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References: <20201020191732.4049987-1-salyzyn@android.com>
In-Reply-To: <20201020191732.4049987-1-salyzyn@android.com>
From:   Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Date:   Tue, 20 Oct 2020 19:10:53 -0400
Message-ID: <CAHC9VhRMj-y2RsJ6HnbVYJV9j_snEqnmoNc6-wFacLG9wyqJpQ@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v17 0/4] overlayfs override_creds=off & nested get xattr fix
To:     Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Cc:     linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kernel-team@android.com,
        Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
        Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>,
        "Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
        Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>,
        Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
        Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
        John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>,
        linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
        selinux@vger.kernel.org
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On Tue, Oct 20, 2020 at 3:17 PM Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com> wrote:
>
> Mark Salyzyn (3):
>   Add flags option to get xattr method paired to __vfs_getxattr
>   overlayfs: handle XATTR_NOSECURITY flag for get xattr method
>   overlayfs: override_creds=off option bypass creator_cred
>
> Mark Salyzyn + John Stultz (1):
>   overlayfs: inode_owner_or_capable called during execv
>
> The first three patches address fundamental security issues that should
> be solved regardless of the override_creds=off feature.
>
> The fourth adds the feature depends on these other fixes.
>
> By default, all access to the upper, lower and work directories is the
> recorded mounter's MAC and DAC credentials.  The incoming accesses are
> checked against the caller's credentials.
>
> If the principles of least privilege are applied for sepolicy, the
> mounter's credentials might not overlap the credentials of the caller's
> when accessing the overlayfs filesystem.  For example, a file that a
> lower DAC privileged caller can execute, is MAC denied to the
> generally higher DAC privileged mounter, to prevent an attack vector.
>
> We add the option to turn off override_creds in the mount options; all
> subsequent operations after mount on the filesystem will be only the
> caller's credentials.  The module boolean parameter and mount option
> override_creds is also added as a presence check for this "feature",
> existence of /sys/module/overlay/parameters/overlay_creds
>
> Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
> Cc: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
> Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
> Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
> To: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
> To: linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: kernel-team@android.com

The SELinux list should also be CC'd on these patches.  For those who
may just be seeing this, the lore link is below:

https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20201020191732.4049987-1-salyzyn@android.com/T/#t

-- 
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com