Received: by 2002:a05:6a10:16a7:0:0:0:0 with SMTP id gp39csp842578pxb; Thu, 19 Nov 2020 15:30:35 -0800 (PST) X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJyLDhgNFhlYJHYslW9t0f9/6iEGgM16yk+dFIWRgOGA2yWZ24aOGNf6LO8UtkPiqeOO2hOx X-Received: by 2002:a50:e68a:: with SMTP id z10mr4197842edm.28.1605828635349; Thu, 19 Nov 2020 15:30:35 -0800 (PST) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1605828635; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=IzAs1wNs4LvUCc5uOJuzjWXLMeJYg16Almjl4I9aljorZOQKG2Yz8uAsu1EK7FG2P7 BiFpy0JZ033SaJLD934EyUMcqsMMCTb8bxCpaxXttCwTxXC07axvOYJsBuiutG9FAUqj ltQMuehqMr9uSrqah4HR6q32LSwq/u/Oc3bbU/kXr8DcxnR3TMi+y5yZ9fsWPOXouukX NLH4Mhlbmc9I0PrFy2YJhFElLAjRsVmKi6pS9dgP/S3HiJfjd8jRUIw9WaRS8qnMuzz4 XJvra+fmn5zNcKFXja8jXcwvKm0r1YoJXw5s/6nWaz7vwVLrfT8rDcHvpo01phczj3HU IvXQ== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:references:in-reply-to:message-id:date:subject :cc:to:from:dkim-signature:dkim-filter; bh=HQPjCXbmCWoNxq+crvgSRCDuSmapzAI99vhPLiG291M=; b=bDEo7E7GhATJsPlCWlBbSX5wo5xeLyP2vF8OXrVWyVIpiUVhaaVWOMxWbSXYHNMlFH Smi1gNOCg41U4J83OSURO/WiUFvqeRJn17U4oxymP5VvHhBgdVbQ3LqXrTkZ36MX7fvp YOkhZbWBVGyWfZc0F0Yysg3igAnqDl57KEs90UvrZVvNeLsROgwqnpJ9h95j7pNtuY1e FloHOzjfUu1uBjwmyUsxkHkzGegNiOZNljCBmDjcM33P2xVMPsuNdMVHKki93go4qeAT tDFxMIGChgrHNcbJRAH3TPA2ddKDlqRYQo9UN9vHU01ORFqb1BnRa4pWpjjlB0giwAp8 dxeA== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.s=default header.b=Eh0J0BWt; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=linux.microsoft.com Return-Path: Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org. [23.128.96.18]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id r26si797987ejb.597.2020.11.19.15.30.12; Thu, 19 Nov 2020 15:30:35 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.18; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.s=default header.b=Eh0J0BWt; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=linux.microsoft.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727161AbgKSX0i (ORCPT + 99 others); Thu, 19 Nov 2020 18:26:38 -0500 Received: from linux.microsoft.com ([13.77.154.182]:32948 "EHLO linux.microsoft.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727071AbgKSX00 (ORCPT ); Thu, 19 Nov 2020 18:26:26 -0500 Received: from tusharsu-Ubuntu.lan (c-71-197-163-6.hsd1.wa.comcast.net [71.197.163.6]) by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 3F33020B8007; Thu, 19 Nov 2020 15:26:25 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com 3F33020B8007 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1605828385; bh=HQPjCXbmCWoNxq+crvgSRCDuSmapzAI99vhPLiG291M=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=Eh0J0BWtS8OEKfZFU22fAm2WREPLsbvN+DQS8POGO9JYEe7Ex4W5fv2nHM2MzLkS9 BcuYCYBT1YUfiA3t9pMv/XxKdXtTw/mzCEKJe9Bn3IUBQzNR0eScu4IMR0IgWl/GEB lswP8P9NqOEhbT36Zg4BKLQtyq392BoObRivaExw= From: Tushar Sugandhi To: zohar@linux.ibm.com, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com, gmazyland@gmail.com, paul@paul-moore.com Cc: tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com, sashal@kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, nramas@linux.microsoft.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com Subject: [PATCH v6 8/8] selinux: measure state and hash of the policy using IMA Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2020 15:26:11 -0800 Message-Id: <20201119232611.30114-9-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.1 In-Reply-To: <20201119232611.30114-1-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> References: <20201119232611.30114-1-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian IMA measures files and buffer data such as keys, command line arguments passed to the kernel on kexec system call, etc. While these measurements enable monitoring and validating the integrity of the system, it is not sufficient. In-memory data structures maintained by various kernel components store the current state and policies configured for the components. Updates to these data structures would have an impact on the functionalities. For example, the in-memory data structures maintained by SELinux store the configuration and policies for this security module and thereby determine the security functionalities provided by this module. Changes to these data at runtime would have an impact on the security guarantees provided by SELinux. Measuring such in-memory data structures through IMA subsystem provides a secure way for a remote attestation service to know the state of the system and also the runtime changes in the state of the system. SELinux configuration and policy are some of the critical data for this security module that need to be measured. This measurement can be used by an attestation service, for instance, to verify if the configurations and policies have been setup correctly and that they haven't been tampered at run-time. Measure SELinux configurations, policy capabilities settings, and the hash of the loaded policy by calling the IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data(). Since the size of the loaded policy can be large (several MB), measure the hash of the policy instead of the entire policy to avoid bloating the IMA log entry. Add "selinux" to the list of supported data sources maintained by IMA to enable measuring SELinux data. To enable SELinux data measurement, the following steps are required: 1, Add "ima_policy=critical_data" to the kernel command line arguments to enable measuring SELinux data at boot time. For example, BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-5.10.0-rc1+ root=UUID=fd643309-a5d2-4ed3-b10d-3c579a5fab2f ro nomodeset security=selinux ima_policy=critical_data 2, Add the following rule to /etc/ima/ima-policy measure func=CRITICAL_DATA data_sources=selinux template=ima-buf Sample measurement of SELinux state and hash of the policy: 10 e32e...5ac3 ima-buf sha256:86e8...4594 selinux-state-1595389364:287899386 696e697469616c697a65643d313b656e61626c65643d313b656e666f7263696e673d303b636865636b72657170726f743d313b6e6574776f726b5f706565725f636f6e74726f6c733d313b6f70656e5f7065726d733d313b657874656e6465645f736f636b65745f636c6173733d313b616c776179735f636865636b5f6e6574776f726b3d303b6367726f75705f7365636c6162656c3d313b6e6e705f6e6f737569645f7472616e736974696f6e3d313b67656e66735f7365636c6162656c5f73796d6c696e6b733d303 10 9e81...0857 ima-buf sha256:4941...68fc selinux-policy-hash-1597335667:462051628 8d1d...1834 To verify the measurement check the following: Execute the following command to extract the measured data from the IMA log for SELinux configuration (selinux-state). grep "selinux-state" /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | tail -1 | cut -d' ' -f 6 | xxd -r -p The output should be the list of key-value pairs. For example, initialized=1;enabled=1;enforcing=0;checkreqprot=1;network_peer_controls=1;open_perms=1;extended_socket_class=1;always_check_network=0;cgroup_seclabel=1;nnp_nosuid_transition=1;genfs_seclabel_symlinks=0; To verify the measured data with the current SELinux state: => enabled should be set to 1 if /sys/fs/selinux folder exists, 0 otherwise For other entries, compare the integer value in the files => /sys/fs/selinux/enforce => /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot And, each of the policy capabilities files under => /sys/fs/selinux/policy_capabilities Note that the actual verification would be against an expected state and done on a system other than the measured system, typically requiring "initialized=1; enabled=1;enforcing=1;checkreqprot=0;" for a secure state and then whatever policy capabilities are actually set in the expected policy (which can be extracted from the policy itself via seinfo, for example). For selinux-policy-hash, the hash of SELinux policy is included in the IMA log entry. To verify the measured data with the current SELinux policy run the following commands and verify the output hash values match. sha256sum /sys/fs/selinux/policy | cut -d' ' -f 1 grep "selinux-policy-hash" /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | tail -1 | cut -d' ' -f 6 Note that the actual verification of SELinux policy would require loading the expected policy into an identical kernel on a pristine/known-safe system and run the sha256sum /sys/kernel/selinux/policy there to get the expected hash. Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley --- Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 6 +- security/selinux/Makefile | 2 + security/selinux/hooks.c | 3 + security/selinux/include/security.h | 11 +- security/selinux/measure.c | 157 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 8 ++ security/selinux/ss/services.c | 71 ++++++++++-- 7 files changed, 247 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/selinux/measure.c diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy index ee60442a41cd..db1ee7bcdba7 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ Description: template:= name of a defined IMA template type (eg, ima-ng). Only valid when action is "measure". pcr:= decimal value - data_sources:= list of kernel subsystems that contain + data_sources:= list of kernel subsystems (eg, SeLinux) that contain kernel in-memory data critical to the integrity of the kernel. Only valid when action is "measure" and func is CRITICAL_DATA. @@ -135,3 +135,7 @@ Description: keys added to .builtin_trusted_keys or .ima keyring: measure func=KEY_CHECK keyrings=.builtin_trusted_keys|.ima + + Example of measure rule using CRITICAL_DATA to measure critical data + + measure func=CRITICAL_DATA data_sources=selinux diff --git a/security/selinux/Makefile b/security/selinux/Makefile index 4d8e0e8adf0b..83d512116341 100644 --- a/security/selinux/Makefile +++ b/security/selinux/Makefile @@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ selinux-$(CONFIG_NETLABEL) += netlabel.o selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND) += ibpkey.o +selinux-$(CONFIG_IMA) += measure.o + ccflags-y := -I$(srctree)/security/selinux -I$(srctree)/security/selinux/include $(addprefix $(obj)/,$(selinux-y)): $(obj)/flask.h diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 6b1826fc3658..8b9fde47ae28 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -7398,6 +7398,9 @@ int selinux_disable(struct selinux_state *state) } selinux_mark_disabled(state); + mutex_lock(&state->policy_mutex); + selinux_measure_state(state); + mutex_unlock(&state->policy_mutex); pr_info("SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n"); diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h index 3cc8bab31ea8..18ee65c98446 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h @@ -229,7 +229,8 @@ void selinux_policy_cancel(struct selinux_state *state, struct selinux_policy *policy); int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void **data, size_t *len); - +int security_read_policy_kernel(struct selinux_state *state, + void **data, size_t *len); int security_policycap_supported(struct selinux_state *state, unsigned int req_cap); @@ -446,4 +447,12 @@ extern void ebitmap_cache_init(void); extern void hashtab_cache_init(void); extern int security_sidtab_hash_stats(struct selinux_state *state, char *page); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA +extern void selinux_measure_state(struct selinux_state *selinux_state); +#else +static inline void selinux_measure_state(struct selinux_state *selinux_state) +{ +} +#endif + #endif /* _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_ */ diff --git a/security/selinux/measure.c b/security/selinux/measure.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..65d42059f588 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/selinux/measure.c @@ -0,0 +1,157 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +/* + * Measure SELinux state using IMA subsystem. + */ +#include +#include +#include +#include "security.h" + +/* + * This function creates a unique name by appending the timestamp to + * the given string. This string is passed as "event_name" to the IMA + * hook to measure the given SELinux data. + * + * The data provided by SELinux to the IMA subsystem for measuring may have + * already been measured (for instance the same state existed earlier). + * But for SELinux the current data represents a state change and hence + * needs to be measured again. To enable this, pass a unique "event_name" + * to the IMA hook so that IMA subsystem will always measure the given data. + * + * For example, + * At time T0 SELinux data to be measured is "foo". IMA measures it. + * At time T1 the data is changed to "bar". IMA measures it. + * At time T2 the data is changed to "foo" again. IMA will not measure it + * (since it was already measured) unless the event_name, for instance, + * is different in this call. + */ +static char *selinux_event_name(const char *name_prefix) +{ + char *event_name = NULL; + struct timespec64 cur_time; + + ktime_get_real_ts64(&cur_time); + event_name = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s-%lld:%09ld", name_prefix, + cur_time.tv_sec, cur_time.tv_nsec); + if (!event_name) { + pr_err("%s: event name not allocated.\n", __func__); + return NULL; + } + + return event_name; +} + +static int read_selinux_state(char **state_str, int *state_str_len, + struct selinux_state *state) +{ + char *buf, *str_fmt = "%s=%d;"; + int i, buf_len, curr; + bool initialized = selinux_initialized(state); + bool enabled = !selinux_disabled(state); + bool enforcing = enforcing_enabled(state); + bool checkreqprot = checkreqprot_get(state); + + buf_len = snprintf(NULL, 0, str_fmt, "initialized", initialized); + buf_len += snprintf(NULL, 0, str_fmt, "enabled", enabled); + buf_len += snprintf(NULL, 0, str_fmt, "enforcing", enforcing); + buf_len += snprintf(NULL, 0, str_fmt, "checkreqprot", checkreqprot); + + for (i = 0; i < __POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX; i++) { + buf_len += snprintf(NULL, 0, str_fmt, + selinux_policycap_names[i], + state->policycap[i]); + } + ++buf_len; + + buf = kzalloc(buf_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!buf) + return -ENOMEM; + + curr = scnprintf(buf, buf_len, str_fmt, + "initialized", initialized); + curr += scnprintf((buf + curr), (buf_len - curr), str_fmt, + "enabled", enabled); + curr += scnprintf((buf + curr), (buf_len - curr), str_fmt, + "enforcing", enforcing); + curr += scnprintf((buf + curr), (buf_len - curr), str_fmt, + "checkreqprot", checkreqprot); + + for (i = 0; i < __POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX; i++) { + curr += scnprintf((buf + curr), (buf_len - curr), str_fmt, + selinux_policycap_names[i], + state->policycap[i]); + } + + *state_str = buf; + *state_str_len = curr; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * selinux_measure_state - Measure SELinux state configuration and hash of + * the SELinux policy. + * @state: selinux state struct + * + * NOTE: This function must be called with policy_mutex held. + */ +void selinux_measure_state(struct selinux_state *state) +{ + void *policy = NULL; + char *state_event_name = NULL; + char *policy_event_name = NULL; + char *state_str = NULL; + size_t policy_len; + int state_str_len, rc = 0; + bool initialized = selinux_initialized(state); + + /* + * Get a unique string for measuring the current SELinux state. + */ + state_event_name = selinux_event_name("selinux-state"); + if (!state_event_name) { + pr_err("%s: Event name for state not allocated.