Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1752156AbWIHEWJ (ORCPT ); Fri, 8 Sep 2006 00:22:09 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1752153AbWIHEWJ (ORCPT ); Fri, 8 Sep 2006 00:22:09 -0400 Received: from nef2.ens.fr ([129.199.96.40]:2056 "EHLO nef2.ens.fr") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752156AbWIHEWH (ORCPT ); Fri, 8 Sep 2006 00:22:07 -0400 Date: Fri, 8 Sep 2006 06:22:05 +0200 From: David Madore To: Linux Kernel mailing-list , LSM mailing-list Subject: [PATCH] new capability patch, version 0.4.2 (now with fs support), part 1/4 Message-ID: <20060908042205.GD24135@clipper.ens.fr> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.9i X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-1.5.10 (nef2.ens.fr [129.199.96.32]); Fri, 08 Sep 2006 06:22:06 +0200 (CEST) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 9462 Lines: 263 Here's the new version (0.4.2) of my capabilities patch, part 1/4 (increases capability sets to 64 bits). Explanations are on . fs/open.c | 3 ++- fs/proc/array.c | 6 +++--- include/linux/capability.h | 30 +++++++++++++++++++----------- kernel/capability.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- security/commoncap.c | 16 +++++++++++----- security/dummy.c | 6 +++--- 6 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c index 303f06d..e58a525 100644 --- a/fs/open.c +++ b/fs/open.c @@ -515,7 +515,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_faccessat(int dfd, c * but we cannot because user_path_walk can sleep. */ if (current->uid) - cap_clear(current->cap_effective); + current->cap_effective = cap_intersect(current->cap_effective, + CAP_REGULAR_SET); else current->cap_effective = current->cap_permitted; diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c index 0b615d6..6724fc2 100644 --- a/fs/proc/array.c +++ b/fs/proc/array.c @@ -285,9 +285,9 @@ static inline char * task_sig(struct tas static inline char *task_cap(struct task_struct *p, char *buffer) { - return buffer + sprintf(buffer, "CapInh:\t%016x\n" - "CapPrm:\t%016x\n" - "CapEff:\t%016x\n", + return buffer + sprintf(buffer, "CapInh:\t%016llx\n" + "CapPrm:\t%016llx\n" + "CapEff:\t%016llx\n", cap_t(p->cap_inheritable), cap_t(p->cap_permitted), cap_t(p->cap_effective)); diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h index 6548b35..e4f6065 100644 --- a/include/linux/capability.h +++ b/include/linux/capability.h @@ -27,7 +27,8 @@ #include library since the draft standard requires the use of malloc/free etc.. */ -#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION 0x19980330 +#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION 0x20060903 +#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_OLD_VERSION 0x19980330 typedef struct __user_cap_header_struct { __u32 version; @@ -35,10 +36,16 @@ typedef struct __user_cap_header_struct } __user *cap_user_header_t; typedef struct __user_cap_data_struct { + __u64 effective; + __u64 permitted; + __u64 inheritable; +} __user *cap_user_data_t; + +typedef struct __user_cap_data_old_struct { __u32 effective; __u32 permitted; __u32 inheritable; -} __user *cap_user_data_t; +} __user *cap_user_data_old_t; #ifdef __KERNEL__ @@ -50,12 +57,12 @@ #include #ifdef STRICT_CAP_T_TYPECHECKS typedef struct kernel_cap_struct { - __u32 cap; + __u64 cap; } kernel_cap_t; #else -typedef __u32 kernel_cap_t; +typedef __u64 kernel_cap_t; #endif @@ -310,12 +317,13 @@ #define cap_t(x) (x) #endif -#define CAP_EMPTY_SET to_cap_t(0) -#define CAP_FULL_SET to_cap_t(~0) -#define CAP_INIT_EFF_SET to_cap_t(~0 & ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP)) -#define CAP_INIT_INH_SET to_cap_t(0) +#define CAP_EMPTY_SET to_cap_t(0ULL) +#define CAP_FULL_SET to_cap_t(~0ULL) +#define CAP_REGULAR_SET to_cap_t(0xffffffff00000000ULL) +#define CAP_INIT_EFF_SET to_cap_t(~0ULL) +#define CAP_INIT_INH_SET to_cap_t(~0ULL) -#define CAP_TO_MASK(x) (1 << (x)) +#define CAP_TO_MASK(x) (1ULL << (x)) #define cap_raise(c, flag) (cap_t(c) |= CAP_TO_MASK(flag)) #define cap_lower(c, flag) (cap_t(c) &= ~CAP_TO_MASK(flag)) #define cap_raised(c, flag) (cap_t(c) & CAP_TO_MASK(flag)) @@ -351,8 +359,8 @@ static inline kernel_cap_t cap_invert(ke #define cap_isclear(c) (!cap_t(c)) #define cap_issubset(a,set) (!