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Peter Anvin" , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann , Andy Lutomirski , Balbir Singh , Borislav Petkov , Cyrill Gorcunov , Dave Hansen , Eugene Syromiatnikov , Florian Weimer , "H.J. Lu" , Jann Horn , Jonathan Corbet , Kees Cook , Mike Kravetz , Nadav Amit , Oleg Nesterov , Pavel Machek , Peter Zijlstra , Randy Dunlap , "Ravi V. Shankar" , Vedvyas Shanbhogue , Dave Martin , Weijiang Yang , Pengfei Xu Cc: Yu-cheng Yu Subject: [PATCH v14 13/26] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking Date: Mon, 12 Oct 2020 08:38:37 -0700 Message-Id: <20201012153850.26996-14-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.21.0 In-Reply-To: <20201012153850.26996-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> References: <20201012153850.26996-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Shadow stack accesses are those that are performed by the CPU where it expects to encounter a shadow stack mapping. These accesses are performed implicitly by CALL/RET at the site of the shadow stack pointer. These accesses are made explicitly by shadow stack management instructions like WRUSSQ. Shadow stacks accesses to shadow-stack mapping can see faults in normal, valid operation just like regular accesses to regular mappings. Shadow stacks need some of the same features like delayed allocation, swap and copy-on-write. Shadow stack accesses can also result in errors, such as when a shadow stack overflows, or if a shadow stack access occurs to a non-shadow-stack mapping. In handling a shadow stack page fault, verify it occurs within a shadow stack mapping. It is always an error otherwise. For valid shadow stack accesses, set FAULT_FLAG_WRITE to effect copy-on-write. Because clearing _PAGE_DIRTY_HW (vs. _PAGE_RW) is used to trigger the fault, shadow stack read fault and shadow stack write fault are not differentiated and both are handled as a write access. Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu Reviewed-by: Kees Cook --- arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h index 714b1a30e7b0..28b493c53d70 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h @@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ void __noreturn handle_stack_overflow(const char *message, * bit 3 == 1: use of reserved bit detected * bit 4 == 1: fault was an instruction fetch * bit 5 == 1: protection keys block access + * bit 6 == 1: shadow stack access fault */ enum x86_pf_error_code { X86_PF_PROT = 1 << 0, @@ -58,5 +59,6 @@ enum x86_pf_error_code { X86_PF_RSVD = 1 << 3, X86_PF_INSTR = 1 << 4, X86_PF_PK = 1 << 5, + X86_PF_SHSTK = 1 << 6, }; #endif /* _ASM_X86_TRAPS_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c index 6e3e8a124903..2390399c157f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c @@ -1110,6 +1110,17 @@ access_error(unsigned long error_code, struct vm_area_struct *vma) (error_code & X86_PF_INSTR), foreign)) return 1; + /* + * Verify a shadow stack access is within a shadow stack VMA. + * It is always an error otherwise. Normal data access to a + * shadow stack area is checked in the case followed. + */ + if (error_code & X86_PF_SHSTK) { + if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHSTK)) + return 1; + return 0; + } + if (error_code & X86_PF_WRITE) { /* write, present and write, not present: */ if (unlikely(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))) @@ -1275,6 +1286,14 @@ void do_user_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS, 1, regs, address); + /* + * Clearing _PAGE_DIRTY_HW is used to detect shadow stack access. + * This method cannot distinguish shadow stack read vs. write. + * For valid shadow stack accesses, set FAULT_FLAG_WRITE to effect + * copy-on-write. + */ + if (hw_error_code & X86_PF_SHSTK) + flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE; if (hw_error_code & X86_PF_WRITE) flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE; if (hw_error_code & X86_PF_INSTR) -- 2.21.0