\n", + __func__); + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + rc = read_selinux_state(&state_str, &state_str_len, state); + if (rc) { + pr_err("%s: Failed to read state %d.\n", __func__, rc); + goto out; + } + + ima_measure_critical_data("selinux", state_event_name, + state_str, state_str_len, false); + + /* + * Measure SELinux policy only after initialization is completed. + */ + if (!initialized) + goto out; + + policy_event_name = selinux_event_name("selinux-policy-hash"); + if (!policy_event_name) { + pr_err("%s: Event name for policy not allocated.\n", + __func__); + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + rc = security_read_policy_kernel(state, &policy, &policy_len); + if (rc) { + pr_err("%s: Failed to read policy %d.\n", __func__, rc); + goto out; + } + + ima_measure_critical_data("selinux", policy_event_name, + policy, policy_len, true); + + vfree(policy); + +out: + kfree(policy_event_name); + kfree(state_str); + kfree(state_event_name); +} diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index 4bde570d56a2..015650220cb2 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -182,6 +182,10 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, selinux_status_update_setenforce(state, new_value); if (!new_value) call_blocking_lsm_notifier(LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, NULL); + + mutex_lock(&state->policy_mutex); + selinux_measure_state(state); + mutex_unlock(&state->policy_mutex); } length = count; out: @@ -762,6 +766,10 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_checkreqprot(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, checkreqprot_set(fsi->state, (new_value ? 1 : 0)); length = count; + + mutex_lock(&fsi->state->policy_mutex); + selinux_measure_state(fsi->state); + mutex_unlock(&fsi->state->policy_mutex); out: kfree(page); return length; diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index 9704c8a32303..dfa2e00894ae 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -2180,6 +2180,7 @@ static void selinux_notify_policy_change(struct selinux_state *state, selinux_status_update_policyload(state, seqno); selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(); selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(); + selinux_measure_state(state); } void selinux_policy_commit(struct selinux_state *state, @@ -3875,8 +3876,33 @@ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state, } #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */ +/** + * security_read_selinux_policy - read the policy. + * @policy: SELinux policy + * @data: binary policy data + * @len: length of data in bytes + * + */ +static int security_read_selinux_policy(struct selinux_policy *policy, + void *data, size_t *len) +{ + int rc; + struct policy_file fp; + + fp.data = data; + fp.len = *len; + + rc = policydb_write(&policy->policydb, &fp); + if (rc) + return rc; + + *len = (unsigned long)fp.data - (unsigned long)data; + return 0; +} + /** * security_read_policy - read the policy. + * @state: selinux_state * @data: binary policy data * @len: length of data in bytes * @@ -3885,8 +3911,6 @@ int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void **data, size_t *len) { struct selinux_policy *policy; - int rc; - struct policy_file fp; policy = rcu_dereference_protected( state->policy, lockdep_is_held(&state->policy_mutex)); @@ -3898,14 +3922,43 @@ int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, if (!*data) return -ENOMEM; - fp.data = *data; - fp.len = *len; + return security_read_selinux_policy(policy, *data, len); +} - rc = policydb_write(&policy->policydb, &fp); - if (rc) - return rc; +/** + * security_read_policy_kernel - read the policy. + * @state: selinux_state + * @data: binary policy data + * @len: length of data in bytes + * + * Allocates kernel memory for reading SELinux policy. + * This function is for internal use only and should not + * be used for returning data to user space. + * + * This function must be called with policy_mutex held. + */ +int security_read_policy_kernel(struct selinux_state *state, + void **data, size_t *len) +{ + struct selinux_policy *policy; + int rc = 0; - *len = (unsigned long)fp.data - (unsigned long)*data; - return 0; + policy = rcu_dereference_protected( + state->policy, lockdep_is_held(&state->policy_mutex)); + if (!policy) { + rc = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + *len = policy->policydb.len; + *data = vmalloc(*len); + if (!*data) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + rc = security_read_selinux_policy(policy, *data, len); + +out: + return rc; } -- 2.17.1