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Date:   Wed, 7 Oct 2020 04:19:53 +1100 (AEDT)
From:   James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To:     Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>, Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>,
        Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>,
        Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
        Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
        Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>, SeongJae Park <sjpark@amazon.de>,
        KP Singh <kpsingh@chromium.org>, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 10/16] module: Call security_kernel_post_load_data()
In-Reply-To: <20201002173828.2099543-11-keescook@chromium.org>
Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.21.2010070419420.18879@namei.org>
References: <20201002173828.2099543-1-keescook@chromium.org> <20201002173828.2099543-11-keescook@chromium.org>
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On Fri, 2 Oct 2020, Kees Cook wrote:

> Now that there is an API for checking loaded contents for modules
> loaded without a file, call into the LSM hooks.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
> Acked-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>


Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>


-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>