Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.18;
Date:   Wed, 13 Jan 2021 15:22:02 +0100
From:   Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
To:     Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc:     Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
        Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
        Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>,
        Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>,
        Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
        Edgar Arriaga =?iso-8859-1?Q?Garc=EDa?= 
        <edgararriaga@google.com>, Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com>,
        linux-mm <linux-mm@kvack.org>, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
        Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        kernel-team <kernel-team@android.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] mm/madvise: replace ptrace attach requirement for
 process_madvise
Message-ID: <20210113142202.GC22493@dhcp22.suse.cz>
References: <20210111170622.2613577-1-surenb@google.com>
 <20210112074629.GG22493@dhcp22.suse.cz>
 <20210112174507.GA23780@redhat.com>
 <CAJuCfpFQz=x-LvONO3c4iqjKP4NKJMgUuiYc8HACKHAv1Omu0w@mail.gmail.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Disposition: inline
In-Reply-To: <CAJuCfpFQz=x-LvONO3c4iqjKP4NKJMgUuiYc8HACKHAv1Omu0w@mail.gmail.com>
Precedence: bulk

On Tue 12-01-21 09:51:24, Suren Baghdasaryan wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 12, 2021 at 9:45 AM Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> wrote:
> >
> > On 01/12, Michal Hocko wrote:
> > >
> > > On Mon 11-01-21 09:06:22, Suren Baghdasaryan wrote:
> > >
> > > > What we want is the ability for one process to influence another process
> > > > in order to optimize performance across the entire system while leaving
> > > > the security boundary intact.
> > > > Replace PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH with a combination of PTRACE_MODE_READ
> > > > and CAP_SYS_NICE. PTRACE_MODE_READ to prevent leaking ASLR metadata
> > > > and CAP_SYS_NICE for influencing process performance.
> > >
> > > I have to say that ptrace modes are rather obscure to me. So I cannot
> > > really judge whether MODE_READ is sufficient. My understanding has
> > > always been that this is requred to RO access to the address space. But
> > > this operation clearly has a visible side effect. Do we have any actual
> > > documentation for the existing modes?
> > >
> > > I would be really curious to hear from Jann and Oleg (now Cced).
> >
> > Can't comment, sorry. I never understood these security checks and never tried.
> > IIUC only selinux/etc can treat ATTACH/READ differently and I have no idea what
> > is the difference.
> 
> I haven't seen a written explanation on ptrace modes but when I
> consulted Jann his explanation was:
> 
> PTRACE_MODE_READ means you can inspect metadata about processes with
> the specified domain, across UID boundaries.
> PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH means you can fully impersonate processes with the
> specified domain, across UID boundaries.

Maybe this would be a good start to document expectations. Some more
practical examples where the difference is visible would be great as
well.

> He did agree that in this case PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH seems too
> restrictive (we do not try to gain full control or impersonate a
> process) and PTRACE_MODE_READ is a better choice.

All that being said, I am not against the changed behavior but I do not
feel competent to give an ack.
-- 
Michal Hocko
SUSE Labs