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[23.128.96.18]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id s18si12001576ejd.305.2020.09.22.01.26.48; Tue, 22 Sep 2020 01:27:12 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.18; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=intel.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728637AbgIVFaG (ORCPT + 99 others); Tue, 22 Sep 2020 01:30:06 -0400 Received: from mga11.intel.com ([192.55.52.93]:40904 "EHLO mga11.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728290AbgIVFaG (ORCPT ); Tue, 22 Sep 2020 01:30:06 -0400 IronPort-SDR: LVXTg3k/Fnl2vUsn+GE2s5ET43jcbsWAvfVZWv4HPRrOwAThAvdN8xA986Z5HuAbtG3AFFxN3I 0vQx7JX3hEpA== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9751"; a="157913369" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.77,289,1596524400"; d="scan'208";a="157913369" X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga004.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.38]) by fmsmga102.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 21 Sep 2020 22:30:06 -0700 IronPort-SDR: nGQQBZPA7Jx3RlVW05VNnlissbQRj9vRriLHdQXnlHWb//2RP+j02eB0LZWKQuO8vTqhxgz5XA cclF3j19Umsg== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.77,289,1596524400"; d="scan'208";a="454349247" Received: from krodolf-mobl1.ger.corp.intel.com (HELO localhost) ([10.252.49.25]) by orsmga004-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 21 Sep 2020 22:29:59 -0700 Date: Tue, 22 Sep 2020 08:29:57 +0300 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: Sean Christopherson Cc: Andy Lutomirski , X86 ML , linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, LKML , Linux-MM , Andrew Morton , Matthew Wilcox , Jethro Beekman , Darren Kenny , Andy Shevchenko , asapek@google.com, Borislav Petkov , "Xing, Cedric" , chenalexchen@google.com, Conrad Parker , cyhanish@google.com, Dave Hansen , "Huang, Haitao" , Josh Triplett , "Huang, Kai" , "Svahn, Kai" , Keith Moyer , Christian Ludloff , Neil Horman , Nathaniel McCallum , Patrick Uiterwijk , David Rientjes , Thomas Gleixner , yaozhangx@google.com Subject: Re: [PATCH v38 10/24] mm: Add vm_ops->mprotect() Message-ID: <20200922052957.GA97272@linux.intel.com> References: <20200915112842.897265-1-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> <20200915112842.897265-11-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> <20200918235337.GA21189@sjchrist-ice> <20200921124946.GF6038@linux.intel.com> <20200921165758.GA24156@linux.intel.com> <20200921210736.GB58176@linux.intel.com> <20200921211849.GA25403@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20200921211849.GA25403@linux.intel.com> Organization: Intel Finland Oy - BIC 0357606-4 - Westendinkatu 7, 02160 Espoo Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Mon, Sep 21, 2020 at 02:18:49PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote: > On Tue, Sep 22, 2020 at 12:07:36AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > On Mon, Sep 21, 2020 at 09:57:58AM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote: > > > On Mon, Sep 21, 2020 at 03:49:46PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > > > On Fri, Sep 18, 2020 at 04:53:37PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote: > > > > > a noexec filesystem by loading code into an enclave, and to give the kernel the > > > > > option of adding enclave specific LSM policies in the future. > > > > > > > > > > The source file (if one exists) for the enclave is long gone when the enclave > > > > > is actually mmap()'d and mprotect()'d. To enforce noexec, the requested > > > > > permissions for a given page are snapshotted when the page is added to the > > > > > enclave, i.e. when the enclave is built. Enclave pages that will be executable > > > > > must originate from an a MAYEXEC VMA, e.g. the source page can't come from a > > > > > noexec file system. > > > > > > > > noexec check is done in __sgx_encl_add_page(), not in this callback. > > > > sgx_vma_mprotect() calls sgx_encl_may_map(), which iterates the > > > > addresses, checks that permissions are not surpassed and there are > > > > no holes. > > > > > > Yes, that's what I said. > > > > sgx_encl_add_page() will remove such page. The callback does not > > interact with this process as such pages never get to the enclave. > > I think we're in violent agreement, mostly. > > Userspace can add the page without EXEC permissions in the EPCM, and thus > avoid the noexec/VM_MAYEXEC check. The enclave can then do EMODPE to gain > EXEC permissions in the EPMC. Without the ->mprotect() hook, we wouldn't > be able to detect/prevent such shenanigans. Right, the VM_MAYEXEC in the code is nested under VM_EXEC check. I'm only wondering why not block noexec completely with any permissions, i.e. why not just have unconditional VM_MAYEXEC check? /Jarkko