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[23.128.96.18]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id bd28si15470272edb.329.2020.11.18.07.33.11; Wed, 18 Nov 2020 07:33:35 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.18; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@google.com header.s=20161025 header.b="Rx3USm/E"; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=REJECT sp=REJECT dis=NONE) header.from=google.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727391AbgKRPa3 (ORCPT + 99 others); Wed, 18 Nov 2020 10:30:29 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:48444 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727378AbgKRPa2 (ORCPT ); Wed, 18 Nov 2020 10:30:28 -0500 Received: from mail-qv1-xf42.google.com (mail-qv1-xf42.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::f42]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id AD01FC061A4D for ; Wed, 18 Nov 2020 07:30:27 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-qv1-xf42.google.com with SMTP id v20so1195385qvx.4 for ; Wed, 18 Nov 2020 07:30:27 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc:content-transfer-encoding; bh=wonpByTzbuJxA+M2ARgOF+/g8Val/wioKkFNzzsy6gU=; b=Rx3USm/EF/+xzXJ3dItOEJTB5qqQxP2Bp+5E6BDeVmQUmuyXjg2dtFMCGlq3oB8B4k 9N8bBvMJiAHRFOtjuPCq7jGUb/18cJv4ZalX00BQbblcX4MXB9tWk3qOC3P+rKlTzaQ3 VLJPFJo/V9bAA6oeh/HT7tcmovDyItVsev9cBUPBZmKlt9df/9RTeWO8S8xfY/mKOZ1n KBjxSS9wq1oArwhOhDvrRtzjIYXOCU5zZ/Iz+XKRcsN/1vJP59xcIYdnyT+iRPVz9PEf XqDUR+8daz0CINYLjsROik5nOdPp+S60Nl3rJ0UEifkBuUpJmOYBCi1YW1IxVmGTeKU6 rIMQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc:content-transfer-encoding; bh=wonpByTzbuJxA+M2ARgOF+/g8Val/wioKkFNzzsy6gU=; b=BwthoTjgy35z0Wszl435Vk/uCeLMnmcbBbdWtPG1GeAlMYLZJtGXvLFlt2EDZ7u/M3 1Q9mUvfZPzIERhgSpJSXt1eF1kTk9TjVgWYba/QjrOtmAKDXe5n5a0EY9xgAQutdNKZr VEPuOiZBAZnxyiSuRB20vqdE/7z0rZvfWqtWIA7/GifYGky8x6UPmUVHSceE074YQqJi CtLKHsTRiZ1WR6ILx4YjLDlpSithzF+cvxPfQN0KmGErCnXBLNN84ScJ7q2MWxm+NGrP ga8AgEdyK2iTyxxX70pc72FXBJ4M3Ica6irhHdXRn/N+VsbFMSViPGH6WIPCjfQyJ5VD aVKw== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM530JYhsxIgJuzmhRCd/N/YcaBLQniowL+vdc1kgZqjALtIm2xPHx g7gJxJNbwGovl0D/sjcOpRn9oQqRzx5v4e9g2lQlFw== X-Received: by 2002:a0c:c583:: with SMTP id a3mr5176021qvj.2.1605713426500; Wed, 18 Nov 2020 07:30:26 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: In-Reply-To: From: Alexander Potapenko Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2020 16:30:15 +0100 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH mm v10 05/42] kasan: rename (un)poison_shadow to (un)poison_range To: Andrey Konovalov Cc: Andrew Morton , Catalin Marinas , Will Deacon , Vincenzo Frascino , Dmitry Vyukov , Andrey Ryabinin , Marco Elver , Evgenii Stepanov , Branislav Rankov , Kevin Brodsky , kasan-dev , Linux ARM , Linux Memory Management List , LKML Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Fri, Nov 13, 2020 at 11:16 PM Andrey Konovalov w= rote: > > This is a preparatory commit for the upcoming addition of a new hardware > tag-based (MTE-based) KASAN mode. > > The new mode won't be using shadow memory. Rename external annotation > kasan_unpoison_shadow() to kasan_unpoison_range(), and introduce internal > functions (un)poison_range() (without kasan_ prefix). > > Co-developed-by: Marco Elver > Signed-off-by: Marco Elver > Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov > Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko > --- > Change-Id: Ia359f32815242c4704e49a5f1639ca2d2f8cba69 > --- > include/linux/kasan.h | 6 +++--- > kernel/fork.c | 4 ++-- > mm/kasan/common.