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Reply-To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Date:   Fri, 22 Jan 2021 12:21:41 -0800
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Subject: [PATCH v3 10/13] KVM: SVM: Move SEV VMCB tracking allocation to sev.c
From:   Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To:     Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc:     Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
        Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
Precedence: bulk

Move the allocation of the SEV VMCB array to sev.c to help pave the way
toward encapsulating SEV enabling wholly within sev.c.

No functional change intended.

Reviewed by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 12 ++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 16 ++++++++--------
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h |  1 +
 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 0c69de022614..55a47a34a0ef 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -1331,6 +1331,18 @@ void sev_hardware_teardown(void)
 	sev_flush_asids();
 }
 
+int sev_cpu_init(struct svm_cpu_data *sd)
+{
+	if (!svm_sev_enabled())
+		return 0;
+
+	sd->sev_vmcbs = kcalloc(max_sev_asid + 1, sizeof(void *), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!sd->sev_vmcbs)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /*
  * Pages used by hardware to hold guest encrypted state must be flushed before
  * returning them to the system.
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 751785b156ab..89b95fb87a0c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -552,22 +552,22 @@ static void svm_cpu_uninit(int cpu)
 static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu)
 {
 	struct svm_cpu_data *sd;
+	int ret;
 
 	sd = kzalloc(sizeof(struct svm_cpu_data), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!sd)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	sd->cpu = cpu;
 	sd->save_area = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!sd->save_area)
+	if (!sd->save_area) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
 		goto free_cpu_data;
+	}
 	clear_page(page_address(sd->save_area));
 
-	if (svm_sev_enabled()) {
-		sd->sev_vmcbs = kcalloc(max_sev_asid + 1, sizeof(void *),
-					GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (!sd->sev_vmcbs)
-			goto free_save_area;
-	}
+	ret = sev_cpu_init(sd);
+	if (ret)
+		goto free_save_area;
 
 	per_cpu(svm_data, cpu) = sd;
 
@@ -577,7 +577,7 @@ static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu)
 	__free_page(sd->save_area);
 free_cpu_data:
 	kfree(sd);
-	return -ENOMEM;
+	return ret;
 
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
index 8e169835f52a..4eb4bab0ca3e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
@@ -583,6 +583,7 @@ int svm_unregister_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm,
 void pre_sev_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int cpu);
 void __init sev_hardware_setup(void);
 void sev_hardware_teardown(void);
+int sev_cpu_init(struct svm_cpu_data *sd);
 void sev_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 int sev_handle_vmgexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
 int sev_es_string_io(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int size, unsigned int port, int in);
-- 
2.30.0.280.ga3ce27912f-goog