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Linux x86_64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/68.11.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 06.10.2020 01:56, Jann Horn wrote: > On Thu, Oct 1, 2020 at 9:43 PM Alexander Popov wrote: >> On 29.09.2020 21:35, Alexander Popov wrote: >>> This is the second version of the heap quarantine prototype for the Linux >>> kernel. I performed a deeper evaluation of its security properties and >>> developed new features like quarantine randomization and integration with >>> init_on_free. That is fun! See below for more details. >>> >>> >>> Rationale >>> ========= >>> >>> Use-after-free vulnerabilities in the Linux kernel are very popular for >>> exploitation. There are many examples, some of them: >>> https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/09/a-cache-invalidation-bug-in-linux.html Hello Jann, thanks for your reply. > I don't think your proposed mitigation would work with much > reliability against this bug; the attacker has full control over the > timing of the original use and the following use, so an attacker > should be able to trigger the kmem_cache_free(), then spam enough new > VMAs and delete them to flush out the quarantine, and then do heap > spraying as normal, or something like that. The randomized quarantine will release the vulnerable object at an unpredictable moment (patch 4/6). So I think the control over the time of the use-after-free access doesn't help attackers, if they don't have an "infinite spray" -- unlimited ability to store controlled data in the kernelspace objects of the needed size without freeing them. "Unlimited", because the quarantine size is 1/32 of whole memory. "Without freeing", because freed objects are erased by init_on_free before going to randomized heap quarantine (patch 3/6). Would you agree? > Also, note that here, if the reallocation fails, the kernel still > wouldn't crash because the dangling object is not accessed further if > the address range stored in it doesn't match the fault address. So an > attacker could potentially try multiple times, and if the object > happens to be on the quarantine the first time, that wouldn't really > be a showstopper, you'd just try again. Freed objects are filled by zero before going to quarantine (patch 3/6). Would it cause a null pointer dereference on unsuccessful try? >>> https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2019/11/bad-binder-android-in-wild-exploit.html?m=1 > > I think that here, again, the free() and the dangling pointer use were > caused by separate syscalls, meaning the attacker had control over > that timing? As I wrote above, I think attacker's control over this timing is required for a successful attack, but is not enough for bypassing randomized quarantine. >>> https://a13xp0p0v.github.io/2020/02/15/CVE-2019-18683.html > > Haven't looked at that one in detail. > >>> Use-after-free exploits usually employ heap spraying technique. >>> Generally it aims to put controlled bytes at a predetermined memory >>> location on the heap. > > Well, not necessarily "predetermined". Depending on the circumstances, > you don't necessarily need to know which address you're writing to; > and you might not even need to overwrite a specific object, but > instead just have to overwrite one out of a bunch of objects, no > matter which. Yes, of course, I didn't mean a "predetermined memory address". Maybe "definite memory location" is a better phrase for that. >>> Heap spraying for exploiting use-after-free in the Linux kernel relies on >>> the fact that on kmalloc(), the slab allocator returns the address of >>> the memory that was recently freed. > > Yeah; and that behavior is pretty critical for performance. The longer > it's been since a newly allocated object was freed, the higher the > chance that you'll end up having to go further down the memory cache > hierarchy. Yes. That behaviour is fast, however very convenient for use-after-free exploitation... >>> So allocating a kernel object with >>> the same size and controlled contents allows overwriting the vulnerable >>> freed object. > > The vmacache exploit you linked to doesn't do that, it frees the > object all the way back to the page allocator and then sprays 4MiB of > memory from the page allocator. (Because VMAs use their own > kmem_cache, and the kmem_cache wasn't merged with any interesting > ones, and I saw no good way to exploit the bug by reallocating another > VMA over the old VMA back then. Although of course that doesn't mean > that there is no such way.) Sorry, my mistake. Exploit examples with heap spraying that fit my description: - CVE-2017-6074 https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2017/02/26/2 - CVE-2017-2636 https://a13xp0p0v.github.io/2017/03/24/CVE-2017-2636.html - CVE-2016-8655 https://seclists.org/oss-sec/2016/q4/607 - CVE-2017-15649 https://ssd-disclosure.com/ssd-advisory-linux-kernel-af_packet-use-after-free/ > [...] >>> Security properties >>> =================== >>> >>> For researching security properties of the heap quarantine I developed 2 lkdtm >>> tests (see the patch 5/6). >>> >>> The first test is called lkdtm_HEAP_SPRAY. It allocates and frees an object >>> from a separate kmem_cache and then allocates 400000 similar objects. >>> I.e. this test performs an original heap spraying technique for use-after-free >>> exploitation. >>> >>> If CONFIG_SLAB_QUARANTINE is disabled, the freed object is instantly >>> reallocated and overwritten: >>> # echo HEAP_SPRAY > /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT >>> lkdtm: Performing direct entry HEAP_SPRAY >>> lkdtm: Allocated and freed spray_cache object 000000002b5b3ad4 of size 333 >>> lkdtm: Original heap spraying: allocate 400000 objects of size 333... >>> lkdtm: FAIL: attempt 0: freed object is reallocated >>> >>> If CONFIG_SLAB_QUARANTINE is enabled, 400000 new allocations don't overwrite >>> the freed object: >>> # echo HEAP_SPRAY > /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT >>> lkdtm: Performing direct entry HEAP_SPRAY >>> lkdtm: Allocated and freed spray_cache object 000000009909e777 of size 333 >>> lkdtm: Original heap spraying: allocate 400000 objects of size 333... >>> lkdtm: OK: original heap spraying hasn't succeed >>> >>> That happens because pushing an object through the quarantine requires _both_ >>> allocating and freeing memory. Objects are released from the quarantine on >>> new memory allocations, but only when the quarantine size is over the limit. >>> And the quarantine size grows on new memory freeing. >>> >>> That's why I created the second test called lkdtm_PUSH_THROUGH_QUARANTINE. >>> It allocates and frees an object from a separate kmem_cache and then performs >>> kmem_cache_alloc()+kmem_cache_free() for that cache 400000 times. >>> This test effectively pushes the object through the heap quarantine and >>> reallocates it after it returns back to the allocator freelist: > [...] >>> As you can see, the number of the allocations that are needed for overwriting >>> the vulnerable object is almost the same. That would be good for stable >>> use-after-free exploitation and should not be allowed. >>> That's why I developed the quarantine randomization (see the patch 4/6). >>> >>> This randomization required very small hackish changes of the heap quarantine >>> mechanism. At first all quarantine batches are filled by objects. Then during >>> the quarantine reducing I randomly choose and free 1/2 of objects from a >>> randomly chosen batch. Now the randomized quarantine releases the freed object >>> at an unpredictable moment: >>> lkdtm: Target object is reallocated at attempt 107884 > [...] >>> lkdtm: Target object is reallocated at attempt 87343 > > Those numbers are fairly big. At that point you might not even fit > into L3 cache anymore, right? You'd often be hitting DRAM for new > allocations? And for many slabs, you might end using much more memory > for the quarantine than for actual in-use allocations. Yes. The original quarantine size is (totalram_pages() << PAGE_SHIFT) / QUARANTINE_FRACTION where #define QUARANTINE_FRACTION 32 > It seems to me like, for this to stop attacks with a high probability, > you'd have to reserve a huge chunk of kernel memory for the > quarantines Yes, that's how it works now. > - even if the attacker doesn't know anything about the > status of the quarantine (which isn't necessarily the case, depending > on whether the attacker can abuse microarchitectural data leakage, or > if the attacker can trigger a pure data read through the dangling > pointer), they should still be able to win with a probability around > quarantine_size/allocated_memory_size if they have a heap spraying > primitive without strict limits. Not sure about this probability evaluation. I will try calculating it taking the quarantine parameters into account. >>> However, this randomization alone would not disturb the attacker, because >>> the quarantine stores the attacker's data (the payload) in the sprayed objects. >>> I.e. the reallocated and overwritten vulnerable object contains the payload >>> until the next reallocation (very bad). >>> >>> Hence heap objects should be erased before going to the heap quarantine. >>> Moreover, filling them by zeros gives a chance to detect use-after-free >>> accesses to non-zero data while an object stays in the quarantine (nice!). >>> That functionality already exists in the kernel, it's called init_on_free. >>> I integrated it with CONFIG_SLAB_QUARANTINE in the patch 3/6. >>> >>> During that work I found a bug: in CONFIG_SLAB init_on_free happens too >>> late, and heap objects go to the KASAN quarantine being dirty. See the fix >>> in the patch 2/6. > [...] >> I've made various tests on real hardware and in virtual machines: >> 1) network throughput test using iperf >> server: iperf -s -f K >> client: iperf -c 127.0.0.1 -t 60 -f K >> 2) scheduler stress test >> hackbench -s 4000 -l 500 -g 15 -f 25 -P >> 3) building the defconfig kernel >> time make -j2 >> >> I compared Linux kernel 5.9.0-rc6 with: >> - init_on_free=off, >> - init_on_free=on, >> - CONFIG_SLAB_QUARANTINE=y (which enables init_on_free). >> >> Each test was performed 5 times. I will show the mean values. >> If you are interested, I can share all the results and calculate standard deviation. >> >> Real hardware, Intel Core i7-6500U CPU >> 1) Network throughput test with iperf >> init_on_free=off: 5467152.2 KBytes/sec >> init_on_free=on: 3937545 KBytes/sec (-28.0% vs init_on_free=off) >> CONFIG_SLAB_QUARANTINE: 3858848.6 KBytes/sec (-2.0% vs init_on_free=on) >> 2) Scheduler stress test with hackbench >> init_on_free=off: 8.5364s >> init_on_free=on: 8.9858s (+5.3% vs init_on_free=off) >> CONFIG_SLAB_QUARANTINE: 17.2232s (+91.7% vs init_on_free=on) > > These numbers seem really high for a mitigation, especially if that > performance hit does not really buy you deterministic protection > against many bugs. Right, I agree. It's a probabilistic protection, and the probability should be calculated. I'll work on that. > [...] >> N.B. There was NO performance optimization made for this version of the heap >> quarantine prototype. The main effort was put into researching its security >> properties (hope for your feedback). Performance optimization will be done in >> further steps, if we see that my work is worth doing. > > But you are pretty much inherently limited in terms of performance by > the effect the quarantine has on the data cache, right? Yes. However, the quarantine parameters can be adjusted. > It seems to me like, if you want to make UAF exploitation harder at > the heap allocator layer, you could do somewhat more effective things > with a probably much smaller performance budget. Things like > preventing the reallocation of virtual kernel addresses with different > types, such that an attacker can only replace a UAF object with > another object of the same type. (That is not an idea I like very much > either, but I would like it more than this proposal.) (E.g. some > browsers implement things along those lines, I believe.) That's interesting, thank you. Best regards, Alexander