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From:   Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@gmail.com>
To:     LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, io-uring@vger.kernel.org,
        Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
        Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>,
        linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc:     Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
        Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>,
        "Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
        Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
        Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v3 7/8] Move RLIMIT_NPROC check to the place where we increment the counter
Date:   Fri, 15 Jan 2021 15:57:28 +0100
Message-Id: <0829877fe0381f10d927bb94548021224e72f3c9.1610722474.git.gladkov.alexey@gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <cover.1610722473.git.gladkov.alexey@gmail.com>
References: <cover.1610722473.git.gladkov.alexey@gmail.com>
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After calling set_user(), we always have to call commit_creds() to apply
new credentials upon the current task. There is no need to separate
limit check and counter incrementing.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@gmail.com>
---
 kernel/cred.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++-----
 kernel/sys.c  | 13 -------------
 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index c43e30407d22..991c43559ee8 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -487,14 +487,26 @@ int commit_creds(struct cred *new)
 	if (!gid_eq(new->fsgid, old->fsgid))
 		key_fsgid_changed(new);
 
-	/* do it
-	 * RLIMIT_NPROC limits on user->processes have already been checked
-	 * in set_user().
-	 */
 	alter_cred_subscribers(new, 2);
 	if (new->user != old->user || new->user_ns != old->user_ns) {
+		bool overlimit;
+
 		set_cred_ucounts(new, new->user_ns, new->euid);
-		inc_rlimit_ucounts(new->ucounts, UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, 1);
+
+		overlimit = inc_rlimit_ucounts_and_test(new->ucounts, UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC,
+				1, rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC));
+
+		/*
+		 * We don't fail in case of NPROC limit excess here because too many
+		 * poorly written programs don't check set*uid() return code, assuming
+		 * it never fails if called by root.  We may still enforce NPROC limit
+		 * for programs doing set*uid()+execve() by harmlessly deferring the
+		 * failure to the execve() stage.
+		 */
+		if (overlimit && new->user != INIT_USER)
+			current->flags |= PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED;
+		else
+			current->flags &= ~PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED;
 	}
 	rcu_assign_pointer(task->real_cred, new);
 	rcu_assign_pointer(task->cred, new);
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index c2734ab9474e..180c4e06064f 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -467,19 +467,6 @@ static int set_user(struct cred *new)
 	if (!new_user)
 		return -EAGAIN;
 
-	/*
-	 * We don't fail in case of NPROC limit excess here because too many
-	 * poorly written programs don't check set*uid() return code, assuming
-	 * it never fails if called by root.  We may still enforce NPROC limit
-	 * for programs doing set*uid()+execve() by harmlessly deferring the
-	 * failure to the execve() stage.
-	 */
-	if (is_ucounts_overlimit(new->ucounts, UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC)) &&
-			new_user != INIT_USER)
-		current->flags |= PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED;
-	else
-		current->flags &= ~PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED;
-
 	free_uid(new->user);
 	new->user = new_user;
 	return 0;
-- 
2.29.2