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Date:   Thu, 7 Jan 2021 09:26:25 -0800
From:   Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To:     Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Cc:     Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>,
        "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
        "Singh, Brijesh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
        "Lendacky, Thomas" <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>,
        X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>, KVM list <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        "dovmurik@linux.vnet.ibm.com" <dovmurik@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
        "tobin@ibm.com" <tobin@ibm.com>,
        "jejb@linux.ibm.com" <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
        "frankeh@us.ibm.com" <frankeh@us.ibm.com>, jon.grimm@amd.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/9] KVM: x86: Add AMD SEV specific Hypercall3
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 <765f86ae-7c68-6722-c6e0-c6150ce69e59@amd.com>
 <20201211225542.GA30409@ashkalra_ubuntu_server>
 <20201212045603.GA27415@ashkalra_ubuntu_server>
 <20201218193956.GJ2956@work-vm>
 <E79E09A2-F314-4B59-B7AE-07B1D422DF2B@amd.com>
 <20201218195641.GL2956@work-vm>
 <20210106230555.GA13999@ashkalra_ubuntu_server>
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On Thu, Jan 07, 2021, Ashish Kalra wrote:
> Hello Steve,
> 
> On Wed, Jan 06, 2021 at 05:01:33PM -0800, Steve Rutherford wrote:
> > Avoiding an rbtree for such a small (but unstable) list seems correct.
> > 
> > For the unencrypted region list strategy, the only questions that I
> > have are fairly secondary.
> > - How should the kernel upper bound the size of the list in the face
> > of malicious guests, but still support large guests? (Something
> > similar to the size provided in the bitmap API would work).
> 
> I am thinking of another scenario, where a malicious guest can make
> infinite/repetetive hypercalls and DOS attack the host. 
> 
> But probably this is a more generic issue, this can be done by any guest
> and under any hypervisor, i don't know what kind of mitigations exist
> for such a scenario ?
> 
> Potentially, the guest memory donation model can handle such an attack,
> because in this model, the hypervisor will expect only one hypercall,
> any repetetive hypercalls can make the hypervisor disable the guest ?

KVM doesn't need to explicitly bound its tracking structures, it just needs to
use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT when allocating kernel memory for the structures so that
the memory will be accounted to the task/process/VM.  Shadow MMU pages are the
only exception that comes to mind; they're still accounted properly, but KVM
also explicitly limits them for a variety of reasons.

The size of the list will naturally be bounded by the size of the guest; and
assuming KVM proactively merges adjancent regions, that upper bound is probably
reasonably low compared to other allocations, e.g. the aforementioned MMU pages.

And, using a list means a malicious guest will get automatically throttled as
the latency of walking the list (to merge/delete existing entries) will increase
with the size of the list.