Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S965197AbWHWUlQ (ORCPT ); Wed, 23 Aug 2006 16:41:16 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S965196AbWHWUlQ (ORCPT ); Wed, 23 Aug 2006 16:41:16 -0400 Received: from kanga.kvack.org ([66.96.29.28]:15822 "EHLO kanga.kvack.org") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S965181AbWHWUlP (ORCPT ); Wed, 23 Aug 2006 16:41:15 -0400 Date: Wed, 23 Aug 2006 16:41:09 -0400 From: Benjamin LaHaise To: Kylene Jo Hall Cc: linux-kernel , LSM ML , Dave Safford , Mimi Zohar , Serge Hallyn Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/7] SLIM main patch Message-ID: <20060823204109.GI28594@kvack.org> References: <1156359937.6720.66.camel@localhost.localdomain> <20060823192733.GG28594@kvack.org> <1156365357.6720.87.camel@localhost.localdomain> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <1156365357.6720.87.camel@localhost.localdomain> User-Agent: Mutt/1.4.1i Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 914 Lines: 20 On Wed, Aug 23, 2006 at 01:35:56PM -0700, Kylene Jo Hall wrote: > Example: The current process is running at the USER level and writing to > a USER file in /home/user/. The process then attempts to read an > UNTRUSTED file. The current process will become UNTRUSTED and the read > allowed to proceed but first write access to all USER files is revoked > including the ones it has open. Don't threads share file tables? What is preventing malicious code from starting another thread which continues writing to the file that the revoke attempt is made on? -ben -- "Time is of no importance, Mr. President, only life is important." Don't Email: . - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/