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[173.230.99.154]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id a23sm1259435ioc.54.2020.09.24.05.06.49 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Thu, 24 Sep 2020 05:06:49 -0700 (PDT) From: YiFei Zhu To: containers@lists.linux-foundation.org Cc: YiFei Zhu , bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Aleksa Sarai , Andrea Arcangeli , Andy Lutomirski , Dimitrios Skarlatos , Giuseppe Scrivano , Hubertus Franke , Jack Chen , Jann Horn , Josep Torrellas , Kees Cook , Tianyin Xu , Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum , Tycho Andersen , Valentin Rothberg , Will Drewry Subject: [PATCH seccomp 0/6] seccomp: Add bitmap cache of arg-independent filter results that allow syscalls Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2020 07:06:40 -0500 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: YiFei Zhu Alternative: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200923232923.3142503-1-keescook@chromium.org/T/ Major differences from the linked alternative by Kees: * No x32 special-case handling -- not worth the complexity * No caching of denylist -- not worth the complexity * No seccomp arch pinning -- I think this is an independent feature * The bitmaps are part of the filters rather than the task. * Architectures supported by default through arch number array, except for MIPS with its sparse syscall numbers. * Configurable per-build for future different cache modes. This series adds a bitmap to cache seccomp filter results if the result permits a syscall and is indepenent of syscall arguments. This visibly decreases seccomp overhead for most common seccomp filters with very little memory footprint. The overhead of running Seccomp filters has been part of some past discussions [1][2][3]. Oftentimes, the filters have a large number of instructions that check syscall numbers one by one and jump based on that. Some users chain BPF filters which further enlarge the overhead. A recent work [6] comprehensively measures the Seccomp overhead and shows that the overhead is non-negligible and has a non-trivial impact on application performance. We observed some common filters, such as docker's [4] or systemd's [5], will make most decisions based only on the syscall numbers, and as past discussions considered, a bitmap where each bit represents a syscall makes most sense for these filters. In order to build this bitmap at filter attach time, each filter is emulated for every syscall (under each possible architecture), and checked for any accesses of struct seccomp_data that are not the "arch" nor "nr" (syscall) members. If only "arch" and "nr" are examined, and the program returns allow, then we can be sure that the filter must return allow independent from syscall arguments. When it is concluded that an allow must occur for the given architecture and syscall pair, seccomp will immediately allow the syscall, bypassing further BPF execution. Ongoing work is to further support arguments with fast hash table lookups. We are investigating the performance of doing so [6], and how to best integrate with the existing seccomp infrastructure. Some benchmarks are performed with results in patch 5, copied below: Current BPF sysctl settings: net.core.bpf_jit_enable = 1 net.core.bpf_jit_harden = 0 Benchmarking 100000000 syscalls... 63.896255358 - 0.008504529 = 63887750829 (63.9s) getpid native: 638 ns 130.383312423 - 63.897315189 = 66485997234 (66.5s) getpid RET_ALLOW 1 filter (bitmap): 664 ns 196.789080421 - 130.384414983 = 66404665438 (66.4s) getpid RET_ALLOW 2 filters (bitmap): 664 ns 268.844643304 - 196.790234168 = 72054409136 (72.1s) getpid RET_ALLOW 3 filters (full): 720 ns 342.627472515 - 268.845799103 = 73781673412 (73.8s) getpid RET_ALLOW 4 filters (full): 737 ns Estimated total seccomp overhead for 1 bitmapped filter: 26 ns Estimated total seccomp overhead for 2 bitmapped filters: 26 ns Estimated total seccomp overhead for 3 full filters: 82 ns