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------- > mm/kasan/generic.c | 23 ++++++++++---------- > mm/kasan/kasan.h | 3 ++- > mm/kasan/tags.c | 2 +- > mm/slab_common.c | 2 +- > 7 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h > index 26f2ab92e7ca..d237051dca58 100644 > --- a/include/linux/kasan.h > +++ b/include/linux/kasan.h > @@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ extern void kasan_enable_current(void); > /* Disable reporting bugs for current task */ > extern void kasan_disable_current(void); > > -void kasan_unpoison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size); > +void kasan_unpoison_range(const void *address, size_t size); > > void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task); > > @@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ struct kasan_cache { > size_t __ksize(const void *); > static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr) > { > - kasan_unpoison_shadow(ptr, __ksize(ptr)); > + kasan_unpoison_range(ptr, __ksize(ptr)); > } > size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache); > > @@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled); > > #else /* CONFIG_KASAN */ > > -static inline void kasan_unpoison_shadow(const void *address, size_t siz= e) {} > +static inline void kasan_unpoison_range(const void *address, size_t size= ) {} > > static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task) {= } > > diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c > index 15f189bb8ec4..bee52236f09b 100644 > --- a/kernel/fork.c > +++ b/kernel/fork.c > @@ -225,8 +225,8 @@ static unsigned long *alloc_thread_stack_node(struct = task_struct *tsk, int node) > if (!s) > continue; > > - /* Clear the KASAN shadow of the stack. */ > - kasan_unpoison_shadow(s->addr, THREAD_SIZE); > + /* Mark stack accessible for KASAN. */ > + kasan_unpoison_range(s->addr, THREAD_SIZE); > > /* Clear stale pointers from reused stack. */ > memset(s->addr, 0, THREAD_SIZE); > diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c > index f5739be60edc..6adbf5891aff 100644 > --- a/mm/kasan/common.c > +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c > @@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len) > * Poisons the shadow memory for 'size' bytes starting from 'addr'. > * Memory addresses should be aligned to KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE. > */ > -void kasan_poison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value) > +void poison_range(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value) > { > void *shadow_start, *shadow_end; > > @@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ void kasan_poison_shadow(const void *address, size_t = size, u8 value) > __memset(shadow_start, value, shadow_end - shadow_start); > } > > -void kasan_unpoison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size) > +void unpoison_range(const void *address, size_t size) > { > u8 tag =3D get_tag(address); > > @@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ void kasan_unpoison_shadow(const void *address, size_= t size) > if (is_kfence_address(address)) > return; > > - kasan_poison_shadow(address, size, tag); > + poison_range(address, size, tag); > > if (size & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK) { > u8 *shadow =3D (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(address + size); > @@ -161,12 +161,17 @@ void kasan_unpoison_shadow(const void *address, siz= e_t size) > } > } > > +void kasan_unpoison_range(const void *address, size_t size) > +{ > + unpoison_range(address, size); > +} > + > static void __kasan_unpoison_stack(struct task_struct *task, const void = *sp) > { > void *base =3D task_stack_page(task); > size_t size =3D sp - base; > > - kasan_unpoison_shadow(base, size); > + unpoison_range(base, size); > } > > /* Unpoison the entire stack for a task. */ > @@ -185,7 +190,7 @@ asmlinkage void kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below(const= void *watermark) > */ > void *base =3D (void *)((unsigned long)watermark & ~(THREAD_SIZE = - 1)); > > - kasan_unpoison_shadow(base, watermark - base); > + unpoison_range(base, watermark - base); > } > > void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) > @@ -199,13 +204,13 @@ void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned = int order) > tag =3D random_tag(); > for (i =3D 0; i < (1 << order); i++) > page_kasan_tag_set(page + i, tag); > - kasan_unpoison_shadow(page_address(page), PAGE_SIZE << order); > + unpoison_range(page_address(page), PAGE_SIZE << order); > } > > void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) > { > if (likely(!PageHighMem(page))) > - kasan_poison_shadow(page_address(page), > + poison_range(page_address(page), > PAGE_SIZE << order, > KASAN_FREE_PAGE); > } > @@ -297,18 +302,18 @@ void kasan_poison_slab(struct page *page) > > for (i =3D 0; i < compound_nr(page); i++) > page_kasan_tag_reset(page + i); > - kasan_poison_shadow(page_address(page), page_size(page), > - KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE); > + poison_range(page_address(page), page_size(page), > + KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE); > } > > void kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object) > { > - kasan_unpoison_shadow(object, cache->object_size); > + unpoison_range(object, cache->object_size); > } > > void kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object) > { > - kasan_poison_shadow(object, > + poison_range(object, > round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_S= IZE), > KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE); > } > @@ -424,7 +429,7 @@ static bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cach= e, void *object, > } > > rounded_up_size =3D round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCA= LE_SIZE); > - kasan_poison_shadow(object, rounded_up_size, KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE); > + poison_range(object, rounded_up_size, KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE); > > if ((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && !quarantine) || > unlikely(!(cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN))) > @@ -467,9 +472,9 @@ static void *__kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache= , const void *object, > tag =3D assign_tag(cache, object, false, keep_tag); > > /* Tag is ignored in set_tag without CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */ > - kasan_unpoison_shadow(set_tag(object, tag), size); > - kasan_poison_shadow((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_= start, > - KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE); > + unpoison_range(set_tag(object, tag), size); > + poison_range((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start, > + KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE); > > if (cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN) > kasan_set_track(&get_alloc_info(cache, object)->alloc_tra= ck, flags); > @@ -508,9 +513,9 @@ void * __must_check kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *p= tr, size_t size, > KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE); > redzone_end =3D (unsigned long)ptr + page_size(page); > > - kasan_unpoison_shadow(ptr, size); > - kasan_poison_shadow((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_= start, > - KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE); > + unpoison_range(ptr, size); > + poison_range((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start, > + KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE); > > return (void *)ptr; > } > @@ -542,7 +547,7 @@ void kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsigned long ip) > kasan_report_invalid_free(ptr, ip); > return; > } > - kasan_poison_shadow(ptr, page_size(page), KASAN_FREE_PAGE= ); > + poison_range(ptr, page_size(page), KASAN_FREE_PAGE); > } else { > __kasan_slab_free(page->slab_cache, ptr, ip, false); > } > @@ -728,7 +733,7 @@ int kasan_populate_vmalloc(unsigned long addr, unsign= ed long size) > * // vmalloc() allocates memory > * // let a =3D area->addr > * // we reach kasan_populate_vmalloc > - * // and call kasan_unpoison_shadow: > + * // and call unpoison_range: > * STORE shadow(a), unpoison_val > * ... > * STORE shadow(a+99), unpoison_val x =3D LOAD p > @@ -763,7 +768,7 @@ void kasan_poison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned= long size) > return; > > size =3D round_up(size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE); > - kasan_poison_shadow(start, size, KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID); > + poison_range(start, size, KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID); > } > > void kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size) > @@ -771,7 +776,7 @@ void kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsign= ed long size) > if (!is_vmalloc_or_module_addr(start)) > return; > > - kasan_unpoison_shadow(start, size); > + unpoison_range(start, size); > } > > static int kasan_depopulate_vmalloc_pte(pte_t *ptep, unsigned long addr, > diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic.c b/mm/kasan/generic.c > index d6a386255007..cdc2d8112f3e 100644 > --- a/mm/kasan/generic.c > +++ b/mm/kasan/generic.c > @@ -203,11 +203,11 @@ static void register_global(struct kasan_global *gl= obal) > { > size_t aligned_size =3D round_up(global->size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE= _SIZE); > > - kasan_unpoison_shadow(global->beg, global->size); > + unpoison_range(global->beg, global->size); > > - kasan_poison_shadow(global->beg + aligned_size, > - global->size_with_redzone - aligned_size, > - KASAN_GLOBAL_REDZONE); > + poison_range(global->beg + aligned_size, > + global->size_with_redzone - aligned_size, > + KASAN_GLOBAL_REDZONE); > } > > void __asan_register_globals(struct kasan_global *globals, size_t size) > @@ -286,13 +286,12 @@ void __asan_alloca_poison(unsigned long addr, size_= t size) > > WARN_ON(!IS_ALIGNED(addr, KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE)); > > - kasan_unpoison_shadow((const void *)(addr + rounded_down_size), > - size - rounded_down_size); > - kasan_poison_shadow(left_redzone, KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE, > - KASAN_ALLOCA_LEFT); > - kasan_poison_shadow(right_redzone, > - padding_size + KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE, > - KASAN_ALLOCA_RIGHT); > + unpoison_range((const void *)(addr + rounded_down_size), > + size - rounded_down_size); > + poison_range(left_redzone, KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE, > + KASAN_ALLOCA_LEFT); > + poison_range(right_redzone, padding_size + KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_S= IZE, > + KASAN_ALLOCA_RIGHT); > } > EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_alloca_poison); > > @@ -302,7 +301,7 @@ void __asan_allocas_unpoison(const void *stack_top, c= onst void *stack_bottom) > if (unlikely(!stack_top || stack_top > stack_bottom)) > return; > > - kasan_unpoison_shadow(stack_top, stack_bottom - stack_top); > + unpoison_range(stack_top, stack_bottom - stack_top); > } > EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_allocas_unpoison); > > diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.h b/mm/kasan/kasan.h > index ac499456740f..42ab02c61331 100644 > --- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h > +++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.h > @@ -150,7 +150,8 @@ static inline bool addr_has_shadow(const void *addr) > return (addr >=3D kasan_shadow_to_mem((void *)KASAN_SHADOW_START)= ); > } > > -void kasan_poison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value); > +void poison_range(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value); > +void unpoison_range(const void *address, size_t size); > > /** > * check_memory_region - Check memory region, and report if invalid acce= ss. > diff --git a/mm/kasan/tags.c b/mm/kasan/tags.c > index 5c8b08a25715..c0b3f327812b 100644 > --- a/mm/kasan/tags.c > +++ b/mm/kasan/tags.c > @@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__hwasan_storeN_noabort); > > void __hwasan_tag_memory(unsigned long addr, u8 tag, unsigned long size) > { > - kasan_poison_shadow((void *)addr, size, tag); > + poison_range((void *)addr, size, tag); > } > EXPORT_SYMBOL(__hwasan_tag_memory); > > diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c > index 479d17b90155..0b5ae1819a8b 100644 > --- a/mm/slab_common.c > +++ b/mm/slab_common.c > @@ -1179,7 +1179,7 @@ size_t ksize(const void *objp) > * We assume that ksize callers could use whole allocated area, > * so we need to unpoison this area. > */ > - kasan_unpoison_shadow(objp, size); > + kasan_unpoison_range(objp, size); > return size; > } > EXPORT_SYMBOL(ksize); > -- > 2.29.2.299.gdc1121823c-goog > --=20 Alexander Potapenko Software Engineer Google Germany GmbH Erika-Mann-Stra=C3=9Fe, 33 80636 M=C3=BCnchen Gesch=C3=A4ftsf=C3=BChrer: Paul Manicle, Halimah DeLaine Prado Registergericht und -nummer: Hamburg, HRB 86891 Sitz der Gesellschaft: Hamburg