for the 
check and use.

I agree with Pavel that the compiler optimization may drop the copying 
operation, and thus READ_ONCE() should be used here.
I will submit a v2 patch soon.


Best wishes,
Jia-Ju Bai