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From:   Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Date:   Wed, 28 Oct 2020 19:25:45 +0100
Message-ID: <CAG48ez3aSn2HSWuO0bhrRSFr_EPqkqshspsqiDZX+aYSpHnjOA@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [seccomp] Request for a "enable on execve" mode for Seccomp filters
To:     Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>
Cc:     Camille Mougey <commial@gmail.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
        lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.pizza>,
        Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>,
        Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>,
        "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
        Denis Efremov <efremov@linux.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
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On Wed, Oct 28, 2020 at 6:52 PM Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org> wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 28, 2020 at 06:34:56PM +0100, Jann Horn wrote:
> > On Wed, Oct 28, 2020 at 5:49 PM Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org> wrote:
> > > On Wed, Oct 28, 2020 at 01:42:13PM +0100, Jann Horn wrote:
> > > > On Wed, Oct 28, 2020 at 12:18 PM Camille Mougey <commial@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > > You're just focusing on execve() - I think it's important to keep in
> > > > mind what happens after execve() for normal, dynamically-linked
> > > > binaries: The next step is that the dynamic linker runs, and it will
> > > > poke around in the file system with access() and openat() and fstat(),
> > > > it will mmap() executable libraries into memory, it will mprotect()
> > > > some memory regions, it will set up thread-local storage (e.g. using
> > > > arch_prctl(); even if the process is single-threaded), and so on.
> > > >
> > > > The earlier you install the seccomp filter, the more of these steps
> > > > you have to permit in the filter. And if you want the filter to take
> > > > effect directly after execve(), the syscalls you'll be forced to
> > > > permit are sufficient to cobble something together in userspace that
> > > > effectively does almost the same thing as execve().
> > >
> > > I would assume you use SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF to implement policy for
> > > controlling these operations and allowing only the ones that are valid
> > > during dynamic linking. This also allows you to defer application of
> > > the filter until after execve. So unless I'm missing some reason why
> > > this doesn't work, I think the requested functionality is already
> > > available.
> >
> > Ah, yeah, good point.
> >
> > > If you really just want the "activate at exec" behavior, it might be
> > > possible (depending on how SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF behaves when there's
> > > no notify fd open; I forget)
> >
> > syscall returns -ENOSYS. Yeah, that'd probably do the job. (Even
> > though it might be a bit nicer if userspace had control over the errno
> > there, such that it could be EPERM instead... oh well.)
>
> EPERM is a major bug in current sandbox implementations, so ENOSYS is
> at least mildly better, but indeed it should be controllable, probably
> by allowing a code path for the BPF to continue with a jump to a
> different logic path if the notify listener is missing.

I guess we might be able to expose the listener status through a bit /
a field in the struct seccomp_data, and then filters could branch on
that. (And the kernel would run the filter twice if we raced with
filter detachment.) I don't know whether it would look pretty, but I
think it should be doable...