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[23.128.96.18]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id ca2si13897474edb.502.2020.11.17.06.06.33; Tue, 17 Nov 2020 06:07:01 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.18; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=default header.b=YRGH1y2l; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=linuxfoundation.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729342AbgKQOCP (ORCPT + 99 others); Tue, 17 Nov 2020 09:02:15 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:44162 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1729693AbgKQNNc (ORCPT ); Tue, 17 Nov 2020 08:13:32 -0500 Received: from localhost (83-86-74-64.cable.dynamic.v4.ziggo.nl [83.86.74.64]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id AF087221EB; Tue, 17 Nov 2020 13:13:31 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1605618812; bh=yU/BCde+VQPfwl4DfTOEL7nAzesvlkrIGSOGDzKVqPo=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=YRGH1y2lsKiEf2N05lA5kY70bU12IUVknP+ME+5Wxiy7QSn1GAle9P5v57xkneJdA x3NMiy4FW06/+yE8FiwfcptGkVb38IP+rtJwmqam7z+Nm7otKwtoXCtOQK3moKlzsh AQCa18r2joCq2pyAzn+AQKAuXEqNFiAy9yDttxXQ= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Oleksij Rempel , Oliver Hartkopp , Marc Kleine-Budde , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 4.14 16/85] can: can_create_echo_skb(): fix echo skb generation: always use skb_clone() Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2020 14:04:45 +0100 Message-Id: <20201117122111.830535627@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 In-Reply-To: <20201117122111.018425544@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20201117122111.018425544@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Oleksij Rempel [ Upstream commit 286228d382ba6320f04fa2e7c6fc8d4d92e428f4 ] All user space generated SKBs are owned by a socket (unless injected into the key via AF_PACKET). If a socket is closed, all associated skbs will be cleaned up. This leads to a problem when a CAN driver calls can_put_echo_skb() on a unshared SKB. If the socket is closed prior to the TX complete handler, can_get_echo_skb() and the subsequent delivering of the echo SKB to all registered callbacks, a SKB with a refcount of 0 is delivered. To avoid the problem, in can_get_echo_skb() the original SKB is now always cloned, regardless of shared SKB or not. If the process exists it can now safely discard its SKBs, without disturbing the delivery of the echo SKB. The problem shows up in the j1939 stack, when it clones the incoming skb, which detects the already 0 refcount. We can easily reproduce this with following example: testj1939 -B -r can0: & cansend can0 1823ff40#0123 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 293 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0x108/0x174 refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. Modules linked in: coda_vpu imx_vdoa videobuf2_vmalloc dw_hdmi_ahb_audio vcan CPU: 0 PID: 293 Comm: cansend Not tainted 5.5.0-rc6-00376-g9e20dcb7040d #1 Hardware name: Freescale i.MX6 Quad/DualLite (Device Tree) Backtrace: [] (dump_backtrace) from [] (show_stack+0x20/0x24) [] (show_stack) from [] (dump_stack+0x8c/0xa0) [] (dump_stack) from [] (__warn+0xe0/0x108) [] (__warn) from [] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0xa8/0xcc) [] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [] (refcount_warn_saturate+0x108/0x174) [] (refcount_warn_saturate) from [] (j1939_can_recv+0x20c/0x210) [] (j1939_can_recv) from [] (can_rcv_filter+0xb4/0x268) [] (can_rcv_filter) from [] (can_receive+0xb0/0xe4) [] (can_receive) from [] (can_rcv+0x48/0x98) [] (can_rcv) from [] (__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x64/0x88) [] (__netif_receive_skb_one_core) from [] (__netif_receive_skb+0x38/0x94) [] (__netif_receive_skb) from [] (netif_receive_skb_internal+0x64/0xf8) [] (netif_receive_skb_internal) from [] (netif_receive_skb+0x34/0x19c) [] (netif_receive_skb) from [] (can_rx_offload_napi_poll+0x58/0xb4) Fixes: 0ae89beb283a ("can: add destructor for self generated skbs") Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel Link: http://lore.kernel.org/r/20200124132656.22156-1-o.rempel@pengutronix.de Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- include/linux/can/skb.h | 20 ++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/can/skb.h b/include/linux/can/skb.h index b3379a97245c1..a34694e675c9a 100644 --- a/include/linux/can/skb.h +++ b/include/linux/can/skb.h @@ -61,21 +61,17 @@ static inline void can_skb_set_owner(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk) */ static inline struct sk_buff *can_create_echo_skb(struct sk_buff *skb) { - if (skb_shared(skb)) { - struct sk_buff *nskb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC); + struct sk_buff *nskb; - if (likely(nskb)) { - can_skb_set_owner(nskb, skb->sk); - consume_skb(skb); - return nskb; - } else { - kfree_skb(skb); - return NULL; - } + nskb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC); + if (unlikely(!nskb)) { + kfree_skb(skb); + return NULL; } - /* we can assume to have an unshared skb with proper owner */ - return skb; + can_skb_set_owner(nskb, skb->sk); + consume_skb(skb); + return nskb; } #endif /* !_CAN_SKB_H */ -- 2.27.0