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Date:   Wed, 21 Oct 2020 22:19:14 -0700
From:   Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To:     Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Cc:     linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kernel-team@android.com,
        Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
        Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>,
        "Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
        Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>,
        Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
        Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
        John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>,
        linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RESEND PATCH v18 0/4] overlayfs override_creds=off & nested get
 xattr fix
Message-ID: <20201022051914.GI857@sol.localdomain>
References: <20201021151903.652827-1-salyzyn@android.com>
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On Wed, Oct 21, 2020 at 08:18:59AM -0700, Mark Salyzyn wrote:
> Mark Salyzyn (3):
>   Add flags option to get xattr method paired to __vfs_getxattr
>   overlayfs: handle XATTR_NOSECURITY flag for get xattr method
>   overlayfs: override_creds=off option bypass creator_cred
> 
> Mark Salyzyn + John Stultz (1):
>   overlayfs: inode_owner_or_capable called during execv
> 
> The first three patches address fundamental security issues that should
> be solved regardless of the override_creds=off feature.
> 
> The fourth adds the feature depends on these other fixes.

FYI, I didn't receive patch 4, and neither https://lkml.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel
nor https://lkml.kernel.org/linux-unionfs have it either.

- Eric