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[198.145.64.163]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id y21sm3609122pfr.90.2020.12.09.10.57.48 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 09 Dec 2020 10:57:49 -0800 (PST) Date: Wed, 9 Dec 2020 10:57:48 -0800 From: Kees Cook To: Marco Elver Cc: Andrey Konovalov , Andrew Morton , Catalin Marinas , Will Deacon , Vincenzo Frascino , Dmitry Vyukov , Andrey Ryabinin , Alexander Potapenko , Evgenii Stepanov , Branislav Rankov , Kevin Brodsky , kasan-dev , Linux ARM , Linux Memory Management List , LKML Subject: Re: [PATCH mm 1/2] kasan: don't use read-only static keys Message-ID: <202012091057.50DEDCC@keescook> References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Wed, Dec 09, 2020 at 07:49:36PM +0100, Marco Elver wrote: > On Wed, 9 Dec 2020 at 19:24, Andrey Konovalov wrote: > > __ro_after_init static keys are incompatible with usage in loadable kernel > > modules and cause crashes. Don't use those, use normal static keys. > > > > Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov > > Reviewed-by: Marco Elver > > > --- > > > > This fix can be squashed into > > "kasan: add and integrate kasan boot parameters". > > > > --- > > mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 4 ++-- > > 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/mm/kasan/hw_tags.c b/mm/kasan/hw_tags.c > > index c91f2c06ecb5..55bd6f09c70f 100644 > > --- a/mm/kasan/hw_tags.c > > +++ b/mm/kasan/hw_tags.c > > @@ -43,11 +43,11 @@ static enum kasan_arg_stacktrace kasan_arg_stacktrace __ro_after_init; > > static enum kasan_arg_fault kasan_arg_fault __ro_after_init; > > > > /* Whether KASAN is enabled at all. */ > > -DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO(kasan_flag_enabled); > > +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(kasan_flag_enabled); > > Side-node: This appears to be just a bad interface; I think the macro > DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO() is error-prone, if it can't be guaranteed > that this is always safe, since the presence of the macro encourages > its use and we'll inevitably run into this problem again. > > > EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_flag_enabled); > > DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO() + EXPORT_SYMBOL() is an immediate bug. > Given its use has not increased substantially since its introduction, > it may be safer to consider its removal. Right -- it seems the export is the problem, not the RO-ness. What is actually trying to change the flag after __init? -- Kees Cook