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From:   Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Date:   Thu, 14 Jan 2021 23:43:02 +0100
Message-ID: <CAG48ez2HJCFvmFALDYDYnufE755Dqh3JquAMf-1mnzmRrdKaoQ@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v26 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control
To:     =?UTF-8?B?TWlja2HDq2wgU2FsYcO8bg==?= <mic@digikod.net>
Cc:     James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
        "Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
        Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
        Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
        Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
        Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
        Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
        Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>,
        Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
        Vincent Dagonneau <vincent.dagonneau@ssi.gouv.fr>,
        Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
        Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
        linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
        "open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
        linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
        kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        "open list:KERNEL SELFTEST FRAMEWORK" 
        <linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org>,
        linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
        "the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@kernel.org>,
        =?UTF-8?B?TWlja2HDq2wgU2FsYcO8bg==?= <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
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On Thu, Jan 14, 2021 at 7:54 PM Micka=C3=ABl Sala=C3=BCn <mic@digikod.net> =
wrote:
> On 14/01/2021 04:22, Jann Horn wrote:
> > On Wed, Dec 9, 2020 at 8:28 PM Micka=C3=ABl Sala=C3=BCn <mic@digikod.ne=
t> wrote:
> >> Thanks to the Landlock objects and ruleset, it is possible to identify
> >> inodes according to a process's domain.  To enable an unprivileged
> >> process to express a file hierarchy, it first needs to open a director=
y
> >> (or a file) and pass this file descriptor to the kernel through
> >> landlock_add_rule(2).  When checking if a file access request is
> >> allowed, we walk from the requested dentry to the real root, following
> >> the different mount layers.  The access to each "tagged" inodes are
> >> collected according to their rule layer level, and ANDed to create
> >> access to the requested file hierarchy.  This makes possible to identi=
fy
> >> a lot of files without tagging every inodes nor modifying the
> >> filesystem, while still following the view and understanding the user
> >> has from the filesystem.
> >>
> >> Add a new ARCH_EPHEMERAL_INODES for UML because it currently does not
> >> keep the same struct inodes for the same inodes whereas these inodes a=
re
> >> in use.
> >>
> >> This commit adds a minimal set of supported filesystem access-control
> >> which doesn't enable to restrict all file-related actions.  This is th=
e
> >> result of multiple discussions to minimize the code of Landlock to eas=
e
> >> review.  Thanks to the Landlock design, extending this access-control
> >> without breaking user space will not be a problem.  Moreover, seccomp
> >> filters can be used to restrict the use of syscall families which may
> >> not be currently handled by Landlock.
> > [...]
> >> +static bool check_access_path_continue(
> >> +               const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
> >> +               const struct path *const path, const u32 access_reques=
t,
> >> +               u64 *const layer_mask)
> >> +{
> > [...]
> >> +       /*
> >> +        * An access is granted if, for each policy layer, at least on=
e rule
> >> +        * encountered on the pathwalk grants the access, regardless o=
f their
> >> +        * position in the layer stack.  We must then check not-yet-se=
en layers
> >> +        * for each inode, from the last one added to the first one.
> >> +        */
> >> +       for (i =3D 0; i < rule->num_layers; i++) {
> >> +               const struct landlock_layer *const layer =3D &rule->la=
yers[i];
> >> +               const u64 layer_level =3D BIT_ULL(layer->level - 1);
> >> +
> >> +               if (!(layer_level & *layer_mask))
> >> +                       continue;
> >> +               if ((layer->access & access_request) !=3D access_reque=
st)
> >> +                       return false;
> >> +               *layer_mask &=3D ~layer_level;
> >
> > Hmm... shouldn't the last 5 lines be replaced by the following?
> >
> > if ((layer->access & access_request) =3D=3D access_request)
> >     *layer_mask &=3D ~layer_level;
> >
> > And then, since this function would always return true, you could
> > change its return type to "void".
> >
> >
> > As far as I can tell, the current version will still, if a ruleset
> > looks like this:
> >
> > /usr read+write
> > /usr/lib/ read
> >
> > reject write access to /usr/lib, right?
>
> If these two rules are from different layers, then yes it would work as
> intended. However, if these rules are from the same layer the path walk
> will not stop at /usr/lib but go down to /usr, which grants write
> access.

I don't see why the code would do what you're saying it does. And an
experiment seems to confirm what I said; I checked out landlock-v26,
and the behavior I get is:

user@vm:~/landlock$ dd if=3D/dev/null of=3D/tmp/aaa
0+0 records in
0+0 records out
0 bytes copied, 0.00106365 s, 0.0 kB/s
user@vm:~/landlock$ LL_FS_RO=3D'/lib' LL_FS_RW=3D'/' ./sandboxer dd
if=3D/dev/null of=3D/tmp/aaa
0+0 records in
0+0 records out
0 bytes copied, 0.000491814 s, 0.0 kB/s
user@vm:~/landlock$ LL_FS_RO=3D'/tmp' LL_FS_RW=3D'/' ./sandboxer dd
if=3D/dev/null of=3D/tmp/aaa
dd: failed to open '/tmp/aaa': Permission denied
user@vm:~/landlock$

Granting read access to /tmp prevents writing to it, even though write
access was granted to /.