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[23.128.96.18]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id l23si12237399ejq.411.2020.09.16.13.33.58; Wed, 16 Sep 2020 13:34:22 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.18; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@amazon.com header.s=amazon201209 header.b=nzqd9VJj; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=QUARANTINE sp=QUARANTINE dis=NONE) header.from=amazon.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728386AbgIPUcr (ORCPT + 99 others); Wed, 16 Sep 2020 16:32:47 -0400 Received: from smtp-fw-6002.amazon.com ([52.95.49.90]:48544 "EHLO smtp-fw-6002.amazon.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726943AbgIPUaI (ORCPT ); Wed, 16 Sep 2020 16:30:08 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=amazon.com; i=@amazon.com; q=dns/txt; s=amazon201209; t=1600288207; x=1631824207; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:mime-version: content-transfer-encoding; bh=4OMtNb83YORhDNCIQPC8PZHNb6sILR2vnYsotDnFmcY=; b=nzqd9VJjBWWXW9MTRoYBhCRF2bp56x5gccM8yk4c1C873HJ8trVqe4Le 8IjnBK8bveUtxcwThN+SofhyABEoJ76aiXBaHe9molyy5tiMKCngKTytU yO8nPXE8FpGm4Bp3z+xs/+1lgPB9pPw5BpowLK/If43t+8LzWqPrUCRp4 o=; X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.76,434,1592870400"; d="scan'208";a="54452033" Received: from iad12-co-svc-p1-lb1-vlan3.amazon.com (HELO email-inbound-relay-2a-538b0bfb.us-west-2.amazon.com) ([10.43.8.6]) by smtp-border-fw-out-6002.iad6.amazon.com with ESMTP; 16 Sep 2020 20:30:04 +0000 Received: from EX13MTAUWC001.ant.amazon.com (pdx4-ws-svc-p6-lb7-vlan3.pdx.amazon.com [10.170.41.166]) by email-inbound-relay-2a-538b0bfb.us-west-2.amazon.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C7A69A1BD3; Wed, 16 Sep 2020 20:30:02 +0000 (UTC) Received: from EX13D20UWC001.ant.amazon.com (10.43.162.244) by EX13MTAUWC001.ant.amazon.com (10.43.162.135) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 15.0.1497.2; Wed, 16 Sep 2020 20:30:02 +0000 Received: from u79c5a0a55de558.ant.amazon.com (10.43.162.35) by EX13D20UWC001.ant.amazon.com (10.43.162.244) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 15.0.1497.2; Wed, 16 Sep 2020 20:29:58 +0000 From: Alexander Graf To: kvm list CC: Sean Christopherson , Aaron Lewis , Paolo Bonzini , Jonathan Corbet , Vitaly Kuznetsov , Wanpeng Li , Jim Mattson , Joerg Roedel , KarimAllah Raslan , Dan Carpenter , , Subject: [PATCH v7 0/7] Allow user space to restrict and augment MSR emulation Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2020 22:29:44 +0200 Message-ID: <20200916202951.23760-1-graf@amazon.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0.394.ge197136389 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Originating-IP: [10.43.162.35] X-ClientProxiedBy: EX13D42UWA002.ant.amazon.com (10.43.160.16) To EX13D20UWC001.ant.amazon.com (10.43.162.244) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org While tying to add support for the MSR_CORE_THREAD_COUNT MSR in KVM, I realized that we were still in a world where user space has no control over what happens with MSR emulation in KVM. That is bad for multiple reasons. In my case, I wanted to emulate the MSR in user space, because it's a CPU specific register that does not exist on older CPUs and that really only contains informational data that is on the package level, so it's a natural fit for user space to provide it. However, it is also bad on a platform compatibility level. Currrently, KVM has no way to expose different MSRs based on the selected target CPU type. This patch set introduces a way for user space to indicate to KVM which MSRs should be handled in kernel space. With that, we can solve part of the platform compatibility story. Or at least we can not handle AMD specific MSRs on an Intel platform and vice versa. In addition, it introduces a way for user space to get into the loop when an MSR access would generate a #GP fault, such as when KVM finds an MSR that is not handled by the in-kernel MSR emulation or when the guest is trying to access reserved registers. In combination with filtering, user space trapping allows us to