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To:     x86@kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org,
        "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc:     linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        "Jethro Beekman" <jethro@fortanix.com>,
        "Chunyang Hui" <sanqian.hcy@antfin.com>,
        "Jordan Hand" <jorhand@linux.microsoft.com>,
        "Nathaniel McCallum" <npmccallum@redhat.com>,
        "Seth Moore" <sethmo@google.com>,
        "Darren Kenny" <darren.kenny@oracle.com>,
        "Sean Christopherson" <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
        "Suresh Siddha" <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>,
        akpm@linux-foundation.org, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com,
        asapek@google.com, bp@alien8.de, cedric.xing@intel.com,
        chenalexchen@google.com, conradparker@google.com,
        cyhanish@google.com, dave.hansen@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com,
        josh@joshtriplett.org, kai.huang@intel.com, kai.svahn@intel.com,
        kmoy@google.com, ludloff@google.com, luto@kernel.org,
        nhorman@redhat.com, puiterwijk@redhat.com, rientjes@google.com,
        tglx@linutronix.de, yaozhangx@google.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v37 13/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES
References: <20200911124019.42178-1-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
 <20200911124019.42178-14-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Date:   Sun, 13 Sep 2020 21:56:03 -0500
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From:   "Haitao Huang" <haitao.huang@linux.intel.com>
Organization: Intel Corp
Message-ID: <op.0qwyftihwjvjmi@mqcpg7oapc828.gar.corp.intel.com>
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On Fri, 11 Sep 2020 07:40:08 -0500, Jarkko Sakkinen  
<jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> wrote:
...

> +/**
> + * sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages() - The handler for  
> %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES
> + * @encl:       an enclave pointer
> + * @arg:	a user pointer to a struct sgx_enclave_add_pages instance
> + *
> + * Add one or more pages to an uninitialized enclave, and optionally  
> extend the
> + * measurement with the contents of the page. The SECINFO and  
> measurement mask
> + * are applied to all pages.
> + *
> + * A SECINFO for a TCS is required to always contain zero permissions  
> because
> + * CPU silently zeros them. Allowing anything else would cause a  
> mismatch in
> + * the measurement.
> + *
> + * mmap()'s protection bits are capped by the page permissions. For  
> each page
> + * address, the maximum protection bits are computed with the following
> + * heuristics:
> + *
> + * 1. A regular page: PROT_R, PROT_W and PROT_X match the SECINFO  
> permissions.
> + * 2. A TCS page: PROT_R | PROT_W.
> + *
> + * mmap() is not allowed to surpass the minimum of the maximum  
> protection bits
> + * within the given address range.
> + *
> + * If ENCLS opcode fails, that effectively means that EPC has been  
> invalidated.
> + * When this happens the enclave is destroyed and -EIO is returned to  
> the
> + * caller.
> + *
> + * Return:
> + *   length of the data processed on success,
> + *   -EACCES if an executable source page is located in a noexec  
> partition,
> + *   -EIO if either ENCLS[EADD] or ENCLS[EEXTEND] fails
> + *   -errno otherwise
> + */
> +static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl, void  
> __user *arg)
> +{
> +	struct sgx_enclave_add_pages addp;
> +	struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
> +	unsigned long c;
> +	int ret;
> +
> +	if ((atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED) ||
> +	    !(atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_CREATED))
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	if (copy_from_user(&addp, arg, sizeof(addp)))
> +		return -EFAULT;
> +
> +	if (!IS_ALIGNED(addp.offset, PAGE_SIZE) ||
> +	    !IS_ALIGNED(addp.src, PAGE_SIZE))
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	if (!(access_ok(addp.src, PAGE_SIZE)))
> +		return -EFAULT;
> +
> +	if (addp.length & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	if (addp.offset + addp.length - PAGE_SIZE >= encl->size)
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	if (copy_from_user(&secinfo, (void __user *)addp.secinfo,
> +			   sizeof(secinfo)))
> +		return -EFAULT;
> +
> +	if (sgx_validate_secinfo(&secinfo))
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	for (c = 0 ; c < addp.length; c += PAGE_SIZE) {
> +		if (c == SGX_MAX_ADD_PAGES_LENGTH || signal_pending(current)) {
> +			ret = c;
> +			break;
> +		}
> +
> +		if (need_resched())
> +			cond_resched();
> +
> +		ret = sgx_encl_add_page(encl, addp.src + c, addp.offset + c,
> +					addp.length - c, &secinfo, addp.flags);

no need passing addp.length - c?

> +		if (ret)
> +			break;

Some error cases here are fatal and should be passed back to user space so  
that it would not retry.

> +	}
> +
> +	if (copy_to_user(arg, &addp, sizeof(addp)))
> +		return -EFAULT;

This copy no longer needed?

> +	return c;
> +}
> +

Thanks
Haitao