(cap_t(a) & ~cap_t(set))) -#define cap_clear(c) do { cap_t(c) = 0; } while(0) -#define cap_set_full(c) do { cap_t(c) = ~0; } while(0) +#define cap_clear(c) do { cap_t(c) = 0ULL; } while(0) +#define cap_set_full(c) do { cap_t(c) = ~0ULL; } while(0) #define cap_mask(c,mask) do { cap_t(c) &= cap_t(mask); } while(0) #define cap_is_fs_cap(c) (CAP_TO_MASK(c) & CAP_FS_MASK) diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c index c7685ad..1233b1e 100644 --- a/kernel/capability.c +++ b/kernel/capability.c @@ -52,7 +52,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_capget(cap_user_head if (get_user(version, &header->version)) return -EFAULT; - if (version != _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION) { + if (version != _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION + && version != _LINUX_CAPABILITY_OLD_VERSION) { if (put_user(_LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION, &header->version)) return -EFAULT; return -EINVAL; @@ -82,8 +83,18 @@ out: read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); spin_unlock(&task_capability_lock); - if (!ret && copy_to_user(dataptr, &data, sizeof data)) - return -EFAULT; + if (!ret) { + if (version == _LINUX_CAPABILITY_OLD_VERSION) { + struct __user_cap_data_old_struct data_old; + data_old.effective = data_old.effective & 0xffffffffULL; + data_old.permitted = data_old.permitted & 0xffffffffULL; + data_old.inheritable = data_old.inheritable & 0xffffffffULL; + if (copy_to_user(dataptr, &data_old, sizeof data_old)) + return -EFAULT; + } else + if (copy_to_user(dataptr, &data, sizeof data)) + return -EFAULT; + } return ret; } @@ -179,7 +190,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_capset(cap_user_head if (get_user(version, &header->version)) return -EFAULT; - if (version != _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION) { + if (version != _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION + && version != _LINUX_CAPABILITY_OLD_VERSION) { if (put_user(_LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION, &header->version)) return -EFAULT; return -EINVAL; @@ -191,10 +203,23 @@ asmlinkage long sys_capset(cap_user_head if (pid && pid != current->pid && !capable(CAP_SETPCAP)) return -EPERM; - if (copy_from_user(&effective, &data->effective, sizeof(effective)) || - copy_from_user(&inheritable, &data->inheritable, sizeof(inheritable)) || - copy_from_user(&permitted, &data->permitted, sizeof(permitted))) - return -EFAULT; + if (version == _LINUX_CAPABILITY_OLD_VERSION) { + const cap_user_data_old_t data2 = (void *)data; + __u32 w; + if (copy_from_user(&w, &data2->effective, sizeof(w))) + return -EFAULT; + effective = (__u64)w | 0xffffffff00000000ULL; + if (copy_from_user(&w, &data2->inheritable, sizeof(w))) + return -EFAULT; + inheritable = (__u64)w | 0xffffffff00000000ULL; + if (copy_from_user(&w, &data2->permitted, sizeof(w))) + return -EFAULT; + permitted = (__u64)w | 0xffffffff00000000ULL; + } else + if (copy_from_user(&effective, &data->effective, sizeof(effective)) || + copy_from_user(&inheritable, &data->inheritable, sizeof(inheritable)) || + copy_from_user(&permitted, &data->permitted, sizeof(permitted))) + return -EFAULT; spin_lock(&task_capability_lock); read_lock(&tasklist_lock); @@ -237,7 +262,8 @@ out: int __capable(struct task_struct *t, int cap) { if (security_capable(t, cap) == 0) { - t->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV; + if (!cap_raised(CAP_REGULAR_SET, cap)) + t->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV; return 1; } return 0; diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index f50fc29..91dc53d 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -244,13 +244,19 @@ static inline void cap_emulate_setxuid ( int old_suid) { if ((old_ruid == 0 || old_euid == 0 || old_suid == 0) && - (current->uid != 0 && current->euid != 0 && current->suid != 0) && - !current->keep_capabilities) { - cap_clear (current->cap_permitted); - cap_clear (current->cap_effective); + (current->uid != 0 && current->euid != 0 && current->suid != 0)) { + if (!current->keep_capabilities) { + current->cap_permitted + = cap_intersect (current->cap_permitted, + CAP_REGULAR_SET); + current->cap_effective + = cap_intersect (current->cap_effective, + CAP_REGULAR_SET); + } } if (old_euid == 0 && current->euid != 0) { - cap_clear (current->cap_effective); + current->cap_effective = cap_intersect (current->cap_effective, + CAP_REGULAR_SET); } if (old_euid != 0 && current->euid == 0) { current->cap_effective = current->cap_permitted; diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c index 58c6d39..572a15b 100644 --- a/security/dummy.c +++ b/security/dummy.c @@ -37,11 +37,11 @@ static int dummy_ptrace (struct task_str static int dummy_capget (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t * effective, kernel_cap_t * inheritable, kernel_cap_t * permitted) { - *effective = *inheritable = *permitted = 0; + *effective = *inheritable = *permitted = CAP_REGULAR_SET; if (!issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) { if (target->euid == 0) { - *permitted |= (~0 & ~CAP_FS_MASK); - *effective |= (~0 & ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP) & ~CAP_FS_MASK); + *permitted |= (CAP_FULL_SET & ~CAP_FS_MASK); + *effective |= (CAP_FULL_SET & ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP) & ~CAP_FS_MASK); } if (target->fsuid == 0) { *permitted |= CAP_FS_MASK; -- David A. Madore (david.madore@ens.fr, http://www.madore.org/~david/ ) - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/