Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1030319AbWILR60 (ORCPT ); Tue, 12 Sep 2006 13:58:26 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1030322AbWILR6Z (ORCPT ); Tue, 12 Sep 2006 13:58:25 -0400 Received: from e32.co.us.ibm.com ([32.97.110.150]:17566 "EHLO e32.co.us.ibm.com") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1030319AbWILR6L (ORCPT ); Tue, 12 Sep 2006 13:58:11 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 6/7] SLIM: debug output From: Kylene Jo Hall To: linux-kernel , LSM ML Cc: Dave Safford , Mimi Zohar , Serge Hallyn , akpm@osdl.org Content-Type: text/plain Date: Tue, 12 Sep 2006 10:58:05 -0700 Message-Id: <1158083885.18137.17.camel@localhost.localdomain> Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Evolution 2.0.4 (2.0.4-7) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 26437 Lines: 831 This patch contains all the necessary pieces to add debugging output to SLIM. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Kylene Hall --- security/slim/slim.h | 15 + security/slim/slm_main.c | 356 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- security/slim/slm_secfs.c | 103 ++++++++++ 3 files changed, 429 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-) --- linux-2.6.18-rc1-dbg/security/slim/slim.h 2006-07-21 15:36:52.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.18-rc1-dbg/security/slim/slim.h 2006-07-21 15:35:21.000000000 -0500 @@ -100,3 +100,18 @@ extern int slm_init_config(void); extern __init int slm_init_secfs(void); extern __exit void slm_cleanup_secfs(void); + +extern __init int slm_init_debugfs(void); +extern __exit void slm_cleanup_debugfs(void); + +extern unsigned int slm_debug; +enum slm_debug_level { + SLM_BASE = 1, + SLM_INTEGRITY = 2, + SLM_VERBOSE = 8, +}; + +#undef dprintk +#define dprintk(level, format, a...) \ + if (slm_debug & level) \ + printk(KERN_INFO format, ##a) --- linux-test/security/slim/slm_secfs.c 2006-09-06 11:14:07.000000000 -0700 +++ linux-test/security/slim/slm_secfs.c 2006-09-06 11:19:20.000000000 -0700 @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ #include "slim.h" static struct dentry *slim_sec_dir, *slim_level; +static struct dentry *slim_debug_dir, *slim_integrity, *slim_verbose; static ssize_t slm_read_level(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t buflen, loff_t *ppos) @@ -42,10 +44,76 @@ static ssize_t slm_read_level(struct fil return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, buflen, ppos, data, len); } +static int slm_open_debug(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + if (inode->u.generic_ip) + file->private_data = inode->u.generic_ip; + return 0; +} + +static ssize_t slm_read_debug(struct file *file, char __user * buf, + size_t buflen, loff_t * ppos) +{ + ssize_t len = 0; + enum slm_debug_level type = (enum slm_debug_level)file->private_data; + char *page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); + + if (!page) + return -ENOMEM; + + switch(type) { + case SLM_INTEGRITY: + len = sprintf(page, "slm_debug: integrity %s\n", + ((slm_debug & SLM_INTEGRITY) == SLM_INTEGRITY) + ? "ON" : "OFF"); + break; + case SLM_VERBOSE: + len = sprintf(page, "evm_debug: verbose %s\n", + ((slm_debug & SLM_VERBOSE) == SLM_VERBOSE) + ? "ON" : "OFF"); + break; + default: + break; + } + len = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, buflen, ppos, page, len); + free_page((unsigned long)page); + return len; +} + +static ssize_t slm_write_debug(struct file *file, const char __user * buf, + size_t buflen, loff_t * ppos) +{ + char flag; + enum slm_debug_level type = (enum slm_debug_level)file->private_data; + + if (copy_from_user(&flag, buf, 1)) + return -EFAULT; + + switch(type) { + case SLM_INTEGRITY: + slm_debug = (flag == '0') ? slm_debug & ~SLM_INTEGRITY : + slm_debug | SLM_INTEGRITY; + break; + case SLM_VERBOSE: + slm_debug = (flag == '0') ? slm_debug & ~SLM_VERBOSE : + slm_debug | SLM_VERBOSE; + break; + default: + break; + } + return buflen; +} + static struct file_operations slm_level_ops = { .read = slm_read_level, }; +static struct file_operations slm_debug_ops = { + .read = slm_read_debug, + .write = slm_write_debug, + .open = slm_open_debug, +}; + int __init slm_init_secfs(void) { if (!slim_enabled) @@ -65,9 +133,45 @@ int __init slm_init_secfs(void) __initcall(slm_init_secfs); +int __init slm_init_debugfs(void) +{ + if (!slim_enabled) + return 0; + + slim_debug_dir = debugfs_create_dir("slim", NULL); + if (!slim_debug_dir || IS_ERR(slim_debug_dir)) + return -EFAULT; + + slim_integrity = debugfs_create_file("integrity", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, + slim_debug_dir, (void *)SLM_INTEGRITY, + &slm_debug_ops); + if (!slim_integrity || IS_ERR(slim_integrity)) + goto out_del_debugdir; + slim_verbose = debugfs_create_file("verbose", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, + slim_debug_dir, (void *)SLM_VERBOSE, + &slm_debug_ops); + if (!slim_verbose || IS_ERR(slim_verbose)) + goto out_del_integrity; + return 0; + +out_del_integrity: + debugfs_remove(slim_integrity); +out_del_debugdir: + debugfs_remove(slim_debug_dir); + return -EFAULT; +} + +__initcall(slm_init_debugfs); + void __exit slm_cleanup_secfs(void) { securityfs_remove(slim_level); securityfs_remove(slim_sec_dir); } +void __exit slm_cleanup_debugfs(void) +{ + debugfs_remove(slim_verbose); + debugfs_remove(slim_integrity); + debugfs_remove(slim_debug_dir); +} --- linux-test/security/slim/slm_main.c 2006-09-06 10:46:22.000000000 -0700 +++ linux-test/security/slim/slm_main.c 2006-09-06 11:19:32.000000000 -0700 @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ #include "slim.h" +unsigned int slm_debug = SLM_BASE; #define XATTR_NAME "security.slim.level" #define ZERO_STR "0" @@ -121,8 +122,13 @@ static inline int mark_has_file_wperm(st isec = inode->i_security; spin_lock(&isec->lock); - if (is_lower_integrity(cur_level, &isec->level)) + if (is_lower_integrity(cur_level, &isec->level)) { rc = 1; + if (file->f_dentry->d_name.name) + dprintk(SLM_BASE, "pid %d - has write perm " + "for %s\n", current->pid, + file->f_dentry->d_name.name); + } spin_unlock(&isec->lock); return rc; } @@ -174,11 +180,18 @@ static inline void do_revoke_mmap_wperm( unsigned long start = mpnt->vm_start; unsigned long end = mpnt->vm_end; size_t len = end - start; + struct dentry *dentry = mpnt->vm_file->f_dentry; if ((mpnt->vm_flags & (VM_WRITE | VM_MAYWRITE)) && (mpnt->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) - && (cur_level->iac_level < isec->level.iac_level)) - do_mprotect(start, len, PROT_READ); + && (cur_level->iac_level < isec->level.iac_level)) { + dprintk(SLM_BASE, + "%s: pid %d - revoking write" + " perm for %s\n", __FUNCTION__, + current->pid, dentry->d_name.name); + if (do_mprotect(start, len, PROT_READ) < 0) + dprintk(SLM_BASE, "do_mprotect failed"); + } } /* @@ -305,11 +318,22 @@ static int slm_get_xattr(struct dentry * rc = integrity_verify_metadata(dentry, XATTR_NAME, &xattr_value, &xattr_len, status); - if (rc >=0 && *status == INTEGRITY_PASS && xattr_value) { + if (rc < 0 && rc != -EOPNOTSUPP) { + dprintk(SLM_BASE, + "%s integrity_verify_metadata failed " + "(rc: %d - status: %d)\n", + dentry->d_name.name, rc, *status); + + } else if (rc >=0 && *status == INTEGRITY_PASS && xattr_value) { rc = slm_parse_xattr(xattr_value, xattr_len, level); kfree(xattr_value); - if (rc == 0 && level->iac_level != SLM_IAC_UNTRUSTED) + if (rc == 0 && level->iac_level != SLM_IAC_UNTRUSTED) { rc = integrity_verify_data(dentry, status); + if ((rc < 0) || (*status != INTEGRITY_PASS)) + dprintk(SLM_BASE, "%s integrity_verify_data failed " + " (rc: %d status: %d)\n", dentry->d_name.name, + rc, *status); + } } return rc; } @@ -348,9 +372,12 @@ static void update_sock_level(struct den int rc, status = 0; rc = slm_get_xattr(dentry, level, &status); - if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) + if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) { + dprintk(SLM_INTEGRITY, "%s:%s - slm_get_xattr " + "not supported pid %d\n", __FUNCTION__, + dentry->d_name.name, current->pid); set_level_exempt(level); - else + } else set_level_tsec_read(level, cur_tsec); } @@ -373,6 +400,8 @@ static void update_level(struct dentry * switch(status) { case INTEGRITY_FAIL: case INTEGRITY_NOLABEL: + dprintk(SLM_INTEGRITY, "%s: %s FAIL/NOLABEL (%d)\n", + __FUNCTION__, dentry->d_name.name, rc); set_level_untrusted(level); break; } @@ -417,6 +446,8 @@ static void slm_get_level(struct dentry spin_lock(&isec->lock); memcpy(level, &isec->level, sizeof(struct slm_file_xattr)); spin_unlock(&isec->lock); + dprintk(SLM_VERBOSE, "%s: %s level %d \n", __FUNCTION__, + dentry->d_name.name, level->iac_level); return; } @@ -445,6 +476,9 @@ static struct slm_tsec_data *slm_init_ta return NULL; tsec->lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED; if (!cur_tsec) { + dprintk(SLM_VERBOSE, + "%s: pid %d current->pid %d cur_tsec\n", + __FUNCTION__, tsk->pid, current->pid); tsec->iac_r = SLM_IAC_HIGHEST - 1; tsec->iac_wx = SLM_IAC_HIGHEST - 1; } else @@ -481,7 +515,10 @@ static int is_iac_greater_than_or_exempt * Permit process to read file of equal or greater integrity * otherwise, demote the process. */ -static int enforce_integrity_read(struct slm_file_xattr *level) +static int enforce_integrity_read(struct slm_file_xattr *level, + const unsigned char *name, + struct task_struct *parent_tsk, + struct slm_tsec_data *parent_tsec) { struct slm_tsec_data *cur_tsec = current->security; int rc = 0; @@ -491,10 +528,31 @@ static int enforce_integrity_read(struct rc = has_file_wperm(level); if (atomic_read(¤t->mm->mm_users) != 1) rc = 1; - if (rc) + if (rc) { + dprintk(SLM_BASE, "ppid %d(%s p=%d-%s) " + " pid %d(%s p=%d-%s) can't revoke, not demoting\n", + parent_tsk->pid, parent_tsk->comm, + parent_tsec->iac_r, + (parent_tsec->iac_wx != parent_tsec->iac_r) + ? "GUARD" : slm_iac_str[parent_tsec-> iac_r], + current->pid, current->comm, + cur_tsec->iac_r, (cur_tsec->iac_wx != cur_tsec->iac_r) + ? "GUARD" : slm_iac_str[cur_tsec->iac_r]); spin_unlock(&cur_tsec->lock); - else { + } else { /* Reading lower integrity, demote process */ + dprintk(SLM_BASE, "ppid %d(%s p=%d-%s) " + " pid %d(%s p=%d-%s) demoting integrity to" + " iac=%d-%s(%s)\n", + parent_tsk->pid, parent_tsk->comm, + parent_tsec->iac_r, + (parent_tsec->iac_wx != parent_tsec->iac_r) + ? "GUARD" : slm_iac_str[parent_tsec-> iac_r], + current->pid, current->comm, + cur_tsec->iac_r, (cur_tsec->iac_wx != cur_tsec->iac_r) + ? "GUARD" : slm_iac_str[cur_tsec->iac_r], + level->iac_level, slm_iac_str[level->iac_level], name); + /* Even in the case of a integrity guard process. */ cur_tsec->iac_r = level->iac_level; cur_tsec->iac_wx = level->iac_level; @@ -507,42 +565,82 @@ static int enforce_integrity_read(struct return 0; } -static int do_task_may_read(struct slm_file_xattr *level) +static int do_task_may_read(struct slm_file_xattr *level, + const unsigned char *name, + struct task_struct *parent_tsk, + struct slm_tsec_data *parent_tsec) { - return enforce_integrity_read(level); + return enforce_integrity_read(level, name, parent_tsk, parent_tsec); } /* * enforce: IWXAC(process) >= IAC(object) * Permit process to write a file of equal or lesser integrity. */ -static int enforce_integrity_write(struct slm_file_xattr *level) +static int enforce_integrity_write(struct slm_file_xattr *level, + const unsigned char *name, + struct task_struct *parent_tsk, + struct slm_tsec_data *parent_tsec) { struct slm_tsec_data *cur_tsec = current->security; int rc = 0; spin_lock(&cur_tsec->lock); if (!(is_iac_greater_than_or_exempt(level, cur_tsec->iac_wx) - || (level->iac_level == SLM_IAC_NOTDEFINED))) + || (level->iac_level == SLM_IAC_NOTDEFINED))) { /* can't write higher integrity */ + dprintk(SLM_BASE, "ppid %d(%s p=%d-%s) " + "pid %d(%s p=%d-%s) can't write higher " + "integrity iac=%d-%s(%s)\n", + parent_tsk->pid, parent_tsk->comm, + parent_tsec->iac_wx, + (parent_tsec->iac_wx != parent_tsec->iac_r) + ? "GUARD" : slm_iac_str[parent_tsec-> + iac_wx], + current->pid, current->comm, + cur_tsec->iac_wx, (cur_tsec->iac_wx != cur_tsec->iac_r) + ? "GUARD" : slm_iac_str[cur_tsec->iac_wx], + level->iac_level, slm_iac_str[level->iac_level], name); rc = -EACCES; + } spin_unlock(&cur_tsec->lock); return rc; } -static int do_task_may_write(struct slm_file_xattr *level) +static int do_task_may_write(struct slm_file_xattr *level, + const unsigned char *name, + struct task_struct *parent_tsk, + struct slm_tsec_data *parent_tsec) { - return enforce_integrity_write(level); + return enforce_integrity_write(level, name, parent_tsk, parent_tsec); } -static int slm_set_taskperm(int mask, struct slm_file_xattr *level) +static int slm_set_taskperm(int mask, struct slm_file_xattr *level, + const unsigned char *name) { + struct task_struct *parent_tsk = current->parent, new_tsk; + struct slm_tsec_data *parent_tsec = NULL, new_tsec; int rc = 0; + if (parent_tsk) + parent_tsec = parent_tsk->security; + else { + printk(KERN_INFO + "%s: current pid %d: parent_tsk is null\n", + __FUNCTION__, current->pid); + memset(&new_tsk, 0, sizeof(struct task_struct)); + parent_tsk = &new_tsk; + } + + if (!parent_tsec) { + memset(&new_tsec, 0, sizeof(struct slm_tsec_data)); + parent_tsec = &new_tsec; + } + if (mask & MAY_READ) - rc = do_task_may_read(level); + rc = do_task_may_read(level, name, parent_tsk, parent_tsec); if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) || (mask & MAY_APPEND)) - rc |= do_task_may_write(level); + rc |= do_task_may_write(level, name, parent_tsk, parent_tsec); return rc; } @@ -562,15 +660,21 @@ static int slm_file_permission(struct fi return 0; } -static int is_untrusted_blk_access(struct inode *inode) +static int is_untrusted_blk_access(struct inode *inode, + const unsigned char *fname) { struct slm_tsec_data *cur_tsec = current->security; int rc = 0; spin_lock(&cur_tsec->lock); if (cur_tsec && (cur_tsec->iac_wx == SLM_IAC_UNTRUSTED) - && S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode)) + && S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode)) { + dprintk(SLM_BASE, "pid %d(%s p=%d-%s) deny access %s\n", + current->pid, current->comm, + cur_tsec->iac_wx, (cur_tsec->iac_wx != cur_tsec->iac_r) + ? "GUARD" : slm_iac_str[cur_tsec->iac_wx], fname); rc = 1; + } spin_unlock(&cur_tsec->lock); return rc; } @@ -583,8 +687,11 @@ static int is_untrusted_blk_access(struc static int slm_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, struct nameidata *nd) { + char *path = NULL; + const unsigned char *fname = NULL; struct dentry *dentry = NULL; struct slm_file_xattr level; + int rc = 0; if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) && (mask & MAY_WRITE)) return 0; @@ -593,16 +700,33 @@ static int slm_inode_permission(struct i if (!dentry) return 0; - if (is_untrusted_blk_access(inode)) - return -EPERM; + if (nd) { /* preferably use fullname */ + path = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); + if (path) + fname = d_path(nd->dentry, nd->mnt, path, PAGE_SIZE); + } + + if (!fname) /* no choice, use short name */ + fname = (!dentry->d_name.name) ? dentry->d_iname : + dentry->d_name.name; + + if (is_untrusted_blk_access(inode, fname)) { + rc = -EPERM; + goto out; + } slm_get_level(dentry, &level); /* measure all SYSTEM level integrity objects */ if (level.iac_level == SLM_IAC_SYSTEM) - integrity_measure(dentry, NULL, mask); + integrity_measure(dentry, fname, mask); - return slm_set_taskperm(mask, &level); + rc = slm_set_taskperm(mask, &level, fname); + +out: + if (path) + free_page((unsigned long)path); + return rc; } /* @@ -616,7 +740,7 @@ static int slm_inode_unlink(struct inode return 0; slm_get_level(dentry, &level); - return slm_set_taskperm(MAY_WRITE, &level); + return slm_set_taskperm(MAY_WRITE, &level, dentry->d_name.name); } static void slm_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode) @@ -644,8 +768,15 @@ static int slm_inode_create(struct inode */ spin_lock(&cur_tsec->lock); spin_lock(&parent_isec->lock); - if (!is_iac_greater_than_or_exempt(parent_level, cur_tsec->iac_wx)) + if (!is_iac_greater_than_or_exempt(parent_level, cur_tsec->iac_wx)) { + dprintk(SLM_INTEGRITY, "%s: prohibit current %s level " + "process writing into %s (%s level directory)\n", + __FUNCTION__, slm_iac_str[cur_tsec->iac_wx], + (!dentry->d_name.name) + ? " " : (char *)dentry->d_name.name, + slm_iac_str[parent_level->iac_level]); rc = -EPERM; + } spin_unlock(&parent_isec->lock); spin_unlock(&cur_tsec->lock); return rc; @@ -713,6 +844,8 @@ static int slm_inode_init_security(struc spin_lock(&parent_isec->lock); memcpy(&level, &parent_isec->level, sizeof(struct slm_file_xattr)); + dprintk(SLM_VERBOSE, "%s: level %d\n", __FUNCTION__, + parent_isec->level.iac_level); spin_unlock(&parent_isec->lock); } @@ -793,9 +926,17 @@ static int slm_inode_mkdir(struct inode spin_lock(&cur_tsec->lock); spin_lock(&parent_isec->lock); - if (cur_tsec->iac_wx < parent_level->iac_level - && parent_level->iac_level == SLM_IAC_SYSTEM) - rc = -EACCES; + if (cur_tsec->iac_wx < parent_level->iac_level) { + if (parent_level->iac_level == SLM_IAC_SYSTEM) + rc = -EACCES; + else + dprintk(SLM_VERBOSE, "%s:ppid %d (%s) %s - creating" + " lower integrity directory, than parent\n", + __FUNCTION__, current->pid, current->comm, + (!dentry->d_name.name) + ? "" : (char *)dentry->d_name.name); + + } spin_unlock(&parent_isec->lock); spin_unlock(&cur_tsec->lock); return rc; @@ -817,8 +958,13 @@ static int slm_inode_rename(struct inode slm_get_level(parent_dentry, &parent_level); dput(parent_dentry); - if (is_lower_integrity(&old_level, &parent_level)) + if (is_lower_integrity(&old_level, &parent_level)) { + dprintk(SLM_BASE, "%s: prohibit rename of %s (low" + " integrity) into %s (higher level directory)\n", + __FUNCTION__, old_dentry->d_name.name, + parent_dentry->d_name.name); return -EPERM; + } return 0; } @@ -840,6 +986,10 @@ int slm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *de if (!value) return -EINVAL; + dprintk(SLM_VERBOSE, "%s: name %s value %s process:iac_r %s " + "iac_wx %s\n", __FUNCTION__, name, (char *)value, + slm_iac_str[cur_tsec->iac_r], slm_iac_str[cur_tsec->iac_wx]); + spin_lock(&cur_tsec->lock); iac = cur_tsec->iac_wx; spin_unlock(&cur_tsec->lock); @@ -950,9 +1100,18 @@ int slm_socket_create(int family, int ty if (atomic_read(¤t->mm->mm_users) != 1) rc = 1; if (rc) { + dprintk(SLM_BASE, + "%s: ppid %d pid %d can't revoke, refusing socket\n", + __FUNCTION__, parent_tsk->pid, current->pid); spin_unlock(&cur_tsec->lock); return -EPERM; } else { + dprintk(SLM_INTEGRITY, + "%s: ppid %d pid %d demoting " + "family %d type %d protocol %d kern %d" + " to untrusted.\n", __FUNCTION__, + parent_tsk->pid, current->pid, family, + type, protocol, kern); cur_tsec->iac_r = SLM_IAC_UNTRUSTED; cur_tsec->iac_wx = SLM_IAC_UNTRUSTED; spin_unlock(&cur_tsec->lock); @@ -1039,16 +1198,37 @@ static int slm_task_post_setuid(uid_t ol if (cur_tsec && flags == LSM_SETID_ID) { /*set process to USER level integrity for everything but root */ + dprintk(SLM_VERBOSE, "ruid %d euid %d suid %d " + "cur: uid %d euid %d suid %d\n", + old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid, + current->uid, current->euid, current->suid); spin_lock(&cur_tsec->lock); if ((cur_tsec->iac_r == cur_tsec->iac_wx) - && (cur_tsec->iac_r == SLM_IAC_UNTRUSTED)); - else if (current->suid != 0) { + && (cur_tsec->iac_r == SLM_IAC_UNTRUSTED)) { + dprintk(SLM_INTEGRITY, + "Integrity: pid %d iac_r %d " + " iac_wx %d remains UNTRUSTED\n", + current->pid, cur_tsec->iac_r, + cur_tsec->iac_wx); + } else if (current->suid != 0) { + dprintk(SLM_INTEGRITY, "setting: pid %d iac_r %d " + " iac_wx %d to USER\n", + current->pid, cur_tsec->iac_r, + cur_tsec->iac_wx); cur_tsec->iac_r = SLM_IAC_USER; cur_tsec->iac_wx = SLM_IAC_USER; } else if ((current->uid == 0) && (old_ruid != 0)) { + dprintk(SLM_INTEGRITY, "setting: pid %d iac_r %d " + " iac_wx %d to SYSTEM\n", + current->pid, cur_tsec->iac_r, + cur_tsec->iac_wx); cur_tsec->iac_r = SLM_IAC_SYSTEM; cur_tsec->iac_wx = SLM_IAC_SYSTEM; - } + } else + dprintk(SLM_INTEGRITY, "%s: pid %d iac_r %d " + " iac_wx %d \n", __FUNCTION__, + current->pid, cur_tsec->iac_r, + cur_tsec->iac_wx); spin_unlock(&cur_tsec->lock); } return 0; @@ -1057,6 +1237,7 @@ static int slm_task_post_setuid(uid_t ol static inline int slm_setprocattr(struct task_struct *tsk, char *name, void *value, size_t size) { + dprintk(SLM_BASE, "%s: %s \n", __FUNCTION__, name); return -EACCES; } @@ -1096,16 +1277,60 @@ static int enforce_integrity_execute(str int rc = 0; spin_lock(&cur_tsec->lock); - if (is_iac_less_than_or_exempt(level, cur_tsec->iac_wx)) + if (is_iac_less_than_or_exempt(level, cur_tsec->iac_wx)) { + dprintk(SLM_INTEGRITY, + "%s: ppid %d(%s %d-%s) pid %d(%s %d-%s)" + " %s executing\n", + __FUNCTION__, parent_tsk->pid, + parent_tsk->comm, + (!parent_tsec) ? 0 : parent_tsec->iac_wx, + (parent_tsec->iac_wx != parent_tsec->iac_r) + ? "GUARD" : slm_iac_str[parent_tsec-> + iac_wx], + current->pid, current->comm, + cur_tsec->iac_wx, + (cur_tsec->iac_wx != cur_tsec->iac_r) + ? "GUARD" : slm_iac_str[cur_tsec->iac_wx], + bprm->filename); + /* Being a guard process is not inherited */ cur_tsec->iac_r = cur_tsec->iac_wx; - else { + } else { rc = has_file_wperm(level); if (atomic_read(¤t->mm->mm_users) != 1) rc = 1; - if (rc) + if (rc) { + dprintk(SLM_BASE, + "%s: ppid %d(%s %d-%s) pid %d(%s %d-%s)" + " %s can't revoke, deny execution\n", + __FUNCTION__, parent_tsk->pid, + parent_tsk->comm, parent_tsec->iac_wx, + (parent_tsec->iac_wx != parent_tsec->iac_r) + ? "GUARD" : slm_iac_str[parent_tsec-> + iac_wx], + current->pid, current->comm, + cur_tsec->iac_wx, + (cur_tsec->iac_wx != cur_tsec->iac_r) + ? "GUARD" : slm_iac_str[cur_tsec->iac_wx], + bprm->filename); spin_unlock(&cur_tsec->lock); - else { + } else { + dprintk(SLM_BASE, + "%s: ppid %d(%s %d-%s) pid %d(%s %d-%s)" + " %s executing, demoting integrity to " + " iac=%d-%s\n", + __FUNCTION__, parent_tsk->pid, + parent_tsk->comm, parent_tsec->iac_wx, + (parent_tsec->iac_wx != parent_tsec->iac_r) + ? "GUARD" : slm_iac_str[parent_tsec-> + iac_wx], + current->pid, current->comm, + cur_tsec->iac_wx, + (cur_tsec->iac_wx != cur_tsec->iac_r) + ? "GUARD" : slm_iac_str[cur_tsec->iac_wx], + bprm->filename, level->iac_level, + slm_iac_str[level->iac_level]); + cur_tsec->iac_r = level->iac_level; cur_tsec->iac_wx = level->iac_level; spin_unlock(&cur_tsec->lock); @@ -1121,9 +1346,25 @@ static void enforce_guard_integrity_exec struct slm_file_xattr *level, struct slm_tsec_data *cur_tsec) { + struct task_struct *parent_tsk = current->parent; + if ((strcmp(bprm->filename, bprm->interp) != 0) - && (level->guard.unlimited)) + && (level->guard.unlimited)) { + dprintk(SLM_INTEGRITY, "%s:pid %d %s prohibiting " + "script from being an unlimited guard\n", + __FUNCTION__, current->pid, bprm->filename); level->guard.unlimited = 0; + } + + dprintk(SLM_INTEGRITY, + "%s: ppid %d pid %d %s (integrity guard)" + "cur: r %s wx %s new: r %s wx %s %s\n", + __FUNCTION__, parent_tsk->pid, current->pid, + bprm->filename, slm_iac_str[cur_tsec->iac_r], + slm_iac_str[cur_tsec->iac_wx], + slm_iac_str[level->guard.iac_r], + slm_iac_str[level->guard.iac_wx], + (level->guard.unlimited ? "unlimited" : "limited")); spin_lock(&cur_tsec->lock); if (level->guard.unlimited) { @@ -1153,7 +1394,13 @@ static int slm_bprm_check_security(struc /* Special case interpreters */ spin_lock(&cur_tsec->lock); if (strcmp(bprm->filename, bprm->interp) != 0) { + dprintk(SLM_INTEGRITY, + "%s: executing %s (interp: %s)\n", + __FUNCTION__, bprm->filename, bprm->interp); if (!cur_tsec->script_dentry) { + dprintk(SLM_INTEGRITY, + "%s: NULL script_dentry %s\n", + __FUNCTION__, bprm->filename); spin_unlock(&cur_tsec->lock); return 0; } else @@ -1165,6 +1412,9 @@ static int slm_bprm_check_security(struc spin_unlock(&cur_tsec->lock); slm_get_level(dentry, &level); + dprintk(SLM_INTEGRITY, "%s: %s level iac %d - %s\n", + __FUNCTION__, bprm->filename, level.iac_level, + slm_iac_str[level.iac_level]); /* slm_inode_permission measured all SYSTEM level integrity objects */ if (level.iac_level != SLM_IAC_SYSTEM) @@ -1177,10 +1427,17 @@ static int slm_bprm_check_security(struc switch(status) { case INTEGRITY_FAIL: - if (!is_kernel_thread(current)) + if (!is_kernel_thread(current)) { + dprintk(SLM_BASE, + "%s: %s (Integrity status: FAIL)\n", + __FUNCTION__, bprm->filename); return -EACCES; + } break; case INTEGRITY_NOLABEL: + dprintk(SLM_BASE, + "%s: %s (Integrity status: NOLABEL)\n", + __FUNCTION__, bprm->filename); level.iac_level = SLM_IAC_UNTRUSTED; } @@ -1215,9 +1472,12 @@ static inline int slm_capable(struct tas /* Derived from include/linux/sched.h:capable. */ if (cap_raised(tsk->cap_effective, cap)) { spin_lock(&tsec->lock); - if (tsec->iac_wx == SLM_IAC_UNTRUSTED && - cap == CAP_SYS_ADMIN) - rc = -EACCES; + if (tsec->iac_wx == SLM_IAC_UNTRUSTED) { + dprintk(SLM_VERBOSE, "%s: pid %d %s requested cap %d\n", + __FUNCTION__, tsk->pid, tsk->comm, cap); + if (cap == CAP_SYS_ADMIN) + rc = -EACCES; + } spin_unlock(&tsec->lock); return rc; } @@ -1255,6 +1515,8 @@ static int slm_shm_alloc_security(struct set_level_tsec_write(&isec->level, cur_tsec); spin_unlock(&cur_tsec->lock); perm->security = isec; + dprintk(SLM_INTEGRITY, "%s: level %d \n", __FUNCTION__, + isec->level.iac_level); return 0; } @@ -1290,7 +1552,7 @@ static int slm_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_k inode = dentry->d_inode; spin_lock(&perm_isec->lock); - rc = slm_set_taskperm(MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE, &perm_isec->level); + rc = slm_set_taskperm(MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE, &perm_isec->level, NULL); spin_unlock(&perm_isec->lock); return rc; } @@ -1314,8 +1576,12 @@ static int slm_shm_shmat(struct shmid_ke mask |= MAY_WRITE; spin_lock(&perm_isec->lock); - rc = slm_set_taskperm(mask, &perm_isec->level); + rc = slm_set_taskperm(mask, &perm_isec->level, NULL); + dprintk(SLM_INTEGRITY, + "%s: %d mask %d level %d replace %d\n", + __FUNCTION__, shp->id, mask, + perm_isec->level.iac_level, isec->level.iac_level); spin_lock(&isec->lock); memcpy(&isec->level, &perm_isec->level, sizeof(struct slm_file_xattr)); spin_unlock(&perm_isec->lock); - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/