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From:   YiFei Zhu <zhuyifei1999@gmail.com>
Date:   Thu, 8 Oct 2020 19:17:39 -0500
Message-ID: <CABqSeASbRXLYgE=rbKO8g8Si9q7nKEGB2UZpi-BcYG5etWVcjA@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 seccomp 3/5] seccomp/cache: Lookup syscall allowlist
 for fast path
To:     Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc:     Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>,
        YiFei Zhu <yifeifz2@illinois.edu>, bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>,
        kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>,
        Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
        David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>,
        Dimitrios Skarlatos <dskarlat@cs.cmu.edu>,
        Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@redhat.com>,
        Hubertus Franke <frankeh@us.ibm.com>,
        Jack Chen <jianyan2@illinois.edu>,
        Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
        Josep Torrellas <torrella@illinois.edu>,
        Tianyin Xu <tyxu@illinois.edu>,
        Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@ibm.com>,
        Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.pizza>,
        Valentin Rothberg <vrothber@redhat.com>,
        Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
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On Wed, Sep 30, 2020 at 4:32 PM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Sep 30, 2020 at 10:19:14AM -0500, YiFei Zhu wrote:
> > From: YiFei Zhu <yifeifz2@illinois.edu>
> >
> > The fast (common) path for seccomp should be that the filter permits
> > the syscall to pass through, and failing seccomp is expected to be
> > an exceptional case; it is not expected for userspace to call a
> > denylisted syscall over and over.
> >
> > This first finds the current allow bitmask by iterating through
> > syscall_arches[] array and comparing it to the one in struct
> > seccomp_data; this loop is expected to be unrolled. It then
> > does a test_bit against the bitmask. If the bit is set, then
> > there is no need to run the full filter; it returns
> > SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW immediately.
> >
> > Co-developed-by: Dimitrios Skarlatos <dskarlat@cs.cmu.edu>
> > Signed-off-by: Dimitrios Skarlatos <dskarlat@cs.cmu.edu>
> > Signed-off-by: YiFei Zhu <yifeifz2@illinois.edu>
>
> I'd like the content/ordering of this and the emulator patch to be reorganized a bit.
> I'd like to see the infrastructure of the cache added first (along with
> the "always allow" test logic in this patch), with the emulator missing:
> i.e. the patch is a logical no-op: no behavior changes because nothing
> ever changes the cache bits, but all the operational logic, structure
> changes, etc, is in place. Then the next patch would be replacing the
> no-op with the emulator.
>
> > ---
> >  kernel/seccomp.c | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  1 file changed, 52 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
> > index f09c9e74ae05..bed3b2a7f6c8 100644
> > --- a/kernel/seccomp.c
> > +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
> > @@ -172,6 +172,12 @@ struct seccomp_cache_filter_data { };
> >  static inline void seccomp_cache_prepare(struct seccomp_filter *sfilter)
> >  {
> >  }
> > +
> > +static inline bool seccomp_cache_check(const struct seccomp_filter *sfilter,
>
> bikeshedding: "cache check" doesn't tell me anything about what it's
> actually checking for. How about calling this seccomp_is_constant_allow() or
> something that reflects both the "bool" return ("is") and what that bool
> means ("should always be allowed").

We have a naming conflict here. I'm about to rename
seccomp_emu_is_const_allow to seccomp_is_const_allow. Adding another
seccomp_is_constant_allow is confusing. Suggestions?

I think I would prefer to change seccomp_cache_check to
seccomp_cache_check_allow. While in this patch set seccomp_cache_check
does imply the filter is "constant" allow, argument-processing cache
may change this, and specifying an "allow" in the name specifies the
'what that bool means ("should always be allowed")'.

YiFei Zhu