emulate arbitrary MSRs in user space, paving the way for target CPU specific MSR implementations from user space. v1 -> v2: - s/ETRAP_TO_USER_SPACE/ENOENT/g - deflect all #GP injection events to user space, not just unknown MSRs. That was we can also deflect allowlist errors later - fix emulator case - new patch: KVM: x86: Introduce allow list for MSR emulation - new patch: KVM: selftests: Add test for user space MSR handling v2 -> v3: - return r if r == X86EMUL_IO_NEEDED - s/KVM_EXIT_RDMSR/KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR/g - s/KVM_EXIT_WRMSR/KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR/g - Use complete_userspace_io logic instead of reply field - Simplify trapping code - document flags for KVM_X86_ADD_MSR_ALLOWLIST - generalize exit path, always unlock when returning - s/KVM_CAP_ADD_MSR_ALLOWLIST/KVM_CAP_X86_MSR_ALLOWLIST/g - Add KVM_X86_CLEAR_MSR_ALLOWLIST - Add test to clear whitelist - Adjust to reply-less API - Fix asserts - Actually trap on MSR_IA32_POWER_CTL writes v3 -> v4: - Mention exit reasons in re-enter mandatory section of API documentation - Clear padding bytes - Generalize get/set deflect functions - Remove redundant pending_user_msr field - lock allow check and clearing - free bitmaps on clear v4 -> v5: - use srcu v5 -> v6: - Switch from allow list to filtering API with explicit fallback option - Support and test passthrough MSR filtering - Check for filter exit reason - Add .gitignore - send filter change notification - change to atomic set_msr_filter ioctl with fallback flag - use EPERM for filter blocks - add bit for MSR user space deflection - check for overflow of BITS_TO_LONGS (thanks Dan Carpenter!) - s/int i;/u32 i;/ - remove overlap check - Introduce exit reason mask to allow for future expansion and filtering - s/emul_to_vcpu(ctxt)/vcpu/ - imported patch: KVM: x86: Prepare MSR bitmaps for userspace tracked MSRs - new patch: KVM: x86: Add infrastructure for MSR filtering - new patch: KVM: x86: SVM: Prevent MSR passthrough when MSR access is denied - new patch: KVM: x86: VMX: Prevent MSR passthrough when MSR access is denied v6 -> v7: - s/MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSGHROUGH_MSRS/MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS/g - Fire #GP without skipping the MSR instruction - uapi: Fix padding - selftest: trap on KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_FILTER as well - selftest: fix asserts - selftest: add test for invalid msr handling Aaron Lewis (1): KVM: x86: Prepare MSR bitmaps for userspace tracked MSRs Alexander Graf (6): KVM: x86: Deflect unknown MSR accesses to user space KVM: x86: Add infrastructure for MSR filtering KVM: x86: SVM: Prevent MSR passthrough when MSR access is denied KVM: x86: VMX: Prevent MSR passthrough when MSR access is denied KVM: x86: Introduce MSR filtering KVM: selftests: Add test for user space MSR handling Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 176 +++++++++- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 18 ++ arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 19 ++ arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 18 +- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 135 ++++++-- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 7 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 303 ++++++++++++------ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 9 +- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 267 ++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 1 + include/trace/events/kvm.h | 2 +- include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 17 + tools/testing/selftests/kvm/.gitignore | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile | 1 + .../selftests/kvm/x86_64/user_msr_test.c | 247 ++++++++++++++ 16 files changed, 1088 insertions(+), 135 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/user_msr_test.c -- 2.28.0.394.ge197136389 Amazon Development Center Germany GmbH Krausenstr. 38 10117 Berlin Geschaeftsfuehrung: Christian Schlaeger, Jonathan Weiss Eingetragen am Amtsgericht Charlottenburg unter HRB 149173 B Sitz: Berlin Ust-ID: DE 289 237 879