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[23.128.96.18]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id y16si11257097edm.444.2020.09.15.17.51.23; Tue, 15 Sep 2020 17:51:45 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.18; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=fail header.i=@kapsi.fi header.s=20161220 header.b=Q9C+Lkg+; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=intel.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726387AbgIPAuf (ORCPT + 99 others); Tue, 15 Sep 2020 20:50:35 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:36272 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726393AbgIOLlD (ORCPT ); Tue, 15 Sep 2020 07:41:03 -0400 Received: from mail.kapsi.fi (mail.kapsi.fi [IPv6:2001:67c:1be8::25]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id EA370C06178A; Tue, 15 Sep 2020 04:41:02 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kapsi.fi; s=20161220; h=Content-Transfer-Encoding:MIME-Version:References:In-Reply-To: Message-Id:Date:Subject:Cc:To:From:Sender:Reply-To:Content-Type:Content-ID: Content-Description:Resent-Date:Resent-From:Resent-Sender:Resent-To:Resent-Cc :Resent-Message-ID:List-Id:List-Help:List-Unsubscribe:List-Subscribe: List-Post:List-Owner:List-Archive; bh=Z0z7VU0ZJOglP2ZP2H14DlOIQchhVanxR/WdYj/tOzs=; b=Q9C+Lkg+d140PJwHzmMxB3GPoh cAqivlF5xy8N9eJuKa75TfKd5gXUqSVh1o0mzOLiuAMtJRBfILXQwoON5WhkE05Dcr6eeeQ7GRUos fHZbCv9kQT4c9t/ZUpUEzerB7LrLItAEkXMo/aDq+x68HL1WEojZdLFc7u8rxNHYxEM7T5PL6+pPJ GXnvTffyMXXo0NDsKPEkUpgsX3wuAxJCSJsiUXFU4ucCgGO6DRfVRPpnMrlXNPmYpVAYHo0UDB0Zr hc6eiZghb1FNneaA7XgowKM5+89r/JFX7cgDNWSdpDDow3FqvnaZJzFwyaKHnenH6oFqCqMIj2fUr nDieUA/g==; Received: from 83-245-197-237.elisa-laajakaista.fi ([83.245.197.237] helo=localhost) by mail.kapsi.fi with esmtpsa (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.89) (envelope-from ) id 1kI8m8-0005t9-MM; Tue, 15 Sep 2020 14:05:28 +0300 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: x86@kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Sean Christopherson , Jethro Beekman , Darren Kenny , Borislav Petkov , Jarkko Sakkinen , akpm@linux-foundation.org, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com, asapek@google.com, bp@alien8.de, cedric.xing@intel.com, chenalexchen@google.com, conradparker@google.com, cyhanish@google.com, dave.hansen@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, josh@joshtriplett.org, kai.huang@intel.com, kai.svahn@intel.com, kmoy@google.com, ludloff@google.com, luto@kernel.org, nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com, puiterwijk@redhat.com, rientjes@google.com, tglx@linutronix.de, yaozhangx@google.com Subject: [PATCH v38 03/24] x86/mm: x86/sgx: Signal SIGSEGV with PF_SGX Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2020 14:05:01 +0300 Message-Id: <20200915110522.893152-4-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20200915110522.893152-1-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> References: <20200915110522.893152-1-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 83.245.197.237 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com X-SA-Exim-Scanned: No (on mail.kapsi.fi); SAEximRunCond expanded to false Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Sean Christopherson Include SGX bit to the PF error codes and throw SIGSEGV with PF_SGX when a #PF with SGX set happens. CPU throws a #PF with the SGX set in the event of Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM) conflict. The EPCM is a CPU-internal table, which describes the properties for a enclave page. Enclaves are measured and signed software entities, which SGX hosts. [1] Although the primary purpose of the EPCM conflict checks is to prevent malicious accesses to an enclave, an illegit access can happen also for legit reasons. All SGX reserved memory, including EPCM is encrypted with a transient key that does not survive from the power transition. Throwing a SIGSEGV allows user space software to react when this happens (e.g. recreate the enclave, which was invalidated). [1] Intel SDM: 36.5.1 Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM) Acked-by: Jethro Beekman Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h | 14 ++++++++------ arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 13 +++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h index 714b1a30e7b0..4446f95ad997 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h @@ -44,12 +44,13 @@ void __noreturn handle_stack_overflow(const char *message, /* * Page fault error code bits: * - * bit 0 == 0: no page found 1: protection fault - * bit 1 == 0: read access 1: write access - * bit 2 == 0: kernel-mode access 1: user-mode access - * bit 3 == 1: use of reserved bit detected - * bit 4 == 1: fault was an instruction fetch - * bit 5 == 1: protection keys block access + * bit 0 == 0: no page found 1: protection fault + * bit 1 == 0: read access 1: write access + * bit 2 == 0: kernel-mode access 1: user-mode access + * bit 3 == 1: use of reserved bit detected + * bit 4 == 1: fault was an instruction fetch + * bit 5 == 1: protection keys block access + * bit 15 == 1: inside SGX enclave */ enum x86_pf_error_code { X86_PF_PROT = 1 << 0, @@ -58,5 +59,6 @@ enum x86_pf_error_code { X86_PF_RSVD = 1 << 3, X86_PF_INSTR = 1 << 4, X86_PF_PK = 1 << 5, + X86_PF_SGX = 1 << 15, }; #endif /* _ASM_X86_TRAPS_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c index 35f1498e9832..1a7cc6d3281a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c @@ -1054,6 +1054,19 @@ access_error(unsigned long error_code, struct vm_area_struct *vma) if (error_code & X86_PF_PK) return 1; + /* + * Access is blocked by the Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM), i.e. the + * access is allowed by the PTE but not the EPCM. This usually happens + * when the EPCM is yanked out from under us, e.g. by hardware after a + * suspend/resume cycle. In any case, software, i.e. the kernel, can't + * fix the source of the fault as the EPCM can't be directly modified by + * software. Handle the fault as an access error in order to signal + * userspace so that userspace can rebuild their enclave(s), even though + * userspace may not have actually violated access permissions. + */ + if (unlikely(error_code & X86_PF_SGX)) + return 1; + /* * Make sure to check the VMA so that we do not perform * faults just to hit a X86_PF_PK as soon as we fill in a -- 2.25.1