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Date:   Sun, 11 Oct 2020 13:53:06 -0700
From:   Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
To:     "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc:     Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>,
        containers@lists.linux-foundation.org,
        Alexander Mihalicyn <alexander@mihalicyn.com>,
        Mrunal Patel <mpatel@redhat.com>, Wat Lim <watl@google.com>,
        Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>,
        Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>,
        Geoffrey Thomas <geofft@ldpreload.com>,
        "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
        Joseph Christopher Sible <jcsible@cert.org>,
        =?iso-8859-1?Q?Micka=EBl_Sala=FCn?= <mic@digikod.net>,
        Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>,
        Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@redhat.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
        Stephane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
        Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: LPC 2020 Hackroom Session: summary and next steps for isolated
 user namespaces
Message-ID: <20201011205306.GC17441@localhost>
References: <20200830143959.rhosiunyz5yqbr35@wittgenstein>
 <20201010042606.GA30062@mail.hallyn.com>
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On Fri, Oct 09, 2020 at 11:26:06PM -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > 3. Find a way to allow setgroups() in a user namespace while keeping
> >    in mind the case of groups used for negative access control.
> >    This was suggested by Josh Triplett and Geoffrey Thomas. Their idea was to
> >    investigate adding a prctl() to allow setgroups() to be called in a user
> >    namespace at the cost of restricting paths to the most restrictive
> >    permission. So if something is 0707 it needs to be treated as if it's 0000
> >    even though the caller is not in its owning group which is used for negative
> >    access control (how these new semantics will interact with ACLs will also
> >    need to be looked into).
> 
> I should probably think this through more, but for this problem, would it
> not suffice to add a new prevgroups grouplist to the struct cred, maybe
> struct group_info *locked_groups, and every time an unprivileged task creates
> a new user namespace, add all its current groups to this list?

So, effectively, you would be allowed to drop permissions, but
locked_groups would still be checked for restrictions?

That seems like it'd introduce a new level of complexity (a new facet of
permission) to manage. Not opposed, but it does seem more complex than
just opting out of using groups for negative permissions.