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Date:   Wed, 23 Sep 2020 05:26:05 +0100
From:   Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
To:     Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Cc:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
        syzbot <syzbot+ea3a78a71705faf41d77@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>,
        Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
        syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: WARNING in ex_handler_uaccess
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On Mon, Sep 21, 2020 at 12:22:19PM +0200, Rasmus Villemoes wrote:

> So, not sure how the above got triggered, but I notice there might be an
> edge case in check_zeroed_user():
> 
> 	from -= align;
> 	size += align;
> 
> 	if (!user_read_access_begin(from, size))
> 		return -EFAULT;
> 
> 	unsafe_get_user(val, (unsigned long __user *) from, err_fault);
> 
> 
> Suppose size is (size_t)-3 and align is 3. What's the convention for
> access_ok(whatever, 0)? Is that equivalent to access_ok(whatever, 1), or
> is it always true (or $ARCH-dependent)?

It's usually true...

> But, AFAICT, no current caller of check_zeroed_user can end up passing
> in a size that can overflow to 0. E.g. for the case at hand, size cannot
> be more than SIZE_MAX-24.

Might be worth slapping if (unlikely(!size)) return -EFAULT; // overflow
just before user_read_access_begin() to be sure...