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Date:   Tue, 15 Sep 2020 19:36:27 +0200
From:   John Wood <john.wood@gmx.com>
To:     Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc:     John Wood <john.wood@gmx.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
        Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
        Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
        Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
        Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>,
        Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>,
        Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>,
        Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
        Ben Segall <bsegall@google.com>, Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>,
        Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
        Iurii Zaikin <yzaikin@google.com>,
        James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
        kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
        linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 5/6] security/fbfam: Detect a fork brute force attack
Message-ID: <20200915173627.GA2900@ubuntu>
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Hi,

On Mon, Sep 14, 2020 at 09:39:10PM +0200, Jann Horn wrote:
> On Sun, Sep 13, 2020 at 6:56 PM John Wood <john.wood@gmx.com> wrote:
> > On Fri, Sep 11, 2020 at 02:01:56AM +0200, Jann Horn wrote:
> > > On Fri, Sep 11, 2020 at 1:49 AM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wr=
ote:
> > > > On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 01:21:06PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > > > [...]
> > > > I don't think this is the right place for detecting a crash -- isn=
't
> > > > this only for the "dumping core" condition? In other words, don't =
you
> > > > want to do this in get_signal()'s "fatal" block? (i.e. very close =
to the
> > > > do_coredump, but without the "should I dump?" check?)
> > > >
> > > > Hmm, but maybe I'm wrong? It looks like you're looking at noticing=
 the
> > > > process taking a signal from SIG_KERNEL_COREDUMP_MASK ?
> > > >
> > > > (Better yet: what are fatal conditions that do NOT match
> > > > SIG_KERNEL_COREDUMP_MASK, and should those be covered?)
> > > >
> > > > Regardless, *this* looks like the only place without an LSM hook. =
And it
> > > > doesn't seem unreasonable to add one here. I assume it would proba=
bly
> > > > just take the siginfo pointer, which is also what you're checking.
> > >
> > > Good point, making this an LSM might be a good idea.
> > >
> > > > e.g. for include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h:
> > > >
> > > > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_coredump, const kernel_siginfo_t *siginfo);
> > >
> > > I guess it should probably be an LSM_RET_VOID hook? And since, as yo=
u
> > > said, it's not really semantically about core dumping, maybe it shou=
ld
> > > be named task_fatal_signal or something like that.
> >
> > If I understand correctly you propose to add a new LSM hook without re=
turn
> > value and place it here:
> >
> > diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
> > index a38b3edc6851..074492d23e98 100644
> > --- a/kernel/signal.c
> > +++ b/kernel/signal.c
> > @@ -2751,6 +2751,8 @@ bool get_signal(struct ksignal *ksig)
> >                         do_coredump(&ksig->info);
> >                 }
> >
> > +               // Add the new LSM hook here
> > +
> >                 /*
> >                  * Death signals, no core dump.
> >                  */
>
> It should probably be in the "if (sig_kernel_coredump(signr)) {"
> branch. And I'm not sure whether it should be before or after
> do_coredump() - if you do it after do_coredump(), the hook will have
> to wait until the core dump file has been written, which may take a
> little bit of time.

But if the LSM hook is placed in the "if (sig_kernel_coredump(signr)) {"
branch, then only the following signals will be passed to it.

SIGQUIT, SIGILL, SIGTRAP, SIGABRT, SIGFPE, SIGSEGV, SIGBUS, SIGSYS,
SIGXCPU, SIGXFSZ, SIGEMT

The above signals are extracted from SIG_KERNEL_COREDUMP_MASK macro, and
are only related to coredump.

So, if we add a new LSM hook (named task_fatal_signal) to detect a fatal
signal it would be better to place it just above the if statement.

diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
index a38b3edc6851..406af87f2f96 100644
=2D-- a/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/kernel/signal.c
@@ -2736,6 +2736,8 @@ bool get_signal(struct ksignal *ksig)
                 */
                current->flags |=3D PF_SIGNALED;

+               // Place the new LSM hook here
+
                if (sig_kernel_coredump(signr)) {
                        if (print_fatal_signals)
                                print_fatal_signal(ksig->info.si_signo);

This way all the fatal signals are caught and we also avoid the commented
delay if a core dump is necessary.

Thanks,
John Wood