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From:   Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
To:     "Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc:     linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        "Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
        Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com>
Subject: [PATCH 0/2] capability conversion fixes
Date:   Tue, 19 Jan 2021 17:22:02 +0100
Message-Id: <20210119162204.2081137-1-mszeredi@redhat.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Precedence: bulk

It turns out overlayfs is actually okay wrt. mutliple conversions, because
it uses the right context for lower operations.  I.e. before calling
vfs_{set,get}xattr() on underlying fs, it overrides creds with that of the
mounter, so the current user ns will now match that of
overlay_sb->s_user_ns, meaning that the caps will be converted to just the
right format for the next layer

OTOH ecryptfs, which is the only other one affected by commit 7c03e2cda4a5
("vfs: move cap_convert_nscap() call into vfs_setxattr()") needs to be
fixed up, since it doesn't do the cap override thing that overlayfs does.

I don't have an ecryptfs setup, so untested, but it's a fairly trivial
change.

My other observation was that cap_inode_getsecurity() messes up conversion
of caps in more than one case.  This is independent of the overlayfs user
ns enablement but affects it as well.

Maybe we can revisit the infrastructure improvements we discussed, but I
think these fixes are more appropriate for the current cycle.

Thanks,
Miklos

Miklos Szeredi (2):
  ecryptfs: fix uid translation for setxattr on security.capability
  security.capability: fix conversions on getxattr

 fs/ecryptfs/inode.c  | 10 +++++--
 security/commoncap.c | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
 2 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)

-- 
2.26.2