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Date:   Wed, 16 Sep 2020 09:02:12 -0700
From:   Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
To:     Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc:     kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 08/35] KVM: SVM: Prevent debugging under SEV-ES
Message-ID: <20200916160210.GA10227@sjchrist-ice>
References: <cover.1600114548.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
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 <fd790047-4107-b28a-262e-03ed5bc4c421@amd.com>
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On Wed, Sep 16, 2020 at 10:11:10AM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> On 9/15/20 3:13 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> > On 9/15/20 11:30 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> >> I don't quite follow the "doesn't mean debugging can't be done in the future".
> >> Does that imply that debugging could be supported for SEV-ES guests, even if
> >> they have an encrypted VMSA?
> > 
> > Almost anything can be done with software. It would require a lot of
> > hypervisor and guest code and changes to the GHCB spec, etc. So given
> > that, probably just the check for arch.guest_state_protected is enough for
> > now. I'll just need to be sure none of the debugging paths can be taken
> > before the VMSA is encrypted.
> 
> So I don't think there's any guarantee that the KVM_SET_GUEST_DEBUG ioctl
> couldn't be called before the VMSA is encrypted, meaning I can't check the
> arch.guest_state_protected bit for that call. So if we really want to get
> rid of the allow_debug() op, I'd need some other way to indicate that this
> is an SEV-ES / protected state guest.

Would anything break if KVM "speculatively" set guest_state_protected before
LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA?  E.g. does KVM need to emulate before LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA?

> How are you planning on blocking this ioctl for TDX? Would the
> arch.guest_state_protected bit be sit earlier than is done for SEV-ES?

Yep, guest_state_protected is set from time zero (kvm_x86_ops.vm_init) as
guest state is encrypted/inaccessible from the get go.  The flag actually
gets turned off for debuggable TDX guests, but that's also forced to happen
before the KVM_RUN can be invoked (TDX architecture) and is a one-time
configuration, i.e. userspace can flip the switch exactly once, and only at
a very specific point in time.