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From:   Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Date:   Fri, 30 Oct 2020 19:00:16 +0100
Message-ID: <CAG48ez3ojo9cLuZWjeB4W2Etv3gJrkAryxMLrgFc-awgYVvoHQ@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 1/2] ptrace: Set PF_SUPERPRIV when checking capability
To:     =?UTF-8?B?TWlja2HDq2wgU2FsYcO8bg==?= <mic@digikod.net>
Cc:     Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
        Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
        Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>,
        James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
        "Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
        Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>,
        Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
        kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>,
        =?UTF-8?B?TWlja2HDq2wgU2FsYcO8bg==?= <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
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On Fri, Oct 30, 2020 at 5:06 PM Micka=C3=ABl Sala=C3=BCn <mic@digikod.net> =
wrote:
> On 30/10/2020 16:47, Jann Horn wrote:
> > On Fri, Oct 30, 2020 at 1:39 PM Micka=C3=ABl Sala=C3=BCn <mic@digikod.n=
et> wrote:
> >> Commit 69f594a38967 ("ptrace: do not audit capability check when outpu=
ting
> >> /proc/pid/stat") replaced the use of ns_capable() with
> >> has_ns_capability{,_noaudit}() which doesn't set PF_SUPERPRIV.
> >>
> >> Commit 6b3ad6649a4c ("ptrace: reintroduce usage of subjective credenti=
als in
> >> ptrace_has_cap()") replaced has_ns_capability{,_noaudit}() with
> >> security_capable(), which doesn't set PF_SUPERPRIV neither.
> >>
> >> Since commit 98f368e9e263 ("kernel: Add noaudit variant of ns_capable(=
)"), a
> >> new ns_capable_noaudit() helper is available.  Let's use it!
> >>
> >> As a result, the signature of ptrace_has_cap() is restored to its orig=
inal one.
> >>
> >> Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
> >> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
> >> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
> >> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> >> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
> >> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> >> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
> >> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> >> Fixes: 6b3ad6649a4c ("ptrace: reintroduce usage of subjective credenti=
als in ptrace_has_cap()")
> >> Fixes: 69f594a38967 ("ptrace: do not audit capability check when outpu=
ting /proc/pid/stat")
> >> Signed-off-by: Micka=C3=ABl Sala=C3=BCn <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
> >
> > Yeah... I guess this makes sense. (We'd have to undo or change it if
> > we ever end up needing to use a different set of credentials, e.g.
> > from ->f_cred, but I guess that's really something we should avoid
> > anyway.)
> >
> > Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
> >
> > with one nit:
> >
> >
> > [...]
> >>  /* Returns 0 on success, -errno on denial. */
> >>  static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int=
 mode)
> >>  {
> >> -       const struct cred *cred =3D current_cred(), *tcred;
> >> +       const struct cred *const cred =3D current_cred(), *tcred;
> >
> > This is an unrelated change, and almost no kernel code marks local
> > pointer variables as "const". I would drop this change from the patch.
>
> This give guarantee that the cred variable will not be used for
> something else than current_cred(), which kinda prove that this patch
> doesn't change the behavior of __ptrace_may_access() by not using cred
> in ptrace_has_cap(). It doesn't hurt and I think it could be useful to
> spot issues when backporting.

And it might require an extra fixup while backporting because the next
line is different and that might cause the patch to not apply.