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[23.128.96.18]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id nq4si12813136ejb.569.2020.09.16.13.28.31; Wed, 16 Sep 2020 13:28:55 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.18; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=fail header.i=@linutronix.de header.s=2020 header.b=D9Q09Gor; dkim=neutral (no key) header.i=@linutronix.de header.s=2020e header.b="u/8CLD7V"; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=QUARANTINE dis=NONE) header.from=linutronix.de Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727666AbgIPU1h (ORCPT + 99 others); Wed, 16 Sep 2020 16:27:37 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:60020 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726932AbgIPRYm (ORCPT ); Wed, 16 Sep 2020 13:24:42 -0400 Received: from galois.linutronix.de (Galois.linutronix.de [IPv6:2a0a:51c0:0:12e:550::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id F31EEC0A893E; Wed, 16 Sep 2020 06:11:26 -0700 (PDT) Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2020 13:11:19 -0000 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linutronix.de; s=2020; t=1600261885; h=from:from:sender:sender:reply-to:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date: message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=hICX3eIXaNN5lGw4Idja4ETjeYv+3b2SANUQdtYZeHM=; b=D9Q09Gork06iy1IiWCdyu0gM+PbV4SFRBx07n1czCxLvTysnGieWR/iIucbeQh9mqBjBYW HzeAX+TwrGZJE4BU/9IE3DnA7L1YqMGAS7ZlTEEVpVLfMNmaLapy4tnKq2eAG64yEIy4Rp FpF96z5yqH+Rw+x9iZJ0rLK6yjzOWb/cTxT5oBT2JfrZro6SJeqRUevuKrlOGuJmaNgQsg vKHzPoVFoKc7BbTejVHPfifFzB+v+T9h1IWAkaXUsSuAlOY5o0UFZuAAHyhGYr8ElDl8lc i3D+Wpxg4VvMCYoRN1+tOLQ6JeeVHdR5oX9Aw4ACqVOaxVozfu7xO0kqtGhdSg== DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linutronix.de; s=2020e; t=1600261885; h=from:from:sender:sender:reply-to:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date: message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=hICX3eIXaNN5lGw4Idja4ETjeYv+3b2SANUQdtYZeHM=; b=u/8CLD7VYQHCqkj/rycdBfnZpKuht9ly7PtXFD8KQ4p9WLMrQoGtjGbKEBFQ/ezUpC8FM+ fRWy6TgGJ6U5rGCQ== From: "tip-bot2 for Balbir Singh" Reply-to: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org Subject: [tip: x86/pti] x86/mm: Refactor cond_ibpb() to support other use cases Cc: Thomas Gleixner , Balbir Singh , x86 , LKML In-Reply-To: <20200510014803.12190-4-sblbir@amazon.com> References: <20200510014803.12190-4-sblbir@amazon.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Message-ID: <160026187981.15536.17927491932304015051.tip-bot2@tip-bot2> Robot-ID: Robot-Unsubscribe: Contact to get blacklisted from these emails Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org The following commit has been merged into the x86/pti branch of tip: Commit-ID: 81f449985c12b83b91849d94724b803ebf856301 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/81f449985c12b83b91849d94724b803ebf856301 Author: Balbir Singh AuthorDate: Wed, 29 Jul 2020 10:11:00 +10:00 Committer: Thomas Gleixner CommitterDate: Wed, 16 Sep 2020 15:08:02 +02:00 x86/mm: Refactor cond_ibpb() to support other use cases cond_ibpb() has the necessary bits required to track the previous mm in switch_mm_irqs_off(). This can be reused for other use cases like L1D flushing on context switch. [ tglx: Moved comment, added a separate define for state (re)initialization ] Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Balbir Singh Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200510014803.12190-4-sblbir@amazon.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200729001103.6450-3-sblbir@amazon.com --- arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 2 +- arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++--------------- 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h index 8c87a2e..a927d40 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h @@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ struct tlb_state { /* Last user mm for optimizing IBPB */ union { struct mm_struct *last_user_mm; - unsigned long last_user_mm_ibpb; + unsigned long last_user_mm_spec; }; u16 loaded_mm_asid; diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c index 0951b47..6bbd758 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c @@ -43,10 +43,14 @@ */ /* - * Use bit 0 to mangle the TIF_SPEC_IB state into the mm pointer which is - * stored in