Date: Mon, 18 Sep 2006 13:58:50 +0200
From: David Madore <david.madore@ens.fr>
To: Joshua Brindle <method@gentoo.org>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>, Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
       Linux Kernel mailing-list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
       LSM mailing-list <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/4] security: capabilities patch (version 0.4.4), part 3/4: introduce new capabilities
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On Mon, Sep 18, 2006 at 07:46:06AM -0400, Joshua Brindle wrote:
> And that is just practical stuff, there are still problems with
> embedding policy into binaries all over the system in an entirely
> non-analyzable way, and this extends to all capabilities, not just the
> open() one.

Some people prefer the policy to be embedded into binaries all over
the system rather than centralized in one place.  I think it's just a
question of choice: if you don't like this way of doing things, you
don't have to use it, of course (my "cuppabilities" module would be
entirely optional).

Happy hacking,

-- 
     David A. Madore
    (david.madore@ens.fr,
     http://www.madore.org/~david/ )
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