Estimated total seccomp overhead for 4 full filters: 99 ns Estimated seccomp entry overhead: 26 ns Estimated seccomp per-filter overhead (last 2 diff): 17 ns Estimated seccomp per-filter overhead (filters / 4): 18 ns Expectations: native ≤ 1 bitmap (638 ≤ 664): ✔️ native ≤ 1 filter (638 ≤ 720): ✔️ per-filter (last 2 diff) ≈ per-filter (filters / 4) (17 ≈ 18): ✔️ 1 bitmapped ≈ 2 bitmapped (26 ≈ 26): ✔️ entry ≈ 1 bitmapped (26 ≈ 26): ✔️ entry ≈ 2 bitmapped (26 ≈ 26): ✔️ native + entry + (per filter * 4) ≈ 4 filters total (732 ≈ 737): ✔️ RFC -> v1: * Config made on by default across all arches that could support it. * Added arch numbers array and emulate filter for each arch number, and have a per-arch bitmap. * Massively simplified the emulator so it would only support the common instructions in Kees's list. * Fixed inheriting bitmap across filters (filter->prev is always NULL during prepare). * Stole the selftest from Kees. * Added a /proc/pid/seccomp_cache by Jann's suggestion. Patch 1 moves the SECCOMP Kcomfig option to arch/Kconfig. Patch 2 adds a syscall_arches array so the emulator can enumerate it. Patch 3 implements the emulator that finds if a filter must return allow, Patch 4 implements the test_bit against the bitmaps. Patch 5 updates the selftest to better show the new semantics. Patch 6 implements /proc/pid/seccomp_cache. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/c22a6c3cefc2412cad00ae14c1371711@huawei.com/T/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202005181120.971232B7B@keescook/T/ [3] https://github.com/seccomp/libseccomp/issues/116 [4] https://github.com/moby/moby/blob/ae0ef82b90356ac613f329a8ef5ee42ca923417d/profiles/seccomp/default.json [5] https://github.com/systemd/systemd/blob/6743a1caf4037f03dc51a1277855018e4ab61957/src/shared/seccomp-util.c#L270 [6] Draco: Architectural and Operating System Support for System Call Security https://tianyin.github.io/pub/draco.pdf, MICRO-53, Oct. 2020 Kees Cook (1): selftests/seccomp: Compare bitmap vs filter overhead YiFei Zhu (5): seccomp: Move config option SECCOMP to arch/Kconfig asm/syscall.h: Add syscall_arches[] array seccomp/cache: Add "emulator" to check if filter is arg-dependent seccomp/cache: Lookup syscall allowlist for fast path seccomp/cache: Report cache data through /proc/pid/seccomp_cache arch/Kconfig | 56 ++++ arch/alpha/include/asm/syscall.h | 4 + arch/arc/include/asm/syscall.h | 24 +- arch/arm/Kconfig | 15 +- arch/arm/include/asm/syscall.h | 4 + arch/arm64/Kconfig | 13 - arch/arm64/include/asm/syscall.h | 4 + arch/c6x/include/asm/syscall.h | 13 +- arch/csky/Kconfig | 13 - arch/csky/include/asm/syscall.h | 4 + arch/h8300/include/asm/syscall.h | 4 + arch/hexagon/include/asm/syscall.h | 4 + arch/ia64/include/asm/syscall.h | 4 + arch/m68k/include/asm/syscall.h | 4 + arch/microblaze/Kconfig | 18 +- arch/microblaze/include/asm/syscall.h | 4 + arch/mips/Kconfig | 17 -- arch/mips/include/asm/syscall.h | 16 ++ arch/nds32/include/asm/syscall.h | 13 +- arch/nios2/include/asm/syscall.h | 4 + arch/openrisc/include/asm/syscall.h | 4 + arch/parisc/Kconfig | 16 -- arch/parisc/include/asm/syscall.h | 7 + arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 17 -- arch/powerpc/include/asm/syscall.h | 14 + arch/riscv/Kconfig | 13 - arch/riscv/include/asm/syscall.h | 14 +- arch/s390/Kconfig | 17 -- arch/s390/include/asm/syscall.h | 7 + arch/sh/Kconfig | 16 -- arch/sh/include/asm/syscall_32.h | 17 +- arch/sparc/Kconfig | 18 +- arch/sparc/include/asm/syscall.h | 9 + arch/um/Kconfig | 16 -- arch/x86/Kconfig | 16 -- arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h | 11 + arch/x86/um/asm/syscall.h | 14 +- arch/xtensa/Kconfig | 14 - arch/xtensa/include/asm/syscall.h | 4 + fs/proc/base.c | 7 +- include/linux/seccomp.h | 5 + kernel/seccomp.c | 259 +++++++++++++++++- .../selftests/seccomp/seccomp_benchmark.c | 151 ++++++++-- tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/settings | 2 +- 44 files changed, 641 insertions(+), 265 deletions(-) -- 2.28.0