cpu_tlb_state.last_user_mm_ibpb. + * Bits to mangle the TIF_SPEC_IB state into the mm pointer which is + * stored in cpu_tlb_state.last_user_mm_spec. */ #define LAST_USER_MM_IBPB 0x1UL +#define LAST_USER_MM_SPEC_MASK (LAST_USER_MM_IBPB) + +/* Bits to set when tlbstate and flush is (re)initialized */ +#define LAST_USER_MM_INIT LAST_USER_MM_IBPB /* * The x86 feature is called PCID (Process Context IDentifier). It is similar @@ -317,20 +321,29 @@ void switch_mm(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next, local_irq_restore(flags); } -static inline unsigned long mm_mangle_tif_spec_ib(struct task_struct *next) +static inline unsigned long mm_mangle_tif_spec_bits(struct task_struct *next) { unsigned long next_tif = task_thread_info(next)->flags; - unsigned long ibpb = (next_tif >> TIF_SPEC_IB) & LAST_USER_MM_IBPB; + unsigned long spec_bits = (next_tif >> TIF_SPEC_IB) & LAST_USER_MM_SPEC_MASK; - return (unsigned long)next->mm | ibpb; + return (unsigned long)next->mm | spec_bits; } -static void cond_ibpb(struct task_struct *next) +static void cond_mitigation(struct task_struct *next) { + unsigned long prev_mm, next_mm; + if (!next || !next->mm) return; + next_mm = mm_mangle_tif_spec_bits(next); + prev_mm = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_spec); + /* + * Avoid user/user BTB poisoning by flushing the branch predictor + * when switching between processes. This stops one process from + * doing Spectre-v2 attacks on another. + * * Both, the conditional and the always IBPB mode use the mm * pointer to avoid the IBPB when switching between tasks of the * same process. Using the mm pointer instead of mm->context.ctx_id @@ -340,8 +353,6 @@ static void cond_ibpb(struct task_struct *next) * exposed data is not really interesting. */ if (static_branch_likely(&switch_mm_cond_ibpb)) { - unsigned long prev_mm, next_mm; - /* * This is a bit more complex than the always mode because * it has to handle two cases: @@ -371,20 +382,14 @@ static void cond_ibpb(struct task_struct *next) * Optimize this with reasonably small overhead for the * above cases. Mangle the TIF_SPEC_IB bit into the mm * pointer of the incoming task which is stored in - * cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_ibpb for comparison. - */ - next_mm = mm_mangle_tif_spec_ib(next); - prev_mm = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_ibpb); - - /* + * cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_spec for comparison. + * * Issue IBPB only if the mm's are different and one or * both have the IBPB bit set. */ if (next_mm != prev_mm && (next_mm | prev_mm) & LAST_USER_MM_IBPB) indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(); - - this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_ibpb, next_mm); } if (static_branch_unlikely(&switch_mm_always_ibpb)) { @@ -393,11 +398,12 @@ static void cond_ibpb(struct task_struct *next) * different context than the user space task which ran * last on this CPU. */ - if (this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm) != next->mm) { + if ((prev_mm & ~LAST_USER_MM_SPEC_MASK) != + (unsigned long)next->mm) indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(); - this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm, next->mm); - } } + + this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_spec, next_mm); } #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS @@ -519,11 +525,10 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next, need_flush = true; } else { /* - * Avoid user/user BTB poisoning by flushing the branch - * predictor when switching between processes. This stops - * one process from doing Spectre-v2 attacks on another. + * Apply process to process speculation vulnerability + * mitigations if applicable. */ - cond_ibpb(tsk); + cond_mitigation(tsk); /* * Stop remote flushes for the previous mm. @@ -631,7 +636,7 @@ void initialize_tlbstate_and_flush(void) write_cr3(build_cr3(mm->pgd, 0)); /* Reinitialize tlbstate. */ - this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_ibpb, LAST_USER_MM_IBPB); + this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_spec, LAST_USER_MM_INIT); this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm_asid, 0); this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.next_asid, 1); this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.ctxs[0].ctx_id, mm->context.ctx_id);